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I. INTRODUCTION
This seminar, convened by the Chief Justice of New South Wales, the
Honourable Sir Leslie Herron, to consider some matters arising from the
promulgation of the 1964 Judges’ Rules, was originally entitled “The
Admissibility of Confessional Statements”. After its preliminary discussions
the Committee decided that its main task should be a review of the police
instructions relating to the interrogation of suspects, and hence the change
of title to “Police Questioning and Confessional Statements”.
The seminar originated in a Conference of Chief Justices of the
Australian States and New Zealand held at Wellington, New Zealand, in
June, 1965, when one of the matters considered was the attitude to be
adopted by the Chief Justices towards the recently promulgated Rules of
the Queen’s Bench Division in England relating to confessional statements.
The question to be determined was whether they favoured adopting the
1964 Judges’ Rules and Administrative Directions to the Police, whether
they should formulate Judges’ Rules different from the English Rules and
different also from the superseded Rules hitherto recognized here, or
whether they should take no action in the matter.
The Conference had come to the conclusion that the Australasian
Judges had no authority to make any such rules and it would therefore be
inappropriate to purport to approve or disapprove of the new English Rules.
The courts here had never regarded compliance or non-compliance with the
English Judges’ Rules as a decisive factor in determining the admissibility of
confessional statements, although they were to some extent guided by the
extent to which police had complied with the spirit of these Rules in the
course of the interrogation. It was, however, for the authorities in charge of
the various police forces to make their own rules for the guidance and good
conduct of their officers.
In his Report of the Conference Sir Leslie said that some practical
considerations followed from these resolutions. If the Full Court sitting as a
Court of Criminal Appeal should in a future judgment declare the principles
applicable to the taking of statements it might take into account some of
the principles set out in the 1964 Judges’ Rules. Since the New South
Wales Police Instructions were based on the superseded English Rules these
might need revision in light of the new Rules, and it would be a matter for
the Attorney General and Law Officers of the Crown to take steps to revise
them and ensure that the police were familiar with the revised matter.
The Chief Justice had in mind the convening of a seminar of Judges,
Magistrates, Crown Prosecutors, members of the Bar, and Crown Ofﬁcers
engaged in criminal work to consider these matters. At a meeting of the
Advisory Committee of the Institute of Criminology held on 20th May,
1965, he proposed from the chair that such a seminar should be held under
the auSpices of that Committee.
  
,4 I/IIrodI/r'limr
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This proposal was adopted with the amendment that the
Commissioner of Police be invited to participate together with such of his
ofﬁcers as he might care to nominate. In accepting the invitation the
Commissioner said that he would welcome the assistance ot‘ such a seminar
in reviewing his administrative instructiOns relating to the conduct of
interrogations by the police, and that he 'was particularly pleased that the
seminar would be under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice. He
nominated the Metropolitan Superintendent and the Senior Police Prosecutor
to participate.
The procedure envisaged was to examine the principles of law
governing the admission of confessional statements from a judicial point of
view; to consider how the law can best be complied with in the varying
circumstances that occur in the investigation of crime; and ﬁnally to assist
the Commissioner in a review of the relevant instructions.
The seminar was convened in May, 1965, and during the ensuing ﬁve
years thirteen meetings of the Committee and ﬁve meetings of a
Subcommittee were held. These resulted in a set of draft instructions for
police ofﬁcers on the conduct of interrogations and the taking of
statements which in July, 1970 were forwarded to the Commissioner with a
recommendation that they replace the existing instructions.
, The Committee had reached agreement on all matters raised except
one — the procedure for dealing with unsigned statements or records of
interview. The question as to whether the person interrogated should receive
a copy of the statement contemporaneously or whether it should be made
available to him only on request and at the discretion of the Commissioner
was one on which members remained ﬁmtly divided.
This question was reopened in November, 1970 following comment
from the Bench in the case of R. v. Dugan in the Court of Criminal Appeal,
and the Committee was reconvened to consider it once again. After two
further meetings members still remained ﬁmrly divided and in the result it
was left to the Police Department itself to resolve the matter.
In June, 1972 the instructions were adopted by the Police Department
with some minor alterations, and in January, 1974, after having been before
the N.S.W. Criminal law Committee, they were integrated into the Police
Instructions.
The report of this seminar is substantially in two main sections: (1) a
brief summary of the proceedings of the Committee over the ﬁve years of
its deliberations; and (2) a resume of the discussions which took place on
particular topics. For convenience, the working papers are included in the
Appendix, and also a list of relevant cases and references.
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II . THE COMMITTEE
The Honourable Sir Leslie Herron, K.B.E., C.M.G., Chief Justice of New
South Wales, Chairman
Mr N. T. W. Allan, M...,V0 Commissioner of the N.S.W. Police Force, and
his nominees:
The Metropolitan Superintendent of Police (Superintendents R.
‘ Waldon, B. Windsor)
The Senior Police- .ProsecutOr (successively, Inspector D. Goode,
Inspector Bush, Superintendent Wright, Superintendent R. H.
Lucas)
Mr J. J. Davoren, Q.C., a member of the New South Wales Barr
Mr W. J. Knight, Q..,C Senior Crown Prosecutor
His Honour Judge A. A. Levine, a Judge of the NS..WDistrict Court and a
Chairman of Quarter Sem'ons
His Honour Judge C. D. Monahan, Chairman of the N.S..W DistrictCourt
Judges and a Chairman of QuarterSessions
Associate-Professor R. P. Roulston, Sydney University Law School
Professor K. O. Shatwell, Challis Professor of Law, Dean of the Faculty of
Law and Director of the Institute of Criminology, Sydney University
Law School
Mr H. A. R. Snelling, Q.C., Solicitor General-for N.S.W.
Mr C. K. Ward, Chairman of the N.S.W. Bench of Stipendiary Magistrates
Research Am‘srants. Miss 0. Wood, Messrs P. G. McGonigal and D. Bennett
Co-opted members.
Representing the NS..W Criminal Investigation Branch (Superintendent
R. A. Lendrum)
Representing the Commonwealth Police Force (Superintendent J.
Davies, Superintendent K. Milte, Inspector J. Aitchison)
Consultants:
Mr R. Sherriff, Chief of the Field Division of the Child Welfare
Department
Mr V. J. Truskett, Assistant Director-General of the Department of
Education -
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Ill. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR
l. Sesn'ons I and 2: Prelim'mary discusn'ons
At the ﬁrst two meetings, which were held on August 5th and
October 18th, 1965, members submitted papers setting out individual
opinions on some matters which were regarded as basic to the work of the
seminar, such as the effectiveness of police control of crime in New South
Wales, whether or not it was thought that existing procedures unduly
hampered the police in their investigation of crime, the balance between the
rights of the individual and the protection of society, and some questions
relating to fairness in interrogations. These papers are included in the
Appendix, and a summary of the opinions expressed is shown below.
(a) The effectiveness of crime control in New South Wales
At that time (i.e. in l965, and before the increase in large-scale
robberies) it was generally thought that the police were well in control, of
crime in this State, although some areas were indicated in which this might
not be so. :- -
Some members thought that organized crime was already sufﬁciently
advanced to call for drastic changes in the law such as a right to detain for
questioning and some restriction of the socalled right of silence. Others
strongly opposed any such move and were of the opinion that although in
any large community there will always be a hard core of experienced
criminals whom the police are unable to ,deal with effectively, to give them
powers to do so might be to introduce an evil greater than the harm to be
averted. This situation might change if gangsterism-became rife' in the
community.
Present police methods appeared to be inadequate to deal with crime
in the ﬁeld of big business, the particular difﬁculty being that there was
nobody to report large scale defaleetions by managements.
. Abortion, gambling and trafﬁc offences were areas in which police
found detection and proof difﬁcult, but it did not seem that this situation
would be inﬂuenced by any changes in the present powers and methods of
investigation and therefore these were not considered to be areas of great
concern to the Committee.
(b) Some police problems in the investigation of crime
The police service in New South Wales is spread over an area of 3,900
square miles, with 500 widely dispersed police stations. The circumstances
in which statements are taken are therefore necessarily very diverse. Owing
to the speed with which events often occur,in practice it is not always easy
. to analyse a situation correctly when a quick decision has to be made.
, Despite training in the law and the rules of evidence a mistake can be made
by a young and inexperienced ofﬁcer which may not only result in an
 Proceedings of the Seminar 17
 
inadmissible statement but may cause him to be held civilly, and sometimes
criminally, responsible for acts subsequently held to be unjustiﬁed in an ex
posto facto judgment by a court as to what was reasonable at the time.
Allegations of police misconduct in the course of an interrogation are
commonly made by the defence merely to lend added weight to a case.
Such criticisms tend to be given great prominence by the news media,
resulting in the undermining of public conﬁdence in the police.
The increasing use of cars in the commission of crimes and of air
travel by criminals has not only increased the difﬁculties of apprehending
offenders but at times produces a situation in which the arresting ofﬁcer
has not sufﬁcient information on which to prefer a charge. There was
discussion of the need for some power to detain the suspect in such cases.
(c) The balance between the rights of the individual and the protection of
society ’
There were considerable differences of opinion as to where the
balance lay between the protection of the rights of the individual and the
protection of society from crime. Some felt that there was a need for
greater protection of individuals against possible misuses of police power,
while others thought that the law had already over-protected the criminal
and that there was now greater need for the protection of individualsand
society against criminal activities and a minimum of restriction on the
skilful and persistent questioning which is essential for the solution of
cnmes.
(d) Fairness in interrogation
On the matter of fairness in interrogation some of the questions set
down for further examination and debate were as follows:
At what stage in a police investigation is the suspect entitled to legal
advice? If he so requests, should questioning be deferred until he has
obtained legal advice?
Where several persons are implicated in the same offence, should the
person interrogated be shown a statement by one of the others implicating
him? Is he entitled to know the evidence against him as and when it arises,
or could this be regarded as an unfair means of breaking down his
defences?
If a juvenile is questioned and asks that his parents should not be
informed, is this a matter for police discretion? If the parents are informed
despite his request, could this be regarded as an infringement of individual
liberty?
What constitutes “proper means of rest and refreshment”? Can it be
argued that the provision of refreshments by the police may have
constituted an inducement to the suspect to make a statement?
s
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Summary by the Chief Justice ' -
Summing up the discussion at these two preliminary meetings of the
Committee, the Chief Justice said:
“Various attitudes have come to light, and there is much to be
said for each of the points of view. I shall just brieﬂy summarize the
way the matter appears to me.
“No matter what rules are made, you will never obtain
convictions from magistrates and juries — who alone decide these
questions of fact — unless the j,uryrnen as bodies of citizens, are
satisfied that the police have acted fairly. In other words, the passing
of Judges’ Rules or Acts of Parliament willnot guarantee that a jury
will accept a policeman’s word; that is a matter of public opinion.
“It seems to me that the ﬁrst thing we must do is to advise the
Police Commissioner to keep reiterating to the Police Force the
necessity for absolute fairness when obtaining confessional statements.
, “The common law has always been that no statement will be
. ‘_ admitted unless it is free and voluntary, and this I think echoes public
‘opinion. It is only bemuse juries are persuaded that generally
speaking, and with only rare exceptions, police treat criminals with
reasonable fairness according to their dues that you can obtain
convictions. In my twenty-ﬁve years on the Bench it has become clear
to me that juries, magstrates and judges are usually prepared to
accept the word of the police when it appears to be fairly given, and
it is only on the odd oceasion, when faith in the police is shaken,
that the position changes.
“It is essential that we establish in the community arrespect for
the word of a police ofﬁcer by seeing to it that they at least do their
very best to abide by certain rules of truth, fair play and the justice
of the oomon.
“To sum up, therefore, I may say that I am not prepared to
advise that Judges’ Rules be passed in this State, and I would be
happy with a rule that a statement must be free and voluntary
coupled with a discretion in the judge not to admit it if, even though
free and voluntary, it would in some way be unfair to admit it.
“If, as has been suggested, there is need for the revision of the
rules of evidence, that is hardly a matter for this Committee, but
should be put before the law Reform Commission. There is much to
be said for this, but less to be said for the proposal to give the police
a power to hold. I know the police have difﬁculties, but it seems like
. the thin end of the wedge: and may cause real trouble, if the police
can hold without cha'rg'ng. I would need a great deal more time to
think about this, and it is rather outside the scope of the present
discussion.
 Proceedings of the Seminar I9
 
“Now that we have this august body together, so representative
as we are of the various facets of the law and its administration, it
would be a pity to go from here without resolving something which
might have its effect on the public mind. Judge Levine’s point is, I
think, a good one — that we should try to set out for the beneﬁt of
police ofﬁcers what the law is on the subject, translating it into
simple, understandable terms. And then, shall we append to that a
series of criteria, or detailed rules, as to investigations by police
ofﬁcers?”
3. Request for restatement of the police instructions
The Commissioner of Police said that he would welcome the course
proposed by the Chief Justice and that he would be particularly grateful to_
have the assistance of the seminar in a review of his instructions to police
ofﬁcers relating to the investigation of crime and the interrogation of
suspects.
[t was decided that a Subcommittee should be nominated to draw up
a set of instructions to police ofﬁcers which could be used as a basis for
discussion by the Committee. These would then be conddered in detail and
in so far as a consensus could be reached they would then be submitted to
the Commissioner as a proposed replacement of his Instruction 16 (11—16)
relating to interrogations by the police.
4. The Subcommittee
(a) Membership
From the Supreme Court: The Honourable Mr Justice J. H. McClemens.
From the District Court: His Honour Judge A. A. Levine, Chairman
From the Stipendr'ary
Magistmtes: Mr C. K. Ward, C.S.M.
The Solicitor General: Mr H. A. R. Snelling, Q.C.
From the Police: The Metropolitan Superintendent
' The Senior Police Prosecutor
From the Institute Professor K. 0. Shatwell
of criminology: Associate-Professor R. P. Roulston
(b) Proceedings of the Subcommittee g
The Subcommittee was ﬁrst convened on let December, 1965, after a
series of ' preliminary discussions had been held between Mr Justice
McClemens, Judge Levine and, Professor Roulston. Professor Roulston had
prepared a document setting out a series of propositions relating to matters
previously raised, to which he had appended his own comments (Appendix
3). These matters were discussed in detail at this meeting.
20
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At the second meeting, on 8th March,l966, Mr ’Snelling submitted a
draft set of instructions as a proposed restatement of the Commissioner’s
instructions relating to police interrogations and the taking of statements
(Appendix 6). These were based in the main on the existing Police
Instructions but with some amendments imported from the 1964 Judges’
Rules and some regard to American authorities on the right to legal
amistance.. \ '
At the following meeting, on 5th May, 1966, Mr Justice McClemens
also submitted a draft set of instructions (Appendix 7). At this meeting and
the two further meetings held on June 8th and October 5th of 1966 all the
matters raised in these two sets of instructiOns were exhaustively debated.
On 27th March, 1967, Judy Icvine, as, Chairman of the
Subcommittee, submitted a Report which included the draft instructions
which had taken shape at the previous meeting. _At this stage unanimity
had not been readied on all matters contained in the instructions, but it
was thought that members would have further opportunity to debate the
. controversial sections when the report came before the Committee.
5. Report of the Subcommittee: ﬁn: draft instructions
Report of Subcommittee
1. This - Subcommittee has prepared a draft set of Revised
Instructions to Police Ofﬁcers, Sergeants and Constables, and for
that purpose did consider the relevant principles of law and
practice. a ’
2. In preparing the draft humans, regard was had .—
(a)_ to the importance _of good public relations between
-~ members of the Police Force and the general public;
(1)) that the Instructions must -be such that compliance
. therewith would ensure the admissibility at subsequent
trials of prisoners’ statements and statements made by ’
suspected persons;
(c) the adequate protection of innocent persons;
(d) and of Police Ofﬁcers who may be subsequently
challenged; ' .
(e) and at the same time to permit the investigation to
proceed;
(f) the dominant purpose of all questions by Police Ofﬁcers is
the detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders.
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The said draft is Annexure 1 hereto.
The Subcommittee met on ﬁve occasions and had the advantage
of special material prepared by Mr Justice McClemens, Mr
Harold Snelling, Q.C., Professor K. O. Shatwell and Mr R. P.
Roulston. The principles of law and practice considered were,
inter alia, those comprised in the Propositions and Cements
prepared by Mr Roulston and circulated previously to all
participants in the seminar.
The Subcommittee was unanimous in the view that there should
be no alteration to the present method and practice by which
the Commissioner of Police issued his instructions.
Where there occurred differences of opinion it was agreed that
the dissentients to the annexed draft could be heard again when .
this Report comes before the Head Committee.
AARON LEVINE,
Chairman
Report of the Subcommittee: Annexure 1
1. (a)
(b)
.(C)
(d)
DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS
When a Police Ofﬁcer is endeavouring to discover the author of
an offence, or a suspected offence, he is entitled (subject as
hereinafter mentioned) to put questions in respect thereof to
any person, whether suspected or not, from whom he believes
useful information can be obtained.
It is a fundamental and overriding condition of the admissibility
in evidence against any person of any answer given by that
person to a question put by a Police Ofﬁcer, and of any
statement made by that person, that it shall have been
voluntary. An answer or statement obtained by any untrue
representation or any threat or promise made or held out by a
person in authority or by oppression is not voluntary.
Such special measures as are practicable and appropriate shall be
taken in the case of persons with apparent infirmity, feeble
understanding or special disability and of persons apparently
unfamiliar with the English language.
These rules are promulgated as a guide to Police Ofﬁwrs
conducting investigations. Substantial non-conformity with these
rules will render answers and statements liable to be excluded
from evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings. But in
addition to complying with the rules, interrogating ofﬁcers
should always try to be fair to the person who is being
questioned, and scrupulously avoid any method which could be
regarded as unfair or oppressive.
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PRIOR TO ARREST
(8)
Ch)
(C)
(d)
(6)
Prior to arrest a Police Ofﬁcer has no authority to exercise any
restraint whatever upon the person being questioned or to detain
him in any way, whether upon police premises or elsewhere, and
such person is free to come and go as he pleases.
If the person being questioned requests that any other person
then in his company or in the irnmdiate vicinity (other‘than a
suspected accomﬂice) remain within hearing during the
. questioning, the Police Ofﬁcer shall not, unless the exigencies of
the occasion otherwise require, prevent this, provided such other
person does not hinder or obstruct the questioning.
If the person being questioned is beliewd to be a child (under
the a; ofsixteenyeus)orisaperscnsuspectedofbeingof
feeble understanding, such person shall, if reasonably practicable,
be interrogated in the presence of a parent, relative, friend or
other responsible person.
If the person being questioned desires to consult a legal adviser
he is entitled to do so and should not be prevented. If he so
requests, further questioning should, except in special
circumstances, be deferred but for only such short period as is
reasonably mmy to enable the person to attempt to obtain
legal advice by telephone or otherwise.
There is no objection to a person being diown and being
allowed to read a statement by some other person concerning
the crime and being questioned mereon (provided that if the
Police Ofﬁcer has mark up his mind to charge the person being
questioned he should be ﬁrst cautioned).
CAUTION AND ARREST
(a) ,
(b)
A Police Ofﬁcer, before questioning a person whom he has made
up his mind to charg with a crime, should so inform such
person indicating the nature of the propmd charge and should
caution him in the usualmanner.('lhe caution should be: “I am
going to ask you' certain questions. You are not obliged to
answer unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say may be
taken down in writing and may be used in evidence").
A Police Ofﬁcer, when arresting a person, shall promptly inform
him of that fact, and of the nature of the charge or charges.
Before a person accompanies a Police Ofﬁcer to a police station
or elsewhere he shall be clearly informed whether or not he is
. under arrest, and if not under arrest, that he is not obliged
to accompany the Police Ofﬁcer but may do so voluntarily.
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. 4. QUESTIONING AFTER ARREST
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
 
After arrest and while in custody, a person may after the usual
caution be questioned as to any offence in respect of which he
has been arrested'or may be charged. If he indicates a desire to
made a statement, he should be allowed to make any statement
he wishes in his own way. (If a record of interview is to be
taken he should again be cautioned.)
He may not be questioned on such statement, but his attention
may be drawn to any matters therein which are not clear, and
he may then be asked if he wishes to say anything further.
A person who has been arrested and who has been charged or
against whom any information has been laid, who desires to
obtain legal advice or representation, shall be afforded by Police
Ofﬁcers such reasonable facilities as possible to permit him to
do so. -
Should the person state that he does not wish to make any
statement until after consulting a legal adviser, the making of
the statement should be deferred for such time as is reasonable
in the circumstances, to enable the person to attempt to obtain
legal advice.-
There is no objection to a person, after arrest and while in
custody, being shown and allowed to read or given a copy of a
statement by some other person concerning the crime. If the
person in custody then desires or starts to make any statement,
the usual caution shall ﬁrst be administered.
Questions may be put to a person who has been charged (after
usual caution has been given) where (they are necessary for the
purpose of preventing or minimizing harm or loss to some other
person or the public or in respect of new or fresh matter since
the person was charged.
5. TELEPHONE CALLS
If so requested it shall be the obligation of the Police Ofﬁcer for the
time being in charge of the station to:
(i) Telephone a relative of the person. charged, or
(ii) telephone his solicitor, or
(iii) telephone a person who might be able to give bail to the
person charged and
(iv) telephone the doctor of his choice - and he may, if he
thinks it proper to do so, enable the person charged to
make a call himself. .
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STATEMENTS GENERALLY
All possible ‘steps should be taken to ensure and establish that
statements be freely and voluntarily made,
(i)
(ii)
(an
by asking the person whether he wishes to write a statement
himself, and if so he should be given the necessary writing
material to enable him to do so;-
if not written by the person concerned, the complete statement
should be accurately recorded in the exact words used;
by adopting the following procedure:
When the person has ﬁnished making or dictating his statement,
the record should be handed to him to read, and he should be
invited to make any correction he may wish. After he has done
this he should be asked whether he will sign the statement or
record, and he should do so if willing. The following questions
should then be asked and the questions and answers typed (or
written) at the foot of the statement or recOrd:
Q. Have ydu read this statement? (In the event of the person
, making the statement being unable to read, he should be
asked: Has this statement been read over to you?)
................................
................................
O
>
O
>
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Has any inducement threat or promise been held out to
you, to make this statement?
5" ..................................
Q. Were you cautioned before making the statement that you
were not obliged to make the statement unless you so
desired, as anything you did say may be taken down in
‘ writing and may be used in evidence? .
A...‘ ...............................
All cOrrections in the statement should be initialled by the
person making the statement. Where the statement consists of
more than one page, each page should be signed by the person
making the same and also by the witness. Every care should be
taken to see that the statement contains only information
regarding one offence;
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(iv) On completion of a statement made by a person SUSpeCted of a
serious crime, the senior Ofﬁcer available (who should wherever
possible not be concerned in the investigation) should be
immediately called in and should ask the person making the
statement whether it is his statement, whether it was free and
voluntary, whether he has any complaints in respect of it and he
should initial and date the statement and keep a full record in
permanent form of the time and place and circumstances.
If the circumstances are such as to render immediate compliance
with this rule impracticable, it should be complied with as soon
as is reasonably possible. "
If any complaint be made it should be reported forthwith.
(v) Where the statement is written by the suspected person or the
statement or record has been signed by him a copy thereof must
be supplied to the person or his legal adviser.
7. CHILDREN
(a) Wherever a child appearing to be under the age of sixteen years
is suspected of an offence, and is to be interviewed or requested
to make a statement, and the child requests his parent or
guardian to be present, or the parent or guardian so request,
such request should be granted unless there are good reasons for
its refusal.
(b) There may be circumstances in which it is desirable that the
parent or guardian should not be present at the interrogation of
such child (e.g., where the parent or guardian will seek to
protect the child or put words into its mouth or are implicated
with the child in the offence), in which event, an Ofﬁcer
of the Child Welfare Department or a senior teacher at the
child’s school should be present if available. In any case where
neither a parent, guardian, teacher or Child Welfare Ofﬁcer is
present at the interview or the making of the statement, it
should take place only in the presence of the senior member of
the Police Force then and there available who is not associated
with the enquiry. He should remain present until the child leaves
the station. Whenever a written admission or confession is made
' in the form of a written statement by the child the instruction
laid down in (5) should be carefully complied with.
6. Sessions 3—9: Consideration of the draft instructions; the interrogation
of children; the taking of statements; records of interview.
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, The Committee was reconvened on 13th April,1967, to receivethe
report of the Subcommittee. In.presenting the report Judge Levine said that
“theAnnexure incorporated allthe matters discussed by the Subcommittee.
, It did not representa unanimity, as”there had been decided voices against
partictilar parts cf it and some who would add paragraphs to this draft. It
V did, .howeverreflect the majority opinion, and it was understood that the I
dissentients would be heard again when the instructionswere debated by
the full Committee. '
At this meeting Mr Justice McClemenssubmitteda.memorandum on
theinterrogation of juveniles(Appendix8)H: pointedout that there were
circumstances where early contact with the Child Welfare Department was ..
desirable and the presence of a Child welfare officer would be proper, and i
also circumstances where police have to question children at schoOl and the
question or police authorityin schools was involved. He therefore proposed
that the Ministers forChild Welfare and for Education be invited to be
. represented When the matter of the interrogation of children came up for
discussion, and. invitations were accoidingly issued.
The Minister for Child Welfare (The Hon. A. D. Bridges) replied as
follows:
. My officers have taken the view, with which I concur, that. '
the investigation and prosecution of alleged criminal offences is a . .
matter for the Police, while my ofﬁcers are concerned on the one '
hand with more general preventive action against the possibility of
family breakdown and aimed also at. reducing the likelihood of
behaviour problems ammgt children and young pemons, and on the
,other hand of attempting remedial and rehabilitative work with
juveniles who have been dealt withby the children’s courts. in these
circumstances it would seem wise that my ofﬁcers adopt an entirely
neutral attitude to the investigation of the participation of children
and young persons in criminal offences; so that it would appear to
any juvenile or his family that the Child Welfare Ofﬁcer is siding
neither with, nor against, the Police in their investigations, though
obviously having the responsibility to produce factual information
relevant to the Police inquiry.
“_1 should also point out thatthe present staff of the Field
Division of my Department is altogether too few in number to
encompass the task of being present at the interviews in Police
Stations whenjuvemlesare being questioned .I am already concerned.
V: x at thesheer volume of work falling to the Field Dvision and have
taken. steps as far as may be possible to irnprove staff training and
recruitment programmes to overcome the situation, and consider that
involvement of myofﬁcers in the interrogation of alleged juvenile
offenders would impose unjustiﬁable restriction on the valuable work
91
_that District. Ofﬁcers carry out in discharging their normal duties. if
.'._' . ~12. i‘. _j r" 1'.- _
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Mr Bridges, however, nominated Mr R. Sherriff, Chief of the Field
Division of his Department, to represent him in the discussions concerning
juveniles, and the latter, together with Mr V. J. Truskett, Assistant
Director-General of the Department of Education, attended the sixth
meeting, at which the instructions conceming the interrogation of juveniles
were reviewed.
During 1967 four further meetings were held (on May 4th, May _8th,
June 19th and October 19th) to discuss.the matters on which agreement
had not been reached, after which Judge Levine, Superintendent Lucas and
Mr Roulston drafted a revised set of instructions thought to represent the
consensus of opinion expressed at all previous meetings during the preceding
three years. One matter on which agreement had not been reached was the
question of whether there should be an onus on a police officer to inform
a person who goes voluntarily to a police station that he is not under
arrest. The revised draft instructions were then circulated to-members with
the request that they be given the fullest consideration before ﬁnal review
at the next meeting. ' -
Some members who were unable to attend the- next meeting
(including Professor Shatwell, at that time in the- United States) wrote
criticizing or dissenting from some of the provisions in the new draft, and
when the Committee met for the eighth session, on 27th March, 1968,
these comments were considered and some amendments made to the draft.
Sections 1—5 and 7 were then approved and adopted by the Committee. It
was thought that Section 6, which dealt with the taking of statements,
should receive further consideration, mainly on the ground that it did not
relate adequately to the now commonly used method of taking statements
in the form of question and answer, i.e. the record of interview. This
section was therefore resubmitted to Judge Levine; Superintendent Lucas
and Mr. Roulston for redrafting.
At the ninth session, on 22nd April, 1968, the revised Section 6 was
considered and generally approved, although two questions still remained
unresolved: (1) whether a person who refuses to sign his statement should
still be given a copy at the time it is made, and (2) whether the draft
should include an instruction relating to the tape-recording of interviews.
It was felt that the Committee had now achieved a very substantial
compromise on the many different views and it was resolved that a report
should go forward to the Advisory Committee of the Institute incorporating
the draft instructions already approved together with a resume of the
principal matters that had been debated and the nature of the
representations.
This action was, however, delayed by the fact that the Chief Justice,
who was Chairman of both the Advisory Committee and the Seminar
Committee, was at that time overseas. In the meantime the draft
instructions were submitted to Commissioner J. M. Davis of the
Commonwealth Police for his comments, andin return the Committee
28
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received from him a copy of the Head Ofﬁce Instruction of the
Commonwealth Police on the handling of incrirninatory statements and his
memorandum on Records of Interview (Appendix 9).
When the Chief Justice returned from overseas he informed the
Committee that his views had been somewhat altered on some of the
matters before it and he suggested that instead of merely preparing a
restatement of the existing instructions the Committee might consider some
new procedures relating to the interrogation of suspected persons. These
new proposals were set out in the following document, which was prepared
by the Chief Justice and circulated to members prior to the tenth session
of the Committee.
7. Comment by the Chief Justice (Sir Leslie Herron) on the Draft
Instructions , ,
I.
2.
I apologise for'the interruption in the work of the Seminar due
to the delay in providing these comments. The fault is entirely
mine, but since returning from overseas I have been hard pressed
with judicial work.
Whilst overseas, both in the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., I
took the opportunity of discussing this subject with a number of
well-informed people. I should mention, ﬁrst and foremost, the
Rt Hon. Lord MacDermott, Lord Chief Justice of Northern
Ireland, whose penetrating opinions inﬂuenced me greatly and to
whom I am indebted for many of these comments.
As a result, I have altered my former views somewhat. I
wonder if, in the Seminar, we are wise to adhere to the old
formulae by attempting in effect to restate in different terms
the Judges’ Rules. Would we not be justiﬁed in rejecting these
in favour of a more modem' approach? Would it not be
preferable to lay down some rules of fairness of gneral
application for guidance of policemen and leave the ultimate
decision of admissibility to the Courts? What we have
accomplished to date appears to be a restatement or revised
version of the Judges’ Rules. 1 hope to show that there is a
more sophisticated alternative, one designed to meet a modern
" outlook on crime detection.
In these comments I will lay emphasis on two aspects 5
(a) the undesirability of fettering police investigation into
crime, and
(b) the ever-increasing-importance of the role of the Judge in
reaching a ﬁnal determination on questions of admissibility.
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3. As to both questions, I observe that in England and in the
U.S.A., and indeed in Australia, indictable crime is on the
increase. «
With respect to crimes of violence there are recent
signiﬁcant statistics from America to support this. In Australia,
offences committed in company, such as rape and armed
hold-ups, are of daily occurrence. The use of ﬁrearms by
criminals may induce reprisals by citizens and police.
Recent published articles by Sir Reginald Sholl (well known to
members of the Institute) suggest that in America the powers of
police over suspects have been curtailed by constitutional
guarantees, with adverse effect on detection and punishment of
the guilty.
I am surprised to ﬁnd from my investigations overseas that the
issue of interrogation of suspects is still in an unsettled
condition. This surely must be by reason of the attitude of
lawyers and judges. Who amongst us is prepared to give a
forthright answer to the question whether and how far a
policeman is at liberty to interrogate a suspect whilst he is in
de jure custody as when he is under lawful arrest? And who will
answer directly the same question when that person is in de
facto custody, for example when he is detained against his will?
Most lawyers today regard these issues as too complex to permit
of a single positive answer without such qualiﬁcations as render
the search for guidance elusive.
May I say that I sympathise with the members of the Institute
who are asked to settle these problems. I was the trial Judge in
R. v. McDermott in 1947 and have been keenly interested in the
subject of admissibility of confessional statements ever since. I
am censcious of one thing, that the subject of confessions is
difﬁcult to discuss in isolation, for two criteria of general
application still must be applied to one’s considerations.
The ﬁrst is the maxim nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum. How far
is this applicable to modern conditions? It is a cardinal principle
of our law and it would be a bold man who would deny today
its application. To quote the words of Dixon J. (as he then was)
in McDermott v. The King (76 C.L.R. at 513):
6‘
. there has arisen almost in our own time a practice
in England of excluding confessional statements made to
ofﬁcers of police if it is considered upon a review of all
the circumstances that they have been obtained in an
improper manner. The abuse of the power of arrest by
using the detention of an accused person as an occasion
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for seeming from him_ evidence by admission .is treated as
an impropriety justifying the exclusion of the evidence. So
is insistence upon questions or an attempt to break down
or qualify the effect of an accused person’s statement so
far as it may be exculpatory. The practice of excluding
statements so obtained is supported by the Court of
Criminal Appeal in England, which will quash convictions
where evidence has been received which in the opinion of
that Court has been obtained improperly, that-is, in some
such manner”.
.‘later in the same judgment Sir Owen Dixon said:
“It is apparent that a rule of practice has arisen, deriving
almost certainly from the strong feeling for the wisdom
and justice of the traditional English principle expressed in
the precept nemo tenetur se ipsum accusaIe. It may be
regarded as' an extension of the common law rule
excluding voltmtary statements. In referring the decision of
the question whether a confessional statement should be
rejected to the discretion of the judge, all that seems to be
intended is that he should form a judgment upon the
propriety of the means by which the statement was.
* obtained by reviewing all the circumstances and considering .
'the fairness of the use made by the police of their
position in relation to the accused”.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
contains a declaration famous in the English-speaking world that
no person shall be compelled to be a‘.witness against himself.
This is in the United States a fundamental and established
concept. It is a principle which is not only deeply rooted but
alive and active throughout the United Kingdom. It is, deSpite
its critics, part of the law throughout the British
Commonwealth. One of its critics was Jeremy Bentham, Bowring
Edition, Vol. V], Bk. 11, p.332. He was a ﬁrm believer in
interrogation as a road to truth and a means of detecting
mendacity and “incompleteness”, and he was no less emphatic
'about the folly of the principle under discussion — that no man
is bound to accuse himself.:lt is a rule which stands in the way
of justice but is, he 'says, of use -to “criminals; deliquents, mala
tide defendants, extortious andoppressive plaintiffs: In a word, to
evil-doers of all sorts and sizes". It continually infuses poison
into what he calls “the moral branch of the public mind”; and
its adoption produces three misdiievous results: (1) the exclusion
of “the very best possible sort of evidence”, (2) the admission
of inferior and less trustworthy evidence likely to cause
misdecision and failure of justice; and (3) more “delay, vexation
and expense”. \
 Proceedings of the Seminar
3!
 
But Bentham lived in days when there was no modem,
well-organized police force. References to an accused being a
witness against himself may possibly refer to a trial before a
judge. Furthermore, there is a tendency, deSpite its recent
afﬁrmation, for example, in the House of Lords (1967 AC
760), to qualify the application of the maxim. -
At the Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, 1965,
in Sydney, Sir Norman Skelhom, Q.C., Director of Public
Prosecutions, stated that “the principle that no man should be
required to incriminate himself should no longer be applied to
suspected persons”. He stated:
“A person being questioned by the police, until such time
as he is timeously charged with the offence, should be
under an obligation to reply to their questions whether the
stage has or has not been reached of his being a suspect,
though it is not sugpsted that his failure to do so should
be a criminal offence. The sanction against his refusing to
answer without adequate reason should be that his refusal
would be capable of being taken into account against him
evidentially in any proceedinﬁ brought against him in
reSpect of the matter upon which he was being
questioned”.: Book of the Commonwealth Conference,
. p.280.
8. The second fundamental principle is that the confession of an
accused person is admissible provided it is free and voluntary.
I will not dwell upon the interpretation of the word
“voluntary”. It is a controversial subject and is explained by the
highest judicial authorities from Lord Sumner in Ibrahim
v. Rex
(1914 AC 599) to recent cases in the High Court. "These are
well known to members of the Institute and l forbear to repeat
them. I believe that uncertainty still exists and this may explain
the definition adOpted by the Judges’ Rules, 1964, which speaks
of a confession obtained by fear of prejudice or hope of
advantage or by oppression. Fortunately for the interests of the
community, it is too late to reject the notion that such a
confession is admissible if shown by the prosecution not to have
been obtained in an oppressive manner and to have been
voluntary in the sense that it has not been obtained by threats
or inducements: Per Lord Parker CJ. (1964 1 0.8. 495 at 501).
9. I now come to the pith and core of my changing views. These
may be summarised thus:
(a) The attempt to deﬁne what is or is not oppressive or free
and voluntary by a series of complex administrative rules
should be abolished.
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(b)
The Judges’ Rules may have had some virtues but in
my opinion they are too general and are too difﬁcult to
apply in a practical sense to each individual case in which
the circumstances vary enormously. " *'
On the one hand the police are tempted to conceal
breaches, and on the other hand~are deterred from acting
in the public interest in a way the Judges, by their Rules,
never intended.
I would prefer to follow the Scottish practice and
have each case decided on its own facts and upon well-
recognized principles. This would leave the courts to
determine whether the evidence is admissible and, as a
matter of discretion, whether it should be excluded in the
interests-of a fair trial.
. The test will still be, is the statement voluntary, and
the mere fact that it is made by a suspect in custody will
not per se be a ground for exclusion. The discretion will
remain on a basis broad and wide, requiring a decision
after all circumstances are analysed, of what is fair and
just and in the public interest.
Instructions to the police Should be conﬁned to a
statement of the principles to be observed, the standards
of conduct to be followed in dealing with suspects and the
steps to be taken for keeping a full record of events.
The maxim nemo tenetur should be respected by the
police, the caution to be retained as at present.
The police will be told to avoid oppression, threats or
promises, grilling or cross-examination. Fairness will be the
keynote, the reputation of the police will be protected and
its effect on the criminal classes will, I believe, be
‘observed. Police can still, within the foregoing limits,
question a person in custody provided there is justifiable
questioning such as is reasonable and proper in the
circumstances.
An elaboration of this could, if desired, form the
basis of discussion by the Institute.
The legal bulwark and practical check against oppression orunfairness of an aCcused should be the discretion of ajudge to exclude what is unfair. '
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(C)
This discretion is, of course, well recognized by the
High Court in many cases of which McDermott’s case may
be regarded as an early’ example: See pp.Sl4/515 and
p. 518. Lord Parker said (1964 1 QB. 495 at 501):
“. . .. as is well known, in every criminal case a judge
has a discretion to disallow evidence, even if in law
relevant and therefore admissible, if admissibility
would operate unfairly against a’defendant. I would
add that in considering whether admissibility would
operate unfairly against a defendant one would
' certainly consider whether it had been obtained in an
oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of
an accused person. That is the general principle”.
Judges should be consistently encouraged by this Institute
to study at seminars the boundaries of discretion and,
being well instructed, to give effect to its policy fearlessly,
avoiding injustice to the accused on the one hand and
likewise to the‘community on the other. '
The maxim against self incrimination should be applied in '
conjunction with a new procedure of controlled
compulsory interrogation before a magistrate, with the
record of such interrogation admissible at the trial.
This seems a rather radical suggestion and I agree it
needs close examination. ‘
The retention of the principle against
self-incrimination must not be allowed to tie the hands of
the police to an extent incompatible with the public
interest and interests of justice. But today’s criminal is
more sophisticated and crafty.
' I suggest that Parliament, by Statute, confer power
on speciﬁed high-ranking police ofﬁcers to detain a susPect
for examination by police before a magistrate.
This need not be done in all cases, nor need it take
the place of reasonable police interrogation such as I have
already endorsed. It would be an additional power
conferred on police. It would have the effect of —
(i) ‘ ' ' ' g the detention of suspects without arrest,
and ' -
(ii) reducing the ever-increasing complaints againstpolice
'methods in obtaining records of interview, in most
cases unsigned.
34
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The police would conduct the examination before laying a
charge and the principle against self-incrimination would
not apply. There would be no caution and both answers
and refusal to answer would be recorded and admissible.
There would be no legal compulsion to answer or
punishment for refusal. .
The mag'strate would merely act as observer, see fair
play, check irrelevance and ensure fairness, and record
what took place.
Mag'strates might be specially trained persons such as
ex police superintendents or justices specially selected.
)
' . ‘ 10. I add an alternative to the foregoing proposal for interrogation
- before a majstrate.
Alrncst every day at Darlinghurst a voir dire is sought to
-' ventilate allegations surrounding confessional statements, mostly,
let it be said,» unformded, of departure from standards of fairness
by police, rang'ng from bashings to police invention and
dictation by police of the allepd confessional matter.
I saw in America interrogations made in interviewing
rooms, the interior of which could be viewed from outside,
through one-way glass, the person within not being aware that ‘
he was observed. Also the room was wired for sound so that
every word or the slightest sound was reproduced outside and
recorded. Why, I ask, could not interviewing rooms at the C13.
and larger suburban and country centres be so equipped, and a
magistrate or his equivalent observe the interrogation and record
all that is said? The result need not be given in evidence unless
and until an attack on the police is made by the accused or his
advocate.
This may be said to be a radical suggestion. But is it? It is
not, from my own observation, impracticable, and why should
we not seek light and-not heat in criminal trials? '
The attacks at trials made on confessional statements are
frequent and consistently follow the same pattern, so that even
if a percentap of cases (certainly not every case would lend
itself to this modus Operandi) could be covered by an
independentwitneas, it would prove a great relief to trial judges
and juryrnen and might even have a bearing on_ the tide of
came.
I .
 Proceedings of the Seminar 35
8. Sessions 10 and 11
The tenth session, on 4th March, 1970, was attended by the Police
Commissioner (Mr N. T. W. Allan), the Head of the N.S.W. Criminal
Investigation Branch (Superintendent R. A. lendrum) and Superintendent K.
Milte of the Commonwealth Police Force. After considering the new
proposals put forward by the Chief Justice the Committee decided that
these new matters would need a great deal more consideration and since it
had already spent so long deliberating on the draft instructions these should
ﬁrst be ﬁnalised and passed on to the Police Department. Mr Allan said
that he was particularly anxious to proceed with the revision of his existing
instructions and would therefore like to have the assistance of the
completed draft as soon as possible. The Chief Justice then moved that the
draft be circulated once again to members, inviting any ﬁnal comment.
‘\
On 121}: June, 1970, the draft was circulated with a summary
indicating that agreement had been unanimous on. all except two matters,
on which the opposing views were set out, and stating that it was not
proposed to introduce an instruction relating to the tape-recording of _
interrogations.
The ﬁrst matter on which there had not been unanimity related to
legal advice, and the instruction which had been approved by the
Committee represented a compromise between the opposing views (1) that a
police ofﬁcer should not be obliged to afford facilities to a prisoner for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice, and (2) that the prisoner’s right to legal
advice could not be effectively implemented without some assistance. The
compromise which had been reached was:
“A person who has been arrested or charged.-... who desires to
obtain legal advice or representation shall be afforded by police
ofﬁcers such reasonable facilities as may be possible to permit him to
do so.” ~
0n the question as to whether the interview should be suspended until the
legal advice had been obtained, the opposing view was that the public
interest required that the police interrogation should not be unduly
interrupted. Here, too, the wording “. .. the interview should be deferred
for such time as is reasonable in the circumstances . . was a compromise
between divergent views.
. The other matter on which agreement had not been reached was the
section of Clause 6 relating to unsigned records of interview. Opinion was
still ﬁrmly divided on the question as to whether or not a copy of an
unsigned record of interview should be handed to the person at the
conclusion of the interview.
At the eleventh meeting, on 28th July, 1970, the Committee made a
ﬁnal review of the draft instructions, approved the compromise version of
 ./
36 ~Procetxdings of the Seminar
 
Clause 4(c) relating to legal advice, and on the matter of unsigned
statements, after reviewing the transcript of the previous discussion and
debating the matter further, found that the same division existed as had
occurred at the many previous meetings and that it was therefore unable to
reach a positive ﬁnding. .
The Committee then resolved that this ﬁnal draft be endorsed and
transmitted to the Police Commissioner with a recommendation that these
instructions be substituted for those currently existing under the Police
Regulation Act under the relevant headings. '
The draft instructions, in the form approved at this meeting, are set
out below.
9. Final Draft Instructions as approved at the meeting on 28th July,
1970
1. (a) These' rules are promulgated as a guide to Police Ofﬁcers
[conducting investigations. Substantial non-conformity with these
rules will render answers to questions by way of‘ interrogation
and statements liable to be excluded from evidence in
subsequent criminal proceedings. But in addition to complying
with the rules, interrogating ofﬁcers should always try to be fair
to the person who is being questioned, and scrupulously avoid
any' method which could be regarded as unfair or oppressive.
(b) When a Police Ofﬁcer is endeavouring to discover the author of
an offence, or a suspected offence, he is entitled (subject as
hereinafter mentioned) to put questions in respect thereof to
any person, whether suspect or not, from whom he believes
useful information can be obtained. .
(c) It is a fundamental and overriding condition of the admissibility
in evidence against any person of any answer given by that
person to a question put by a Police Ofﬁcer, and of any
statement made by that person, that it shall have been
voluntary.
(d) (i) In general an answer or statement obtained by untrue
representations or any threat or promise made or held out
by a person in authority or by any form of oppression is
NOT a voluntary answer or statement.
(ii) An answer or statement which transgresses rule (d) (i) is
not admissible in evidence. This effect may be removed if,
before the trial, some person in authority causes the maker
of it clearly to understand that any further statements
should be voluntary.
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(6)
This may be achieved if the person concerned states that
he understands what has been said to him, and expresses
his willingness to make a further statement. Theopening
'of such statement should set out:
(i) the date and place of the previous statements and to
whom made;
(ii) the steps taken (in detail) to remove such
inducement; ' -
(iii) that anything said or done previously either did not
operate on his mind or no longer does so.
In Wthe ease of persons with apparent _ infirmity, feeble
understanding or special disability and of persons apparently
unfamiliar with the English language such special measures as are
practicable and appropriate shall be taken to ensure a fair
interrogation.
2; r PRIOR TO ARREST
(a)
(b).
" (C)
(d)
(6)
Prior :to arrest a Police Ofﬁcer has no authority to exercise any
restraint whatever upon a person being questioned or to detain
him in, anyway, whether 'upon police premises or elsewhere, and
such person is free to come and go as he pleases.
If the person being questioned requests that any other person
then in his company or in the immediate vicinity (other than a
suSpected accomplice) remain within hearing during .‘ the
questioning, the Police Ofﬁcer shall not, unless the exigencies of
the occasion otherwise require, prevent this, provided such other
person does not hinder or obstruct the (questioning.
If the person being questioned is suspected of being of feeble
understanding, such person shall, if reasonably practicable, be
interrogated in the presence of a parent, guardian, relative, friend
or other responsible person not associated with the inquiry.
If the person being questioned desires to consult a legal adviser
he is entitled to do so and should not be prevented. If he so
desires, further questioning should, except in special
, circumstances, be deferred, but. only for such short period as is
reasonably necessary to enable the person to attempt to obtain
legal advice by telephone or otherwise.
There is no objection to a person being shown and being
allowed to read or have read to him a statement of, or record
of interview by, some other person concerning the offence and
being questioned thereon (provided that if the Police Officer has
made up his mind to charge the person being questioned he
should be first cautioned).
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3. CAUTION AND ARREST
(a)
(b)
l (e)
A Police Ofﬁcer, before questioning a person whom he has made
up his mind to charge, should so inform such person indicating
the nature of the proposed charge and mould caution him in
the usual manner. (The caution should be: “I am going to ask
you certain questions. You are not obliyd to answer unless you
wish to do so, but whatever you say may be used in evidence”)
Where a record is to be made of the interrogation such person
shall be cautioned in the following manner: “I am going to ask
you certain questions which will be recorded (on the typewriter,
" in shorthand, on a taperecorder, etc., as the case may be). You
are not oblipd to mswer rmless you wish to do so, but
whatever you say will be recorded mid may be uwd in evidence.
Do you understand that?”
APoﬁceOfﬁcerwhenarrestingapersonshallrnformhimof
that fact and of the grormds for the arrest. Before a person
accompanies a Police Ofﬁcer to a police station or elsewhere he
should, if he is not under arrest, be so informed-If not under
arrest he is not oblipd to accompany thePolice Ofﬁcer but
may do so voluntarily.
On arresting a mm m warrant aPolice Ofﬁcer ought simply to
readhiswarmtortelltheaccmedthenanueofthecharge
upm‘which he is arrested, leaving itato him tosay anything or
nothirrgasheﬂem
4. QUMONINGmARREST
(a)
(b)
(0)
While in custody, and before being chargd, a person may, after
the usual caution, be questioned as to any offence in respect of
whichhe hasbeen arrestedormaybechargedeheindicatesa
desire to make a statement, he should be allowed to make any
statement he wishes in his own way.
After a person has been chargd he shall only be questioned in
exceptional circumstances (after the usual caution has been .
given) where such questions are necessary for the purpose of
preventing or minimising harm or 10$ to some other person or
the public or for the purpose of recovering property or, in
respect of new or fresh matters.
A person who has been arrested or charged or against whom any
information has been laid, who desires to obtain legal advice or
representation, shall be afforded by Police Ofﬁcers such
reasonable facilities as may be possible to permit him to do so.
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(d)
Should the person state that he does not wish to make any
statement or answer any questions until after consulting a legal
adviser, the interview should be deferred for such time as
is
reasonable in the circumstances, to enable the person to attem
pt
to obtain legal advice.
There is no objection to a person, after arrest and while i
n
custody, being shown and allowed to read or given a copy of
a
statement of, or record of interview by, some other
person
concerning the offence. If the person in custody then desires o
r
starts to make any statement, the usual caution shall first be
administered. -
5. TELEPHONE CALLS BY 0R 0N BEHALF’OF PERSONS CHARGED
If so requested by the person charged it shall be the obligation of the
Police Ofﬁcer for the time being in charge of 'the matter to:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v) -
telephone a relative of the person charged, or
telephone his solicitor, or .
telephone a person who might be able to arrange bail for the
person charged, and . .
telephone the doctor of his choice, and
if .such Police Ofﬁcer thinks proper, to enable the person
charged to personally make a telephone call.
6._ STATEMENTS GENERALLY
(a)
(b)
(0)
(d)
The admissibility in evidence against a person of answers to
questions or a statement made, either orally or in writing, by
such person depends upon the Court’s decision as to whether
such answers and/or statement were free and voluntary. All
possible steps should therefore be taken to ensure and establish
that such statements be freely and voluntarily made and such
answers to questions be freely and voluntarily given.
A person should be asked whether he wishes to write a
statement himself, and if so, he should be given the means
to
do so.
If such a person does not write the statement himself,
the
complete statement of what he says should be accurately
recorded in the exact words used.
When the making or dictating of the statement or record o
f
interview is completed, the document should be handed to
him
to read. He should not be questioned thereon but his attention
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(6)
may be drawn to any matters therein which are nOt clear and
he may be asked if he wishes to say anything further and he
should be invited to make any correction or note he may wish.
After he has done this he should be asked whether he will sign
the document, and he should so do if willing. The following
questions should then be asked and the questions and answers
typed (or written) at the foot of the statement or record of
interview:
.. Q. Have you read this statement (or record 'of interview)?
. [In the event of the person making the statement or
‘record of interview being unable to read, he should be
asked: “Has this statement (or record of interview) been
read over to, you?”]
Q. Have you made this statement (or record of interview) of
your own free will?
Q.- Has any inducement, threat or promise been held out to.
. you to make this statement (or record -of interview)?
A. . ................................
Where a record of interview has not been taken the following
question should be added to the foot of the statement:
Q. .Were you cautioned before making this statement that you
were not obliged to, make this statement unless you so
desired, as anything you did say may be taken down in
writing and may be used in evidence?
Where a record of interview has been taken the caution should
be administered and recorded at the appropriate time. The
person making a statement or record of interview should be
invited to initial all corrections and additions in the statement or
record of interview. Where the statement consists of more than
one page, each page should be signed by the person making the
same and by a witness to his signature.
Every care should be taken to see that the statement or record
of interview contains, if reasonably possible, only information
regarding one offence.
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(0
(g)
(11)
On completion of the making of the statement by, or recording
of the interview with, a person, the senior ofﬁcer available (who
should wherever possible not be concerned in the investigation)
should be immediately called in and should ask the person
making the statement or record of interview whether it is his
statement or record of interview, whether it was free and
voluntary, and whether he has any complaints in respect of it,
and he should initial and date the document and keep a full
record in permanent form of the time and place and
circumstance. If the circumstances are such as to render
~ immediate compliance with this mle impracticable, it should be
complied with as soon as is reasonably possible. If any
complaint be made it should be reported forthwith.
Where the statement is written by the person or the statement
or record of interview has been signed by him a copy thereof
must be supplied to the person or his legal adviser.
Oral statements should be reduced to writing as soon as possible.
If rough notes only are made at the time or immediately
afterwards the pieces of paper on which.they are made should,
if practicable, be preserved even after a more complete
typewritten statement has been compiled.
7. INTERROGATION OF CHILDREN (at police stations, at institutions,
at home, or at school.)
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
If the person being interrogated is believed to be a child (under
the age of 16 years) such person shall, if reasonably practicable,
be interrogated in the presence 'of a parent, guardian, relative,
friend or other responsible person.
There may be special circumstances in which it is desirable that
the parent or guardian should not be present, e.g., where
implicated in the offence.
Considerations of time or distance may sometimes preclude the
presence of parent, guardian, relative or friend. In such cases, if
an independent responsible person is not available, a senior
Police Ofﬁcer, not connected with the case, should, if possible,
be present. E ,
If possible, police should avoid interviewing pupils at school.
Interviews should be conducted at home or at a police station
rather than at school.
Where it is deemed necessary to question a pupil at school, the
principal (or, if absent, the next senior teacher) should be
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present during the interview, and it should be
conducted
privately. As soon as practicable, after completion of
the
interview, the principal will, in accordance with Educa
tion
Department instructions, inform the parent or guardian the
reof,
and the District Inspector of the Education Department.
(28th July, 1970)
10. Sessions 12 and 13: the Committee reconvened
' On 26th November, ,1970, the Committee was recon
vened following
comment from the Benehjn the Court of Criminal Appe
al in the case of
R. v. 'Dugan when it w stated that “if the conte
nts of a record of
interview are to be given in evidence the accused should
be given a copy as
a matter of fairness”. 1 .
This twelfth meeting.was devoted entirely to discussion,
of police
procedure in relation to unsigned - statements and ‘ the
question of the
contemporaneous copy, _but.:the Committee remained ﬁrml
y deadlocked
along the lines of all previous debates and came to the conc
lusion that it
was still unable to pronounce on the matter. The argume
nts on either side
are summarized later in this report.
.
The Chief Justice said that these draft instructions wer
e not ex
cathedra statements but were intended to be submitted to t
he Commissioner
for his acceptance or rejectim, so that the ﬁnal decision cl
early rested with
him. He pointed out, however, that there was a tendency f
or judges not to
accept so readily as formerly an unsigned statement whi
ch had been
acknowledged to be a correct record of the interview and wh
ich the police
subsequently sought to tender in evidence.
One further meetingwas held by the Committee, on
6th April, 1971,
and at the invitation of the Chairman this was atten
ded by two overseas
visitors to the Law School _— Professor Larry Elison of t
he University of
Montana and Professor Russell Niles of the New Yo
rk University Law
School. .. .
At this meeting Mr Snelling submitted a proposed amen
dment to
subclause 6 (g) relating to uns'gned statements. Under this a
mendment, if
the person had acknowledged _the unsigned record of inter
view to- be a
correct record of the interview he should receive a c0py. Sup
erintendent
Lucas said that the Commissioner and his senior ofﬁc
ers had also
reconsidered the matter and had put forward a proposal that a
n addition be
made to Clause 6 stating that where a person refuses to sign th
e statement
he should be advised.that he may- make application to the
Commissioner
for a Copy and that this should be supplied'to him if and
when it was
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decided that the document would be tendered in evidence.
The Chief
Justice reiterated that it was no function of the Committee to impose
an
instruction upon the Commissioner against his will and he would there
fore
move that the clause remain as previously formulated. If the Commissio
ner
should wish to add to or vary it in any way it would be a mat
ter for his
own decision.
‘ One further matter was then raised in the context of arrests on
warrant. It was suggested that subclause 3 (c) might appear to precl
ude
questioning by police of a person arrested on warrant. A paper by M
essrs
McGonigal and Bennett setting out the historical basis of the Warrant
of
Arrest was tabled. (Appendix 10) The Chief Justice said that it seem
ed
clear from the name “Warrant of Arrest" that the serving of the warra
nt
was in fact an arrest procedure and that subsequently the same procedur
es
would apply as with arrest in other circumstances. He pointed out that t
his
instruction had been in the Police Instructions for a very long time witho
ut
resulting in any difﬁculties in practice, and after discussion it was resol
ved '
that subclause 3 (c) remain as formulated. '
.
The Committee therefore resolved that the Commissioner of Poli
ce be
informed that after reconsidering subclause 6 (g) relating to uns
igned
statements and subclause 3 (c) relating to arrest on warrant it had de
cided
that no alteration should be made to these. The draft instruct
ions submitted
to him on 30th July, 1970, were therefore confirmed a
s the final
recommendations of the committee and it was hoped that the
se would be
of assistance to him when he came to reframe his instructio
ns to police
ofﬁcers.
The Chief Justice said that this completed the work of the Committee
and he wished to thank the members who had taken part in this long and
arduous task which had been in process for a number of years and had
involved much time and effort.
Speaking on behalf of the Institute, ProfessonShatwell said that he
also would like to thank the members of the Committee, and particular
ly
the Chief Justice himself, who had not only initiated this valuabl
e inquiry
but had presided over the many sessions of the Committee. He would al
so
like to thank particularly Judge Levine, who had acted as Chairman o
f the
Subcommittee which prepared the original draft instructions
for
consideration by the Committee and who, together with Professor Roul
ston,
had carried a great deal of the burden of the preparatory work fo
r the
serrunar.
The Chairman then declared the work of the seminar closed.
11. Adoption of the Draft Instructions by the Police Department
On 22nd June, 1972 the Deputy Commissioner wrote thanking the
Committee for the time and deliberation given to the preparation of t
he
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draft instructions and stating that these had now been given close
consideration by senior ofﬁcers of the Department, that generally the
propositions put forward were acceptable, and that these had been adopted
by the Police Department with some minor alterations and additions.
The minor alterations were mainly verbal changes made to facilitate
the incorporation of the new sections into the Police Instructions. The
additions were four in number and were as follows:
1. The controversy of the unsigned statement had been ﬁnally
resolved by the Commissioner by the addition of an instruction stating that
whether or not the statement or record of interview had been signed by the
person interrogated he should be given a copy forthwith.
2. In the section entitled “Questioning after Arrest” an additional
clause was inserted stating that there is no legal right for any person other
than the person being interrogated and the necessary Police Ofﬁcers to be
present at an interrogation, but stating that each instance must be affected
by its own particular circumstances, as, for example, those which have been
set out in 2 (c). This would of course cover the situation of the legal
adviser, and the fact that after having tendered his advice to his client he
might be asked to leave during the course of the interrogation had always
been accepted by the Committee to be the legal position although not
speciﬁcally mentioned in the draft instructions.
' 3. In the section entitled “Caution and Arrest” the statement that
a Police Ofﬁcer when arresting a person shall inform him of that fact and
of the grounds for the arrest has been qualiﬁed by the words unless the
actions of the person being arrested or the mrrounding circumstances render
this impracticable. This is in keeping with the judgment in Christie v.
Leachinsky.
4. In the section dealing with the interrogation of children, where
examples are given of circumstances. in which it may be undesirable that the
parent or guardian remain during the interrogation, the addition has been
made where the child indicates an unwillingness to answer questions in the
presence of such persons. This was a matter which had been raised in
discussion by the representative of the Education Department, who said that
the experience of his Department was that children were often unwilling to
make admissions in front of their parents, particularly in matters relating to
sex. The provisions as to the presence of another responsible person would
of course still apply.
The amended instructions relating to the interrogation of persons by
members of the Police Force were incorporated into the Commissioner’s
Instructions on 4th January, 1974.
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IV. MATTERS CONSIDE/RED BY THE COMMITTEE
\
l. - The New South Wales Police Instructions ,
Under the New South Wales Police Regulation Act a series of Police
Rules for the government and discipline of members of the Force are
promulgated. -'Ihese Rules, which are issued on the advice of the Executive
-Council and with the Govemor’s approval, provide, inter alia, that the
Commissioner may issue such Instructions for the government or direction.
of the Force as he considers the circumstances require. Under this power
the Commissioner issues instructions which give general advice and assistance
to police in the performance of their duties, these instructions being
amended and added to as required. Both the Rules and the Instructions'are
contained in one volume entitled The New South Wales Police Rules and
Instructions, a book of approximately 670 loose-leaf pages of which the
Instructions comprise by far the greater part. A copy of this book is
supplied to each member of the Force. '
Unlike the Rules, the Instructions do not have the force of law. They
are concisely stated and intended for easy reference, and are supplemented
by information contained in the Police Reference Book, a copy of which is
available at each police station for the information of police. The volume of
Police Rules and Instructions is necessarily conﬁdential to members of the
Force.
_ There is, however, nothing intrinsically secret about the instructions
relating to police interrogations. These occupy less than three pages and
appear in. Instruction, 16 (11-16) under the heading of “Crime”.-The
existing instructions relating to interrogations were based substantially on
the 1930 Judges’ Rules, but with more detail and some additional
instructions. They are quoted in full in Ragen's case and have in fact came
to be regarded in the courts in much the same way as the Judps’ Rules in
England. It 'was necessary to bear this in mind in formulating the revised
instructions. -‘ - -
2.‘ The revised instructions
The set of draft instructions prepared by Mr Snelling were ﬁrst used
by the Subcommittee as a basis for discussion in formulating the new
instructions. In introducing these, Mr Snelling said that his' backgrou
nd
thought had been to set down something which would-be accepted by the
community and the legal profession as reasonable and proper and a fair
. balance between the competing interests of all concerned. He had attempted
to clarify' a number of debatable points and cater {Or some difﬁcult
problems which constantly arise, while at the same time not unduly
frustrating the police in their investigations. He thought that the revised
instructions ’should attempt to meet public criticism about police
interrogations and be in the interests of good public relations.
r
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Mr Snelling said that in drafting his instructions he had commenced
with the existing Police Instructions, then considered the 1964 Judges’
Rules with a view to importing anything that appeared to be an
improvement on these, examined American legal authorities on the right to
legal assistance, and ﬁnally introduced such amendments as he had thought
proper.
The arrang=ment is logical, the instructions falling into the following
sections: (1) General instructions as to fairness and voluntariness; (2) the
situation prior to arrest; (3) caution and arrest; (4) questioning after arrest;
.and (5) statements generally. To these were added later two further
sections, since the matters of telephone calls and the interrogation of
children were thought of sufﬁcient importance to be dealt with in separate
sections. '
The Subcommittee was also asisted by a set of instructions drawn up
by Mr Justice McClemens and submitted at the following meeting. As a
result of these and the many further submisions made by members of the
Committee the original draft was considerably modiﬁed in the light of later
discussions. The Committee also had before it a Report by the Solicitor
General of Victoria on “Procedure on the Interrogation of Suspected
Persons by the Police” dated 12 October, 1965.
3. “Fairness" in interrogation; the meaning of “oppressive".
The instructions begin with a gueral statement as to their purpose,
the likely consequences of nonconformity with them, and a statement
emphasising the need for fairness memlly in questioning and the avoidance
of any method whi¢h could be regarded as unfair or oppressive. The word
oppressive, which was selected. with some care, was intended to imply
something beyond the arstained questioning which is commonly used by a
skilled interrogator, and was not thougit to preclude this.
4. "Crime” or “oﬁ'ence ”
The 1964 Judges’ Rules substituted the word “offence” for the word.
“crime” previously used, and a similar change was made by the Committee
in formulating the revised instructions. Home Ofﬁce Circular 536053/23 of
24th June, 1930 stated that for the purposes of the Judges’ Rules the
words “crime” and “offence” were synonymous and included any offence
for which a person might be apprehended or detained in custody, Although
not speciﬁcally stated by the Committee it is clear from the form of the
draft instructions that they are intended to have the same application.
5. Limitations on questioning ' '
Subclause l (b) closely follows Rule I of the 1.964 Judges’ Rules but
has some variation in the wording It is as follows:
When a Police ofﬁcer'is endeavouring to discover‘ the author of an
offence, or a suspected offence, he is entitled (subject as hereinafter
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mentioned) to put questions in respect thereof to any person, whether
suspect or not, from whom he believes useful information can be
obtained.
The change in both cases from the previous form of “...ther
e is no
objection to his putting questions" to “he is entitled. . .”I gives some c
hange
in emphasis. Although it is true as a generality to say that a
nyone is
entitled to ask anyone else a question, it was pointed out
that this
statement is deceptively simple in the case of a police ofﬁcer,
since it
involves the question of the extent to which he can press his ent
itlement.
Can he break into premises for the purpose of questioning, o
r otherwise
force his way towards the person required for questioning? The an
swer will
depend on the seriousness of the offence, the urgency of
the situation, and
the purpose of the questioning - whether as a prime suspect o
r merely a
potential witness. Obviously the statement in the preface to th
e Police
Instructions that “something must necessarily be left to the intel
ligence and
discretion of the individual police ofﬁcer” is relevant here. '
The words “in reSpect thereof”, limiting the questioning to the
particular offence under investigation, no longer appear in the
Judges’ Rules
but have been retained here. It was not thought that th
is qualiﬁcation
would unduly restrict \the type of question the police woul
d feel entitled to
put. '
6. Voluntary statements
. There was some discussion as to whether the
use of the word
“voluntary” might lead to some confusion in the mind o
f- a police ofﬁcer
between a voluntary statement and a volunteered s
tatement. Although the
existing Police Instruction 16 (12) commenced w
ith the words, “If an
accused person wishes to volunteer any statement...” a
nd carried the side
title of “Voluntary statements”, it was thought by the p
olice representatives
that police ofﬁcers generally were familiar with the te
chnical legal use of
the word “voluntary”. Since it isa word so well kno
wn in the law it was
decided to retain it and to follow subclause l (0) re
lating to voluntary
statements by an ampliﬁcation which would leave no doub
t in the» mind of
the police ofﬁcer as to the technical sense of the word.
This was accordingly set out in subclause l (d), whi
ch indicates that a .
statement is not voluntary if it is obtained “by untru
e representations or
any threat or promise made or held out by a person in au
thority or by any
form of oppression”. The orig'nal version included
the word “... or
otherwise by the will of the person questioned b
eing overbome”, but the
Committee felt that this was not an appropriate in
struction to a police
ofﬁcer, since normal questioning of a suspect must of
necessity to some
extent _be aimed at breaking down the will of th
e person. The word
“oppression” was thought to have a more deﬁnite
meaning and imply
something beyond mere questioning. It is also the
word used in the Note to
Appendix A of the Judges’ Rules.“
.
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The procedure to be followed if subclause l (c) as to voluntariness is
inadvertently transgressed is contained in subclause 1 (d) (ii), which
substantially follows Police Instruction 16 (15). Some members thought this
instruction of doubtful utility, but the police representatives stated that
such a situation does occasionally arise and it is important that the police
officer should know what to do in such a case.
The Chief Justice pointed out that a statement could still be rejected
by the judge as a matter of discretion even though he ruled it to be
‘voluntary.
7. Administrative arrangements for interrogation
The ﬁrst draft of the instructions contained a statement that, “As far
as possible in the circumstances persons being questioned by police mall be
afforded reasonably comfortable conditions and adequate breaks for rest and
refreshment”, which reflects the lastpstatement in the Note to Appendix A
of the Judgs’ Rules.
The inclusion of such a statement was opposed by some members on
the ground that if these matters of administrative arrangement are spelt out
in detail these instructions may be put in evidence and lead to argument in
court as to the adequacy of the arrangements for the comfort of the V
, accused and the nature of the refreshments offered. it was also pointed out
by police representatives that there is no provision by the Police
Department for refreshments for persons under interrogation, that frequently
meals are paid for by the investigating ofﬁcer, and that this can raise the
question of inducement.
It was therefore decided that no reference should be made in the
instructions to the conditions of interrogation or to breaks for rest and
refreshment but to leave it to the Commissioner to deal with these matters
as illustrations of how fairness can be achieved throughout the interrogation.
It was thought that in general questioning is carried out by the New South
Wales police under reasonably comfortable conditions and that it should be
. left to the judge and jury to decide in any particular case whether the
canons of fairness had been transgressed.
8. Questioning of persons with special disability '
Subclause 1 (e) is a general statement drawing attention to the need
for special care in interrogating persons with apparent inﬁrmity, feeble
understanding or special disability and persons apparently unfamiliar with
the English language.
The words “mentally ill” and “mentally defective” were avoided on
the ground that these would involve a medical assessment which the police
ofﬁcer would not be competent to "make; “Of feeble understanding” is an
expression used in the Note to Appendix A of the Judges’ Rules and
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appeared to the Committee to cover the situation‘ satisfactorily and include
within its range persons suffering from varying degrees of senility. The
procedures 1?) be followed in the case of persons of feeble understanding
are set out in subclause 2 (c).
For persons unfamiliar with the English language the police have a
panel of language experts, some from within the Force and some from
outside, and they also have access to interpreters for deaf. mutes.
9. Presence of another person during the interrogation
The preliminary working paper submitted by Mr Ward suggested that
some provision might be made for the presence of an observer during an
interrogation if the person questioned so desired, and particularly that a
friend or acquaintance present at the time of the alleged offence or an
independent witness of it should be permitted to remain during the
questioning. ’
Other members felt that this would serve no protective function to
the innocent and that the effective investigation of a crime required
separate questioning to check discrepancies and prevent collusion. The police
indicated a real problem in the possibility that a guilty person giving untrue
answers might anticipate. that this information would be conveyed to friends
or confederates, enabling the fabrication of corroborative evidence and the
setting up of false alibis, thus stultifying the investigation and weighting the
scales against the police. '
The difﬁculty was to frame an instruction which would be appropriate .
both to. the situation involving the unfortunate citizen who had got‘into the
hands of the police and perhaps needed some support and also that of the
experienced and hardened criminal. In the former case, apart from‘ the
consideration of good public relations, the situation might in certain
circumstances involve considerations of fairness when perhaps it should not
be refused, although there would of course be no duty on the police ofﬁcer
to inform the person of his right to make such a request.
In the case of the experienced criminal the presence of another person
would clearly be inappropriate to effective investigation, and the phrase
‘irnless the exigencies of the occasion otherwise require” was selected as a
qualiﬁcation which would allow the police ofﬁcer sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to
act according to the varying situations.
The relevant instruction ﬁnally approved by the Committee was as
follows: '
2 (b) If the person being questioned requests that any other person
. then in his company or in the immediate vicinity (other than a
suspected accomplice) remain within hearing during the
questioning, the Police ofﬁcer shall not, unless the exigencies of
the occasion otherwise require, prevent this, providing such other.
person does not hinder or obstruct the questioning.
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10. The caution
There was considerable criticism of the existing requirement that a
person should be cautioned by police before being interrogated. it was
pointed out that the caution is no help to the innocent and can only assist
the guilty, and also that it is illogical that when the police are endeavouring
to ascertain the author of a crime they should be required to tell the
person questioned that he need not answer. However, working within the
framework of the existing law, it was necessary to formulate an instruction
as to when the caution should be administered.
'Rule ll of the Judys' Rules states:
As soon _ as a Police. ofﬁcer ‘has evidence which would afford
remonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed
an offence, he shall caution that person .....
It was sugested that it may not be an easy matter for a police ofﬁcer to
determine how the evidence in his possession might appear to other'people
and that the test of having determined his own course of action was a
much simpler _one.. ' -
The‘altemative of Whenhe has made up his mind to arrest” was
then considered, but this raised a question as to whether the obligation
would be for the police ofﬁar to let the person know as soon as he was
regarded as a, person mestable for the offence or whether he would not be
obliyd to tell him until he was on the point of making the arrest. The two
are not necesarily the amne, as the investigation may call for other action
to be taken hefore the person is arrested. ' J ‘
__The Committee therefore decided to adhere to the existing Police
Instruction 16 (ll), requiring the administration of the caution when the
police ofﬁcer has made up his mind to charge the person. Police
representatives said they had experienced no difﬁculty with this instruction
in the past. Subclause 3 (a) was accordingly formulated as follows:
A Police ofﬁcer, before questioning a person whom he has made up .
his mind to charge, should so inform such person indicating the
natumf the proposed charge and should caution him in the usual‘
manner. The caution should be...... .
and the instruction then goes on to indicate the form of the caution,
amplifying the existing Police instruction according to whether ' the
interrogation is to be recorded or otherwise.
The additional requirement that the police ofﬁcer should inform the
person of his intention to dwge him and of the nature of the charge was
an extension of the existing police" instruction. Its purpose was to resolve
the unreal situation which. frequently arises when at some later stage the
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police, ofﬁcer is asked, “Had you made up your mind to ch
arge him?” The
police ofﬁcer may not at this stage be in a position to d
etermine the
precise charge or charges to be preferred, but the natu
re of the proposed
charge was thought to be sufﬁciently general for the purpo
se.
The fact of the police ofﬁcer having made up his mind to
charge the
suSpect does not of course preclude further questioning,
since whether or
not the person is in fact charged with the offence may well d
epend on the
outcome of the questioning and the further evidence whi
ch comes to light
-- the effect of which may also be to exonerate him.
11. Arrest procedure
The existing Police Instruction 16 (13) contained
under the heading
“Persons under Arrest” the following statemen
t:
For a Constable to press an'accused to say anything
with reference to
the crime of which he is accused is very wrong. T
here is, however, no
objection to a Constable listening to any mere volu
ntary statement an
accused desires to make, and repeating such statemen
t in evidence.
This apparently stems from the ancient dictum of Lord
Brampton, “Keep
your eyes open and your ears open, and your mouth shut
”, contained in an
address_to police ofﬁcers, which is reprinted in Cmd.
3297 (1929), p. 147.
It reﬂects also Rule 7 of the 1930 Judges’ Rules
prohibiting any
cross-examination on a voluntary statement except
for the purpose of
removing ambiguities. In the 1960 Judges’ Rules this
prohibition applies
only to the period" after the person has been charged or informed
that he
may be prosecuted for the offence.
This outdated police instruction, which was no longer i
n accordance
with police practice, was replaced in the new draft
instructions by
subclauses 3 (b), 3 (c) and 4 (a), dealing resp
ectively with arrest without
warrant, arrest on warrant, and questioni
ng after arrest.
(a) Arrest without warrant
In discussing the procedure for arrest it was felt that
the obligation
imposed by artistic v. Leachinsky to inform th
e suspect of the reason for
his arrest should be given effect to in an instruction.
The phrase “grounds
for the arrest" was selected after consideration o
f the difﬁculty sometimes
experienced in determining at this stage what the precise
offence is.
Mention was made of the device of a “holding” charge,
i.e. arresting
on a minor charge pending further investigation of a mor
e serious offence.
Police representatives gave examples of cases, some ve
ry recent, in' which
resort to a minor charge had later been followed by co
nviction for a more
serious offence, e.g., a charge of drunkenness resulting in a con
viction for
murder.
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In Christie v. Leachinsky the obligation to inform the person of the
reason for his arrest is abrogated where the circumstances are such that he
must be taken to know the cause or where he by his conduct makes it
impossible for the police ofﬁcer making the arrest to inform him, e.g., by
resisting arrest or by escaping.
The second part of subclause 3 (b) deals with the situation where a
person is invited by the police to come to a police station to answer
questions .about an offence] Although there "are obvious advantages in
questioning taking place at the station in that recording of the interview is
facilitated and the person is not needlessly embarrassed by being questioned
in public,..to some people such an invitation might appear to be more in
the nature of a command. The police ofﬁcer is therefore instructed to
inform the person that he is not under arrest. There is no further obligation
imposed on the police ofﬁcer to tell the suspect he is not obliged to come,
since it was thought that (apart from the administration of ' the caution
where required) it was no part of a police oﬁicer’s. duties to inform the
person of his civil-rights. » ' ' - .
(b) Arrest on warrant
Subclanse 3 (c) dealing. with arrest on warrant follows the existing
Police Instruction l6 (13): z .
.
On arresting a man on warrant a Police Ofﬁcer ought simply to read
his warrant or tell the accused the nature of the'charg upon which '
he is arrested, leaving it to-hir'n to‘ say anything or nothing as he'
. pleases, “ .
_ The reason for this instruction is administrative: the arresting ofﬁcer may
have .no information on the facts of the ease beyond the identiﬁcation of
the person to be arrested and therefore questioning should be left to the
ofﬁcers who have been dealing with the particular case.
The question was raised as to whether the wording of the instruction
.might appear to imply that further questioning was precluded or whether
further questioning (except in special circumstances) might in fact be
precluded on the ground that the. issue of a warrant was the
commencement of _the judicial process. It was pointed out, however, that
although the issue of a _warrant involves the exercise of a. judia'al power the
decision taken is simply to perform an administrative act; in other words, it
is at most a quasi judicial act, still essentially administrative in nature.
The Chief Justice said that although the name Warrant of Arrest
wouldvseem to make it clear that the serving of the warrant is an arrest
procedure and that subsequently the same procedures would apply as with
arrest in other circumstances some amendment of the wording of the
warrant (“. . . forthwith to apprehend andtbring the said defendant before a
Stipendiary Magistrate”) might be thought desirable.
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A paper setting out the historical basis of the Warrant of Arrest
appears in Appendix 10.
12. Questioning after arrest '
Rule I of the 1964 Judges’ Rules states that a police officer is
entitled to question any person —
whether or not the person in question has been taken into custody so '
long as he has not been charged with the offence or informed that he
may be prosecuted for it.
Rule III goes on to say —
It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence
should be put to the accused after he has been charged or informed
that he may be prosecuted. . . .
The wording “or informed that he may be prosecuted ...” is somewhat
ambiguous, and in R. v. Collier and R. v. Stenning" it was argued for the
defence that the arrest was itself tantamount to infomring the prisoners that
they might be prosecuted for the offence. It was however held by Lord
Parker, C.J. (Ashworth and Waller J.J. assenting) that the words “or
informed that'he may be prosecuted” in Rule III were intended to cover a
case where the suspect had not been arrested, and where, in the course of
questioning, a time came where the police contemplated that a summons
might be issued; but they did not apply to a case where the suspect had
been arrested and might, on further consideration, be charged.
The period between arrest and charge is of course the only
opportunity the police have for effective questioning, since prior to arrest
the person may simply walk away without answering any question and after
he has been charged the type of question which may be put to‘him is
strictly limited.
The new instruction, set out in subclause 4 (a), was formulated as
follows:
While in custody, and before being charged, a person may, after the
usual caution, be questioned as to any offence in respect of which he
has been arrested or may be charged. If he indicates a desire to make
a statement, he should be allowed to make any statement he wishes
in his own way.
l3.- The right to legal advice
Although it is clear that a person is entitled to seek to obtain legal
assistance immediately he has been charged with an offence there was
considerable debate about the situation in the period of interrogation
preceding the charge.
* (l965H W.L.R. I470
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Appendix A to the 1964 Judges’ Rules sets out as a basic principle — I
That every person at any stay of an investigation should be able to
communicate and consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if
he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay
or hindrance is wmd to the processes of investigation or the
administration of justice by his doing so;
and in Appendix 3, Administrative Direction No. 7 states _—
A person in custody should be allowed to speak on the telephone to
his solicitor . . . provided that no hindrance is reasonably likely to be
caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of
justice by his doing so.
'Ihis seems to_ recognim that there are many cases in which it seems fair.
and reasonable that the suspect should be permitted to seek legal advice ’
while there are others in which the'request for legal advice might be used I
by experienced crimihals to delay or hinder the investigation. But the '
proviso _ is in each'ctme 'so broadly stated that it was thought by the
Committee to pose a questich which even the courts might ﬁnd difﬁcult toJ. ‘
resolve and it seemed thirefoie that an instruction in these terms would not ‘
be appropriate for a police ofﬁcer. -
After a‘ great deal gfgdebate on the matter it was decided to deal
with it in two sections, the ﬁrst relating to the period prior to arrest and
the second the periOd Abetiveen arrest and charge. ‘
Prior to arrest a persm is' not subject to any restraint and is of
course entitled to we]: legal advice if'he so wishes. Some members thought
that since the fact that the police have no authority to exercise any
restraint in these circumstances is set out elsewhere in the instructions and
is well understood by police ofﬁcers there would be no need to reiterate it ‘
in this context and that to do so would simply, encourage people to
exercise more frequently the demand for legal consultau’on and further
- frustrate investigations when the police are already in the difﬁcult position
of trying to obtain informaﬁon from a person who may simply walk away
and refuse to answer. Others felt that since it commonly happens that a
person asks for legal advice before answering questions the police should
have some guidance on this situation, as otherwise they might be tempted
to ignore the request or delay complying with it, thus contravening what is
the law and proper practice and inviting a judicial decision that the evidence
should not be admitted. . ’ ' I
A compromise was reached in formulating an instruction which sets
out clearly the legal position while at the same ~time recognizing that there
may be situations of urgnq in which questioning should not be unduly
delayed. Subclause 2 (d) under the heading “Prior to arrest” states —
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1f the person being questioned desires to consult a legal adviser he is
entitled to do so and should not be prevented. If he so desires,
further questioning should, except in special circumstances, be
deferred, but only for such short period as is reasonably necessary
to
enable the person to attempt to obtain legal advice by telephone or
otherwise.
This is not of course to be taken to imply any right in the police to hold
for questioning at. this stage, as is made clear by subclause 2 (a) above.
In the period between arrest and charge the situation is changed in
that the person is not now legally entitled to legal advice, nor is he in a
position to contact a solicitor without assistance. The Committee was fairly
evenly divided on the question as to whether or not he should be permitted
to seek legal advice at this stage. Those who argued against did so on the
following grounds:
1. That no such requirement had so far been laid down by British
courts, and therefore its introduction into the instructions would not be
within the terms of reference of the seminar, namely, that it should work
within the framework of existing law.
2. That it was an attempt to introduce US. Supreme Court
doctrines representing judicial legislation based on the so-called
constitutional guarantees, which have no counterpart in British law.
3. That to introduce a lawyer at this stage would mean that the
adversary process is brought into existence at a stage earlier than the
charge.
4. That it would not be in the interests of the administration of
justice, since if there appears to be evidence of guilt the solicitor can only
advise his client not to answer any questions.
5. That it would discriminate between the wealthy and the skilful
criminal on the one hand and the poor and less intelligent on the other,
since the latter would not be expected to seek legal assistance.
6. That it could be used by the astute criminal to hinder the
investigation, and that the opportunity to use the telephone for this
purpose could be used to pass infcrrnation to confederates, perhaps resulting
in the destruction of evidence, the fabrication of alibis, or the suboming of
witnesses. ,
7. . There could be practical difﬁculties in attempting to obtain legal
advice at night or in the early hours of the morning, or in country districts
where a telephone might not be readily available.
On the other hand it was argued that the police are frequently
criticized for not having allowed the person to obtain legal advice before
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questioning and that there are many cases where it would do no harm to
the process of investigation and where it might appear fair and reasonable
that he should be permitted to contact his solicitor.
Subclause 4 (c) under the heading “Questioning after arrest” was
thought to achieve a compromise between the divergent views:
A person who has been arrested or charged or against whom any
information has been laid, who desires to obtain legal advice or
representation, shall be afforded by Police ofﬁcers such reasonable
facilities as may be possible to permit him to do so. Should the
person state that he does not wish to make any statement or answer
any questions until after consulting a legal adviser, the interview
should be deferred for such time as is reasonable in the circumstances
to enable the person to attempt to obtain legal advice.
This instruction recognizes that the person will need assistance if he is to
contact his solicitor and should therefore be afforded the necessary
facilities; that there is no obligation if such facilities are not readily
available; and that there is now not such urgency in the investigation, the
questioning being deferred not for such short time but for such time as is
reasonable in the circumstances.
To guard against the possibility that the investigation might be
stultiﬁed through the use of the telephone with the ostensible purpose of
contacting a solicitor it was thought that the police ofﬁcer might himself
dial the number and ascertain that it was in fact a solicitor being contacted.
At the same time it was recalled that one of the persons convicted in the
Great Train Robbery was a solicitor.
Two other matters relating to legal assistance were raised in discussion,
but it was not thought necessary to deal with these in the instructions. The
ﬁrst was the case of the solicitor who apparently has a standing brief to act
whenever his client has been picked up by the police and who arrives at a
police station to make inquiries whenever the client is missing from his
usual haunts. The second concerns the solicitor who arrives at the police
station claiming to represent the person being interrogated despite the fact
that the latter has made no request for legal advice. In the latter case the
solicitor might of course have been retained by a member of the family or
a friend, but in either case it was agreed that the police officer should ask
the suspect whether he wished to consult with this solicitor and if so,
proceed according to instruction 4 (c). ~ ’
There was unanimous agreement that there is no legal entitlement for
a solicitor to remain during the questioning of his client and that after
having tendered his advice he may be asked to leave. This is implicit also in
the words “consult privately” in Appendix A to the Judges’ Rules.
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l4. Statements by other persons implicated in the same offence
Rule V of the Judges’ Rules and Instruction 16 (14) of the N.S.W.
Police Instructions both relate to the situation where two or more persons
have been charged with the same offence, and state that a written
statement by one may be handed to another to read but that nothing shall
be said or done to invite a rcply and if either then indicates a desire to
make a statement he should be ﬁrst cautioned.
The new instructions deal with the matter in two sections, subclause
2 (e) relating to questioning before arrest and'4 (d) to the period between
arrest and charge. In both cases it is stated that there is no objection to a
person being shown and allowed to read, or have read to him, a statement
or record of interview by another person concerning the offence. He may
then be questioned on the statement, provided that if the police ofﬁcer has
made up his mind to charge him with the offence he should ﬁrst be
cautioned.
The Committee felt that a person is entitled to know the evidence
against him as and when it arises and that it is important to the
investigation that the police should be able to question a suspect in these
circumstances since he is likely to more readily answer questions once he
sees that an accomplice has implicated him in the offence. ‘
It was agreed that as a matter of principle if the suspect is able to
read the statement for himself this should be the procedure. The words “or
have read to him” were included to cover the case of a person unable to
read or for some other reason not able to read the statement for himself,
e.g., not having his spectacles.
15. Telephone calls on behalf of persons charged
The question of telephone calls by persons charged was thought
sufﬁciently important to call for a separate instruction. Clause 5 is therefore
a new instruction and states that it shall be the obligation of the police
ofﬁcer in charge of the matter to telephone, if requested, a relative of the
person charged, or his solicitor, or a person who may arrange bail, and, if
desired, the doctor of his choice.
The accused is to be allowed to make the telephone call personally
only if the police ofﬁcer thinks prOper. Here again the Committee .
recognized the hazard to the processes of investigation and the
administration of justice which may ensue from indiscriminate use of the
telephone by an accused person.
16. Questioning after charge
Subclause 4 (b) deals with questioning after charge, and the wording
closely follows that of Rule III of the 1964 Judges’ Rules in that it permits
\
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questioning “only in exceptional circumstances" and where the questions are
necessary “for the purpose of preventing or minimizing harm or loss to
some other person or to the public”.
The new instruction does, however, go beyond the Judges’ Rules by
extending the exceptional circumstances to include “the purpose of
recovering property or in respect of new or fresh matters”. The Committee
thought that where fresh evidence had been received after the person had
been charpd he should be given the opportunity to comment on this. .
l7. Questioning of children
In New South Wales the police have certain powers and duties under
the Child Welfare'Aet, 1939, and for the purposes of this Act the foll
owing
deﬁnitions apply: “child” means a person under the age of 16 year
s;
Wotmg person” means a person 16 and under 18 years of age; “juvenil
e”
includes both these classes.
The existing Police Instructions have a separate section which deals
comprehensively with juveniles, but the Conunittee thought that the
questioning of dn'ldren was of sufﬁcient importance to be included in the
re'visedjristmctions-relating to interrogations, - . .
The new instructions relate only to “children”, i.e., persons under
the
ag of 16 years, since the Committee wasunanirnously of the opinion that
persons of 16 years and over do not need any special protection during the
process of interrogation.
,. . Although it was thought desirable that an independent person should
be present at the questioning of a child it was realized that the parents are
not 'necesarily suitable persons for this purpose. For instance, the child
may be unwilling to answer questions in their presence or there may be
cases in which it is likely they have been implicated in the offence. Since
the Child Welfare” Department thought it inappropriate for its ofﬁcers to be
involved during the period of investigation the instruction was framed to
specify the presence of a parent, guardian, relative, friend or other
. responsible person, or,~if considerations of time or distance preclude the
attendance of an)" independent person, a senior police ofﬁcer not connected
- with the case. *
. This instmction' is not absolute, but is qualiﬁed by the words “if
reasonably practicable”, since it was realized that' there may be
circumstances where it is important .that the investigation should not be
delayed despite the fact that no independent person is immediately
._ available.
The instruction also takes into account the fact that a child may state
his age wrongly to avoid having his parents brought into the matter and it
may_be difﬁcult for the police to determine on appearance whether or not
he is under 16. It therefore commences, “If the person being interviewed is '
believed to be a child .....”
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The question was raised as to whether or not the child should be
given a choice in the matter of having another person present at the
interrogation, particularly if he is merely being questioned as a possible
witness to the offence. The Committee thought that the police should insist
against his objection, since they would have no protection if he were to
make a confession and it was later suggested that they did not give him an
opportunity to have an independent person present at the interrogation.
Subclause 7 (c) states that police should avoid interviewing pupils at
school. Police representatives said that this was normal police practice, as
they always sought to keep the fact of a child having committed an offence
away from his school and persons connected with it. Where it was necessary
to interview a child, effect an arrest or effect a service of any process
against him this was usually done at his home or at a police station. If it
was essential to call at the school (eg, when called in
by school
authorities) they always went in plainclothes.
Subclause 7 (d) states that if it is deemed necessary to question a
pupil at school the principal (or, if absent, the next senior teacher) should
be present during the interview, and it should be conducted privately.
The ﬁnal instructions relating to the interrogation of children were
drafted 'by Mr Snelling in accordance with previous discussions and were
adopted by the Committee without change.
18. The taking of statements
The procedure laid down ‘for the taking of statements generally
follows that set out in the Judges’ Rules but is in some respects more
precise. Under the Judges’ Rules, if the person who has made a statement
refuses to read it or to write a certiﬁcate of correctness at the end of it or ,
to sign it, the senior police ofﬁcer present is to record on the statement
and in the presence of the person making it what has happened. If the
person cannot read, or refuses to read it, the ofﬁcer who has taken it down
reads it to him, asks him whether he would like to correct, alter or add
anything, and puts his signature or mark at the end. The police ofﬁcer then
certiﬁes on the statement what he has done.
Under the draft instructions, when the statement has been completed
the senior ofﬁcer available, and if possible, one not involved in the
investigation, is to be called in to ask the suspect if this is his statement, if
it is a true record of the interview, whether it was true and voluntary, and
whether he has any complaints. The senior police ofﬁcer then initials and
dates the statement, showing the place, the time, and the circumstance.
The Judges’Rules make no mention of the supply of a copy of his
statement to the person interrogated. The New South Wales Police
Instructions state that a copy of a statement made by a person charged
with an offence may be supplied to that person on request, and the policy
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has been that where the document is signed by the person he shall receive
a copy forthwith, but if it is unsigned he may apply to the Department to
be furnished with a copy and this application will be determined on its
merits by the Commissioner.-
19. Unsigned statements or records of interview
The matter of the admissibility in evidence of unsigned statements or
records of interview was one which the Chief Justice had very much in
mind in' convening the seminar. Although cases in the Supreme Court and
the High court had decided that such a document could be tendered in
evidence‘ if the accused had subscribed to it by acknowledging it to be a
correct record of the interrogation, these statements had become so subject
to challenge in the courts that there was a growing tendency among trial
judges to exclude them. It was stated that the current thought seemed to
be that if they were not signed they were not adopted, and several judges
had come to rule this as a matter of course.
The Chief Justice was therefore strongly' of the opinion that if the
person interrogated were to be given a copy of the statement at the time it.
was made this procedure would greatly asist the court in the exercise of
the discretion whether or not to admit the document and in rebuttal of
challenys as to its authenticity. Speaking in the debate on this matter,~ he
said: ' ~ .
In all my life sitting on the Bench in criminal matters I have been
assailed with argument that the statement was a perversion of the
truth, that it had been invented by the police, that no questions were
asked, or answered by the accused person, and that the document was
corrupt and the whole thing a fraud from start to ﬁnish.
' / We agree, and experience shows, that police sometimes err on the side
of zeal. Nonetheless, these statements are mostly the result of
spontaneous disclosures by. a man who is prepared to talk after he has
been arrested. They are prepared to talk to the arresting constable,
but when they come to trial they raise‘the question, for the ﬁrst
time, that the statement was forced from them by threats and terror,
or else that the whole thing was an invention.
‘Now, what greater argument, more convincing or cogent, can the
Crown have than by saying to the jury that the accused has this
statement given to him at the time, that he did not tell a superior
ofﬁcer or the magistrate that he didn’t say these thing and his
solicitor didn’t mentionit at the hearing at the court below?
So therefore I say that the greatest bulwark against fraud and
collusion that you can have is to_ give a copy of the statement to the .
man there and then. He may try to make some misuse of it, he may
seek to destroy it and say he.was never given it, but nine times out
of ten the fact that he was given it will appear as an essential truth.
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The matter was debated many times, and at the meeting of 28th July,
1970, Judge Levine recapitulated the earlier arguments as follows:
The ﬁrst thing you notice is that the suspect is only to be entitled to
- a copy of a document he has not signed if it is to be alleged against
. him that he said it was correct.
Some judys admit in evidence statements that have not been signed
and some don’t, but that is not simpliciter — it depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. I don’t think the mere fact that the
accused had got a copy of the statement would make it admissible. I
don’t think that would affect the ultimate decision as to whether or
not it is going to be admitted.
Another point that was spoken on was that counsel for accused
persons believe — rightly or wrongly — that a written document in
the hands of the jury carries more weight, even when it is unsigned,
than the oral evidence given by the police ofﬁcer.
If the Crown doesn’t tender the statement, very often the police
ofﬁcer says, “i have got an exact note of what was said, if I am
allowed to look at it”, and counsel for the accused often doesn’t
object to this course, and the police ofﬁcer ends up pretty well
reading it word for word, so that in the end the evidence can get to
the jury in its exact form, extracted by the police ofﬁcer from the
document. But it was thought to be somewhat different to allow the
police ofﬁcer to refresh his memory from the document and to quote
from it almost word for word than to allow the document itself to go
before the jury.
Another argument against giving the accused the document was that
unless he has signed it it is really only an aide-memoire to the police
ofﬁcer. It is his document, and not the accused’s. He has brought it
into being for the purpose of refreshing his memory and for no other
purpose, so that unless it is signed the accused should not get it.
Sometimes an unsigned statement fails to get into evidence because it
is not only question and answer but may contain a statement such as,
“At this point the accused was shown . . . .” so that is then becomes
a narration instead of simply a record of a conversation. And there
are many other things that may keep it out other than the
non-signing.
The police objection to handing over the document immediately was
that it may facilitate the fabrication of evidence. If it is a long document
the suspect may have little recollection of what he has said during the
interrogation, but if he is given a copy of the actual record he may be able
to concoct evidence to meet the situation. It was also said that an unsigned
statement was in no real sense different from the ofﬁcial notebook or other
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rough notes made by the policeman, and that to direct police to hand over
a copy of an unsigned statement may open up the way for the defence to
call for these also, to which there would be great objection.
Despite these arguments, many active detectives were in_favour of
handing over the statement immdiately. In the ﬁnal analysis it was found
that the Committee was still fairly evenly divided, not, as might have been
expected, between the police and the leyLmembers, but with division
among the police, among the legal members, and even among the academics.
The Committee therefore resolved that it _ could not pronounce on this
matter and no instructim was formulated.
In November, 1970, however, the Grief Justice directed attention to a
statement from the Bend: in the Court of Criminal Appeal in a joint
judgment by Manning Lit-and Taylor J. in the ease of R. v. Dugan, where
the police ofﬁcer had been permitted to use an unsigned statement for —. . I
‘hefreshment of recdlecticnﬁwhemg‘vinghis evidence. This statement was
as follows: .‘ ' - ' '
Evidence was also g'veriby Detective.._Constable McNamara that it is.
5 not the practia toaerveia'fcopy 'of- a ‘ﬁecord of interview" on the ‘
I? accused when it ismmdyed; this is a direction from the Commissioner
of Police and the. mlyn‘ﬁecordof interview”. to be handed to the
suspect is one whidi hasbeén dyed 2 .
We do not know whetinr this is so or not but we would have
thought that it may be a very unwis direction. If the contents of a
“record of interview” are to‘be y've'n in evidence, the accused should
be given a copy as a matter of fairness. Otherwise it may have the
result of making such “records of interview” suspect and liable to
attack. Perhaps if it is a directiqi from the Commissioner of Police
the matter may be recanidered in due course.
In light of this statement the Cbmmittee'was reconvened to consider
whether the Commissioner should now beadvised to amend his instructions
.in such a manner as to ensure that an accused person would be given a
copy of the record of interview whetlnr or not it had been_signed or
acknowledged to be correct. ’
Commissioner Allan, who attended this meeting, said that the policy
of his Department on records of interview had been laid down in 1965
following a conference of his senior ofﬁcers. The policy regarding unsigned
records of interview was that where the person is charged with the offence
on application by him or on' his behalf to be furnished with a’ copy of the
unsigned document would be determined on its merits by the
Commissioner.
_ After further discussion the Committee still remained ﬁrmly
, deadlocked on the question of the 'procedure for dealing with unsigned  
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statements and decided that it could only adhere to it
s previous decision
not to pronounce ‘on this matter.
The matter was ﬁnally resolved by the Police Department i
tself when
the draft instructions were being considered for adoption
. At this time
Commissioner Hanson approved the insertion of an additi
onal instruction
stating that whether or not a statement or record of i
nterview had been
signed the person interrogated should be given a copy for
thwith.
20. Detention for questioning: the right against sel
f-incrimination
Although the question of a police power to hold for que
stioning was
not strictly within the terms of reference of the Committ
ee it was a matter
that inevitably arose in the context of other matters and i
t revealed much
division of opinion.
Professor Shatwell said that the law in this area was c
onfused and
uncertain and placed the police ofﬁcer in a dilemma i
n that it was very
difficult for an invesu'gation to proceed without resort
to the device of
- using a holding charge or some degree of bluff and at
times the acquiescing
in illegalities by all concerned, particularly where the'
suspect had ﬂed to
another State and there was insufficient evidence to enab
le a warrant to be
obtained until it was possible to question him.
'
Other members felt that neither the Government, the leg
al profession
nor the community in general would accept such a
Chang in the law at the
present time. Police representatives pointed out that an
authority to hold
for questioning would in any case be ineffective without so
me restriction of
the right against self-incrimination, since the period of
detention would
necessarily be brief and the experienced criminal would s
imply “sit it out”.
The Chief Justice was in the earlier stages of the discuss
ions strongly
opposed to polio: having a power to detain for questioni
ng, but he later
suggested that the risk of suspects being detained wi
thout arrest might be
minimized if Parliament were to confer power by sta
tute on certain
high-ranking ofﬁcers to detain a suspect for questioning bef
ore a magistrate,
and that answers, and refusal to answer, should t
hen be recorded and
admissible in evidence.
The Committee decided that any such changes in the law
would be a
matter for referral to the Criminal Law Committee,
but since the matter
was outside the terms of reference of the seminar it wa
s not prepared to
make any recommendation in this regard.
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APPENDIX 1
Extract from a Report to the Government by the then Chief Justice of
New South Wales (Sir Ledie Herron) following a Conference of Australian
and New Zealand Chief Justices held at Wellington, New Zealand, in
February, 1965
(1) Rules of the Queen’s .Bench (Eng. ) relating‘to Confessional Statements
The Chief Justices gave very careful consideration to this matter and
the discuss'on occupied a great deal of the time of the Conference. The
question was whether the Chief Instices favoured adopting in Australia the
1964 Judges’ Rules and Administrative Directions to the Police recently
published in England, or whether they favoured formulating amended
Judges’ Rules in the States different from the English Rules 'and different
also from the Rules hitherto recognized, or whether they should take no
action.
It appeared to the Chief Justices in pneral terms that the Judges’
Rules have no legal force in Australia.» They are used only as a pneral
guide to the kind of conduct which will be considered apprOpriate in the
taking of police statements. But they have no binding force. The legal
position as to admisﬂbility in New South Wales is governed by the
Common Law rule that statements must be voluntary and by section 410
of the Crimes Act, NSW. The latter reads as follows:
~ “No confession, admission or statement shall be received in evidence
against an accused person if it has been induced —
.(a) by an untrue representation made to him by the prosecutor, or
‘ ' some person in authority; or
(b) by any threat or promise, held out to him by the prosecutor, or
some person in authority. -
Every confession, admission or statement made after any such
representation or threat or promise shall be deemed to have been
induced thereby, unless the contrary be shown.
Provided that no confession, admission or statement by the accused
shall be rejected by reason of his having been told, by a person in
authority, that whatever he should say might be given in evidence for
or against him.” '
To these rules is added the trial Judge’s discretion to exclude
statements unfairly obtained. This discretion is one which the Judges
originally gave to themselves as a rule of practice: Ibrahim v. Rex (1914
AC. 599, per Lord Sumner at 611—613). Courts have no authority (save in
the course of administering justice) to control the policy when investigating
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crime but, as Judges, it is their duty to rule upon the admissibility of
evidence‘. In regard to this, the Judges’ Rules were formulated from time to
time as a guide to the police and their authority is due directly to the fact
that they were promulgated by the executive. This guide, though essential
in England where there is no centralization of the Police Force, is not quite
sonecessary in New South Wales where the Police are under one central
control. This central control enables uniform instructions easily to be g'ven
administratively governing the taking of all Police statements.
In New South Wales it has become recognized that, in exercising the
general discretion which the Judges use to exclude unfair statements, regard
will be had, but only in a general way, to the English Judges’ Rules which
aretaken as a general guide to Police conduct. The discretion therefore is
exercised in this State in a rather more general way than in England. In
this regard we are also assisted by the section of the Crimes Act. It is felt
that this position tends to promote justice and that this wider discretion
should not be lightly cut down by the deliberate adoption of carefully
formulated Rules; it is better that it should be generally known that the
Judy will be guided ﬁnally simply by what. is fair in the circumstances of
a particular case. (See Lenthall v. Curran, 1933 S.A.S.R. 248 at 260.)
It is to be noted that the new Rules have been received. in English
periodicals with some considerable reserve and in the opinion of the Chief '
Justices they tend to be over-elaborate, especially if applied to New South
Wales conditions. The Chief Justices felt that there is much force ‘in a
criticism which was clearly stated in an article on the point in the
Australian Law Journal, March 30th, 1964, pp. 337—338:
“They (the new Rules) demonstrate the unsoundness of Judges
endeavburing to administer the police force. That there is need to
reform the procedures concerning the taking of statements from
accused persons cannot be denied, but the laying down of rules with
regard thereto is a matter for the legislature or for police
commissioners, and not for Judges.” '
The A.L.J. concludes:
“Whatever might be said of the spirit of the new rules, there is little
likelihood that any attempt will be made in Australia to proclaim
~ them judicially.”
The Chief Justices, while thinking there might be a case for some
tightening up of the Police Code of Conduct from‘ within the Police Force,
. nevertheless were unanimously of the opinion that they should not
recommend the adoption in the Australian States of the new Rules, either
with or without modiﬁcation. While it may be possible to suggest some
improvement in the draftmanship of the old Judges’ Rules if it were. now
necessary to reformulate them, yet they have worked reasonably well in the
New South Wales framework and the Chief Justices recommend that no
alteration or amendement be proposed.
I
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Finally, after much discussion, the Chi
ef Justices ad0pted the 1
resolution of which the following is a copy
:
“The Chief Justices at their Conference gave c
lose attention to
the problem of the admission of incrimina
tory statements made by
accused persons. They regard this as a most
important aspect of the
administration of justice. The Conference con
sidered at length the new
Judges’ Rules promulgated by the Judges
of the Queen’s Bench
Division in England and desire to make
the following statement
thereon: '
1. ‘ Neither the old nor the new English
Judges’ Rules have the
force of law in Australia or in New Zealan
d. In considering whether
confessional statements made by persons char
ged with crimes ought to
be admitted in evidence the Australian and N
ew Zealand Courts have
taken into account whether police ofﬁcers
have complied with the
spirit of these Rules. But our Courts have nev
er regarded compliance
or non-compliance an a dea'sive factor and h
ave always emphasized
that it is for the Court to take into account
all the circumstances of
an individual case in determining whether a conf
essional statement
should be admitted.
2. As far as the Australasian Judges are c
oncerned they wish to
state that they have no authority to mak
e any such rules. It is for
the authorities in char; of the various Police
Forces to make their
own rules for the good conduct and guidance of t
heir ofﬁcers and the
Judges are always at their guard to ensure t
hat fair conduct is
observed by the Police in the examination o
f suspects. The law
requires a Judge to determine whether in th
e light of all the
circumstances of a case there are such elements
of unfairness in the
use made by the Police 'of their position in re
lation to the accused
that a confession alleged to have been made
by him ought to be
rejected. An appeal lies from the order of a Judge.
3. It follows that it would be entirely inappropriate f
or this
conference to purport to approve or disapprove the ne
w detailed
Rules formulated by the English Judges. It may be that
the Police
Commissioners or other proper authorities will give considera
tion to
them in the formulation of administrative instructions. Sh
ould
amendments be made to the existing instructions no doubt judge
s will
in the course of trials take them into account as an admini
strative
attempt to prescribe standards of propriety for the conduct of p
olice
interviews but no code of rules can guarantee fairness and justice
in
advance in every case. A police ofﬁcer’s sense of fair play in a
given
case is likely to be of much greater importance than mere complian
ce
with a set of written rules.” . '
There are one or two matters of practical consideration
that arise
from. this. It may be that in future the Full Court, sitting as a Co
urt of
Criminal Appeal, will declare in a judgment the principles applic
able to
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taking statements. It is quite possible that such judgment wouki refer to
and incorporate some of the principles which are seen in the new Judges’
Rules in England. However, it cannot be said that rules prevent dishonest
policemen from giving evidence that the rules have been followed.
One further thing is that the Judges should have no objection,
particularly from conveying to the 'Crown Law authorities what their views
are. There are several useful Rules; for instance, Rule [V with regard to
details of taking written statements, and Appendix B as to arrangements as
to rest and refreshment, etc. The practical consideration is that Judges
should watch carefully the evidence as to voluntary statements but not be
bound by strict Rules. The police, after all, have to investigate crime and
they should not be unduly curtailed. The rules are a compromise betwee
n
two conﬂicting interests, (a) the public, and (b) the individual.
The Chief Justices thought that there should be lectures given to
Police periodically by experts, and they should be dissuaded from being
unscrupulous in the taking of statements. But the Chief Jusu'ces also
thought that unscrupulous Policemen would not be hampered by the Rules,
but that scrupulous ones might be.
A revision of the Police Regulation Act, 1899—1957, should be
considered to bring in such amendments or modiﬁcations as more modern
practice seems to suggest. The Police Force is governed by this Act. It
creates a centralized Police Force under a Commissioner, who is charged
with its superintendence, subject to the direction of the Minister, who is
the Premier of the State. The Commissioner is appointed by the Governor,
who likewise appoints the superintendents and inSpectors. The
Commissioner, subject to disallowance by the Governor, appoints sergeants
and constables.
In New South Wales the old Rules, 1912—1918, are incorporated in
the Act and Rules governing the Police Force, and these may well need
revision in light of the recent English Rules, so it would be a matter for
the Attorney General and the law Officers of the Crown to be on guard
constantly to revise these- and to lecture to the Police Force constantly o
n
the newly revised matter.
I am contemplating convening a seminar of Magistrates, Quarter
Sessions Judges and the Judges of the Supreme Court, and possibly Crown
Prosecutors, members of the Bar and Crown ofﬁcers engaged in criminal
work to discuss these matters. Reference would be made to the High
Court’s judgment in McDermott v. R. (76 C.L.R. 501) and also to R.
v.
Jeffries (47 SR. 284) and R. v. Lee (82 C.L.R. 133). See also R. v. Ba
iley
(1956 S.A.S.R. 153) and R. v. Evans (1962 S.A.S.R. 303).
However, before this is done I recommend that the whole matter be
discussed with the Attorney General and such other Ministers and/or Law
Ofﬁcers of the Crown as he may nominate.
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APPENDIX 2
Preliminary Statements by Members of the Committee
(a) Judge Levine:
. ' Confessional Statemarts
1. The function of the criminal law is the protection of the -
commrmity from crime. .
2. This protection is most likely to be effective where crime is
- detected and the criminal brought to justice.
3. In New South Wales the! function of detection (and prevention)
of crime and identiﬁcation of the criminal is for the most part
entrusted to the police force under the Police Regulation Act,
1957.
'4. The best information about a crime can usually be givenby the
actual perpetrator, who knows better than anyone else what he
did and with what mind, and consequently facts against him are
likely to be true if he has admitted them of his own free will
(we article by R. R. Kidson, 33 A..LJ 369). At the same time
it is essential that the Court be assured that what is confessed is
true in fact, because it has been rightly said that the possibility
that a person may falsely acknowledy guilt will always arise
when an innocent person is placed in such a position that an
untrue acknowledgment of guilt is at the time the more
promising of two alternatives between which he is forced to
choose (Wrgmore, 3rd edn Vol. 3, p.246).
- 5. To ensure that such confessions are true ones the Common Law
rule is that no statement of an accused person is admissible in
evidence against him at his trial unless it is shown by the
prosecution to have been a voluntary statement. The rule is said ‘
to be as old as Lord Hale (Re Voisr'n 13 C.A.R 94, R. -.v
Kempley 44 S.R. at 434).
. 6. To determine whether the confessionalstatement of an accused
be voluntary or not, all the circumstances of its making must be
considered, and the ,Judges’ Rules do set out matter which
should be considered. ' ‘
7. The Judges’ Rules are directions to the police, compliance with
which is necessary (in England) if they do not wish to run the
risk of having a confession obtained in breach'of them rejected ‘
at the trial. (For Rules see note to R. v. Voisin 1918 (1) KB.
531 at 539; in their present form see Halsworthy 3rd edn V. 10
pp. 470—472; and for added mles see 1964 (l) A.E.R. at p. 23.)
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10.
11.
In England these Rules do not have the force of law, nor do
they have the force of law in New South Wales, where they
have been adopted in substance in a code of Instructions made
by the Commissioner of Police for the guidance of police in this
State in their conduct of interrogations (R. v. Ragen 81
W.N.573).
A strict compliance with the Judges’ Rules would in most cases
result in true confessions, but in my view such compliance
should not automatically entitle a confession to be admitted in
evidence at the trial nor should a failure to comply
automatically result in rejection. The decision whether the
confession be a voluntary one must be made by the Trial Judge
on all the circumstances then established (on voir dire),
including, of course, the circumstances in which the statement
was made which would involve the considerations contemplated
in the Judys’ Rules. A judge will then exclude statements in all
circumstances where he thinks they have been improperly
obtained (McDermott 76 C.L.R. at 515), but even if there has
been a contravention of the Rules the Trial Judge still has a
discretion whether to admit the statements or not (Smith (1961)
46 CAR. $1). ‘ .
[t is of importance that the Commissioner of Police so instruct
his policemen upon the manner of interrogation as to ensure the
likelihood of any confession being admitted in evidence, and,
broadly speaking, the instructions given constitute a good guide.
But this is a matter for the Commissioner; the judges should not
bind themselves in advance.
Any instructions so given should have as their dominant purpose
the detection of the crime and identiﬁcation of ' the criminal,
'and at the same time should afford adequate protection to an
innocent person being questioned and to the policeman, who
may be subsequently challenged.
It is essential that sight be not lost of the principle appearing in
paragraph (1) above, and that no rule of law or practice be
adopted which encourages the matter of the detection of crime
and identiﬁcation of the criminal to be treated as some kind of
game in which the criminal is afforded protection he \does not
deserve and rewards and congratulations are afforded topersons
who are acquitted of crimes albeit guilty they may be.
Additional comments by Judge Levine
(a) 1 do not favour the incorporation of any so-called Judges Rules
in any Act or Regulation, because it could result in their too
rigid application. It is quite impossible for the Rules to cover all
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(b)
possible situations, and in my view they cannot and should not
do more than afford a guide for the exercise of the Trial
Judge’s discretion after hearing evidence (on the voir dire) and
the argument and submissions of counsel.
(b) I do not favour the suggestion that before a statement can be
admitted in evidence the prosecution should be obliged to prove
that it was given in the presence of an independent person. Such
a procedure would in my view. be impracticable, because it often
happens in the investigation of crime that immediate answers
must be had from suspects to enable investigations to be
. immediately and effectively continued, and in the end such
answers may turn out to be confessional statements in the light
of subsequently ascertained facts.
(c) I am not in favour of ‘ the Judges’ Rules. being shown to
' suspected persons, or that they be speciﬁcally advised of their
so-called rights to silence or to have their legal adviser present. I
do not believe there is anything like an absolute right to silence
or to legal advice, and there would be endless difﬁculties arising
in relation to whether ornnot the suspect understood the Judges’
Rules. Indeed, a suspected person could ask questions about his
rights which could be resolved only by the Trial Judge. And on
whom is it suggested that the burden would be to ensure that
the suspected person rmderstood the instructions before further
questions were asked?
((1) It is for the Commissioner of Police to formulate his instructions
to his police ofﬁcers. He should have the assistance of the State
Law Ofﬁcers, and judgs too if he wishes, but his instructions
are made to regulate the conduct of his men and should be in
accordance with paragraph (10) above.
hofessor K. 0. Shatwell
Patterns of crime in modem democratic societies
In all modern cities there exist criminal subcultures consisting of
' (l) a large number of socially inadequate persons who are regularly
convicted of offences against person and prOperty, and (2) a hard core
of tough and skilful criminals who achieve considerable success in
their enterprises. The organizational and executive skills possessed by
the latter lead to forms -of organization which may pass beyond the
control of law enforcement instrumentalities in societies which
subscribe to the rule of law if the activities of such individuals are
not checked in the early stages. The leaders are increasingly able to
avoid direct participation in criminal activities, and with the
acquisition of wealth they acquire power to influence and corrupt,
and other advantages deriving from their contacts in political, social,
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legal and press circles. These patterns are already much further
advanced, not only in London but in other large cities of the
Commonwealth, than is commonly supposed.
If police forces did not wage an unceasing war against both
types of criminals life would be intolerable for the law abiding citizen.
The difﬁculties of police in light of their limited powers
The powers of the police in relation to questioning, arrest and
charge have been narrowly deﬁned against the background of the
principle that every police ofﬁcer is civilly, and in some cases
criminally, responsible for acts subsequently held to be unjustiﬁed by
an ex posto facto value judgment by a court as to what was
reasonable at the time.
The solution of crimes necessarily involves the questioning of
possible suspecm and other persons who may be able to throw light
upon the occurrence. The fact is that skilful and persistent questioning
over a period not excessively prolonged produces a large number of
genuine confessions of guilt and also Operates to free a number of
persons from suspicion of complicity. The legal rules to which the
police are subject nevertheless preclude such questioning where a
person refuses at the outset both to answer questions and to remain
in the presence of a police ofﬁcer unless compelled to do so. The
police ofﬁcer has then to choose between abandoning the inquiry in
respect of such an individual or exposing himself to the risk of an
action for false imprisonment.
There is therefore a strong element of social hypocrisy in the
assumption that crimes can be solved without resort to persistent
questioning both of suSpects and of other persons who for various
reasons may be reluctant to volunteer information. The present system
is unfair to conscientious police ofﬁcers and detrimental to their
morale, and the police dilemma is not lessened by the fact that the
community calls for the apprehension of criminals with the same
vociferousness with which it criticizes police methods.
Comments
1. The iniposition of formal restrictions on the investigative process
is in my opinion outside the judicial function. \
2. There is at present more need to protect the individual and
society against criminal activities than to protect individuals
against possible misuse of police power. I think therefore that
the police power to question should be put beyond doubt by
the conferrnent of a statutory power to detain for questioning
for a period up to, say, 48 hours, with further detention by
order of a magistrate where necessary.
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An accused person is entitled to arrange for legal representation
after being charged. I see no ground for any assumption that the
right extends further than this, and no reason for legally
extending this right.
. - I would draw attention to'the clear reSponsibility of counsel for
the defence in criminal cases to reconcile the duty to the client
with the paramount duty not to mislead the court. This includes
a proper scrupuloumess in relation to allegations on behalf of
their clients that there has been police misconduct.
vIn- my opinion there diould be no right against
. self-incrimination. This means simply that if a suspect refuses to-
give information to the police this should be allowed to count
against him in subsequent proceedings.
The accused should be compelled to disclose any defence at the
preliminary hearing. This would be a safeguard against the
fabrication of defences by dishonest lawyers and private
investigators. .
.. ' The practice of allowing unswom statements from the dock is a
thoroughly bad one. If the accused declines to go into the box
- his failure to do so should belopen to adverse comment.
Associate-Professor R. P. Roubron(C)
Confesa'ons and admissions: Mandatoor exchm‘on
The rule that involuntary confessions are inadmissible is of relatively
recent origin.
It may not be without sigriﬁc'ance to note that there appears to be
an _important divergence of view between the English and the Australian
Courtsas to the meaning to be given to 'the term “involuntary”. In England
theterm seems to be construed in quite a limited sense; “that it has not
. been obtained by fear of prejudice or- hope of advantage, exercised or held
out by a person in authority or by oppression.” In Australia, the High
Court adopts a more comprehensive interpretation. As Dixon J. said in
McDermott v. King (76 C.L.R.:)
“It is perhaps doubtful, whether, particularlyin this country, a
sufﬁciently wide operation has been given to the basal principle that.
to be admissible a confession must be voluntary, a principle the
_ application of which is ﬂexible and is not limited by any category of
inducement that may prevail over a man’s will.”
The statement must be made in theexercise of a free choice to speak
or remain silent and
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“if he speaks because he is overbome, his confessional statement
‘ cannot be received in evidence and it does not matter by what means
he has been overbome.”
Various reasons have been suggested for the introduction of this -
principle. Some consider it reﬂected judicial antipathy to the more barbaric
methods of extorting confessions, whilst others have suggested it was
introduced to mitigate the former severity of the criminal law.
Whatever its original justiﬁcation, opinion remains divided as to its
present day justiﬁcation. Doubts have, from time to time, been expressed as
to the wisdom of such a_ rule and of the way in which it has been applied
by the Courts. ‘
“I can confess that I cannot look at the decisions without some
.shame when I consider what objections have prevailed to prevent the
reception of confessions in evidence; and I agree . . . that the rule
has been extended quite too far, and that justice and commonsense
' have, too frequently, been sacriﬁced at the shrine of mercy”; (R.v.
dery (1852) 2. Dem. C..C 430 p. 444, 445) '. k
“Many reasons may be urged in favour of the admissibility ofall
confessions, subject of course to their being tested by the cross-
.examiriatioir‘ of those'who heard and testify of them; and‘Bentham
bems‘ to be of this opinion . . . . but this -is not the law of England.”
(R.v. Thompson(1893)2 0.13.12 p. 15) _ " A
“I must say that the law as to the admissibility of the confessions
appears to me to be a relic of the times when the criminal code was
of such a barbarous and cruel nature that every technicality was taken
advantay of to shield criminals from the awful consequences of a
conviction. For my part, I think it would be a more rational rule that
confessions, under whatever circumstances they are made, should be
admitted, and that it should be left to the jury to judge whether they
were really falsely made under the inﬂuence of any inducement,
threat, or promise." R. v. O’Keefe (1893) 14 N..SW..R 345 p. 351,
352).
The justiﬁcations that are ynerally advanced today for excluding
relevant, but involuntary, statements are that the involuntary con ession is‘
more likely to be false than true and that the exclusion of involuntary
statements provides an effective safeguard against police use of improper
methods.
If the ﬁrst reason be considered valid, and there seems to be little
empirical evidence to support it, then it may be observed that the situation
could be more rationally met by a statutory provision similar to that which
was contained in s. 20 of the Evidence Act (New Zealand) 1908:
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“A confession tendered in evidence in any cnminal proceedings shall
not be rejected on the ground that a promise or threat has been held '
out to the person confessing, unless the judg or other presiding
ofﬁcer is of opinion that the inducement was in fact likely to cause
anuntrue admimion ofguilt tobe made."
'If this is thought to be unduly restrictive consideration could be given
to the present provision of the New Zealand Evidence Act which, as
amended, now reads:
“Actmfession tendered in evidence'm any criminal proceeding shall not
be rejected on the ground that a promise or threat or any other
inducement (not being the exercise of violence or force or other form
of compulsion) has been held out to or exercised upon the person
" confessing, if the judp or other presiding ofﬁcer is satisﬁed that the
means~bywhich the confemion was obtained were not in fact likely
Itocausean untrue admission of guilt to be made."
.: .J.1‘ . .
As.to the second justiﬁcatim we have the authority of Lord Devlin
' for the view that “the rule does not embody any conscious attempt by the
judge to exercise control over any ﬁeld of enquiry legitimately pursued by
thepollce‘.”.
It may bequestioned whether the rejection of relevant evidence as a
'waming to ofﬁcialdom that convictions cannot be obtained by improper
methods is an eﬂective way of controlling police practices. To adopt such
an approach assumes the conduct of the police is exclusively inﬂuenced by
the number of convictions obtained and it leaves out of account the all
mpoit‘apt sanctions provided by internal disciplinary procedures, police
trainingand the Commissioner of Police’8 instructions as well as expressions
of disapproval by the judiciary. In spite of opinion to the contrary, too
mudr irnportance may be attached to the rejection of improperly obtained
evidence as an incentive togood behaviour on the part of the police.
Mentionary exchu'ion
The view that a judg presiding at a criminal trial possesses a
discretion to. exclude evidence of admissible confessional statements is of
quite recent growth. Its historical .source is apparently to be found in what
Lord Sumner in Ibrahim v. The King called the growth of a police force of
the modem type and its legal source in the statutory power of the Court
of Criminal Appeal to lquaglr a conviction if “on any ground there was a
miscarriage of justice.”
The High Courtin The King v.. Lee (1950) 82 C.L.R. 149 expressed
the view that “the introduction of a discretion rule may be considered by
some to be, on the whole, unnecessary. The ,word Voluntary’ in the
relevant connection does not mean ‘volunteered’. It means ‘made in the
exercise of a free choice to speak or to be silent’, but a full understanding
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and correct application of the common law rule that confessional
statements
must be voluntary provides . . . . extensive protection to accused persons
. ..
Again, it is to be remembered that the admission of such evidence does
not
make it conclusive. It is for the jury to determine what Weight shoul
d be
attached to it. They will have evidence of all the circumstanc
es in which it
was made and should have received any necessary warning from th
e judge.
Nor should it be forgotten that an accused person is now entitl
ed to give
evidence on oath, and has been so entitled for many years
. As Dixon J.
said in Sinclair v. King ‘the tendency in more recen
t times has been against
the exclusion of relevant evidence for reasons founded on the
supposition
that the medium of proof is untrustworthy, in the case of
a witness,
because of his situation and, in the case of evidentiary mat
erial, because of
its source. The days are gone when witnesses were incompetent to tes
tify ‘
because they were parties or married to a party, because of interes
t,
because of their religious beliefs or want of them or because of crim
e or
infamy. We now call the evidence and treat the factors which formerl
y
excluded it as matters for comment to the tribunal of fact, wh
ose duty it
is to weight the evidence.’ ” '
These remarks suggest that the discretionary rule, at least in so far as
confessions and admissions are concerned, is one which should be exerci
sed
exceptionally and Sparingly. It may even be doubted whether such a
rule is
really necessary. But as the law stands at present, a judge at the trial
should exclude confessional statements if in all the circumstances he thi
nks
that they have been imprOperly procured by ofﬁcers of the police
even
although he does not consider the strict rules of law,‘common law
and
statutory, require the rejection of the evidence.
The existence of this power to exclude on such a vague criterion
as
“improperly obtained” leaves the police ofﬁcer in an awkward and invidi
ous
position. It is recognized that what is an “impropriety” in police me
thods
and what would be ‘ﬁrnfaimess” in admitting in evidence a sta
tement
obtained by “improper” methods are questions which cannot be answe
red
in the abstract, but it is desirable that the police be given
authoritative
guidelines concerning the obtaining and recording of statements whi
ch, if
observed, will preclude any legitimate attack being made upon th
e .
admissibility of a statement so obtained.
In this respect it is believed that the decision in R. v. ngen
(1964—5) N.S.W.R. 1515 achieved a very satisfactory result. It was ther
e
held that if the Commissioner of Police Instructions concerning the
recording of interviews are complied with by the police ofﬁcer concerned
the documentary record of the interview is admiixible in evide
nce and
“there can be no valid criticism of the police concerned.”
It would seem that the Commissioner of Police is the proper and
competent person to formulate proper standards of conduct to
be observed
by police ofﬁcers. By s. 12 of the Police Regulations Act, 189
9—1957 the
Governor has power to make rules for the general government and disc
ipline
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of the police force and such rules, not having been disallowed, have the
force of law. Rules made under the Act provide that the Commissioner may
issue such instructions for the government or direction of the force as he
considers the circumstances require. The Commissioner in the exercise of
this power has laid down a code for the instruction of police in the
conduct of interrogatibns. The actual legal effect of these instructions
however, may not be beyond dispute and it would be desirable, to set at
rest any doubts as to their effect in law, to have them formulated in the
form of rules made by the Governor under s. 12. '
The duty to inform
For a long _time the controls over police investigation, of both a
formal and an informal kind, were based on the assumption that the police
ofﬁcer in endeavouring to discover whether an offence has been committed
and, if so, by whom, was entitled to question anybody from whom he
thougit useful information could be obtained and that the law which gave
freedom to the police to question 'gave equal freedom to the person
questioned not to answer. It was thought that it vested in the citizen a
right to silence and that there was no obligation to give the police helpful
information." , - ‘
The decisfon of the House of Lords in Sykes v. Director of Public
Prosecutions. (1962) 15.0220 has destroyed the validity of this assumption
and, in effect, created an entirely different legal context. The holding that
the offence of misprision of felony is not obsolete and is complete if a
person knows that a felony has been committed by someone and fails to'
convey all his knowledge to a person in authority has effectively destroyed
any notion that the citizen has a right to remain silent and has replaced it
with a positive, duty on the citizen to inform.
This makes it imperative to re-examine both the informal rules of
police practice and' instruction and the formal rules formulated by the
Court for the guidance of law enforcement ofﬁcers.
' Although the Court of Criminal Appeal has recently recognized (R. v.
King (1965) I All ER. 1053) that the duty to make a full disclosure is
not, in all circumstances, absolute, many important and difﬁcult questions
remain unanswered. ‘
1. Is the offence impossibly wide?
2. Should the offence be extended to include information about
misdemeanours and contemplated offences? -
3. ls the administering of the traditional caution inconsistent with
the law-of rnisprision, or at least misleading?
4. Should a .police officer tell a person who is being questioned his
duty to inform?
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5. What are the proper limits on the duty to disclose and what
circumstances 'or relationships justify non-disclosure?
The answers to these questions are of great practical importance in
considering the proper scope of police powers and any approach to that
problem will be sigtiﬁcantly effected by the answers adopted.
1 submit for cons'deration the following views on these questions.
1. The offence of misprision is impossibly wide. It should be
limited to the active concealment, when questioned, of factual
knowledge. This does not mean that the moral, as opposed to
the legal, duty to assist police ofﬁcers to discover offenders
should be discouraged, but to impose criminal liability for
passive non-disclosure impinges unnecessarily upon the area of
personal judgment and morality in a wide variety of situations.
The offence of misprision should be extended to include factual
information about all criminal offences. The present law of
misprim'on is meaningless, for example, in the context of the
Commonwealth Crimes Act, which creates many Criminal
offences but does not classify them as either felonies or
rnisderneanours. Furthermore, the distinction between felonies
and misdemeanours has, in' itself, become archaic and arbitrary
and bears no necessary relationship to the gravity. of the offence.
The administering of the traditional caution is inconsistent with
the law of misprision and the practice should be discontinued.
It is proper and desirable that a police officer should inform a
person being questioned that he is under a legal duty to disclose
all material information in his possession, and that his failure to
do so, unless justified, is itself a criminal offence. The privilege
against self-incrimination should be explained and it should be
made clear that, although privilege may justify him in remaining
silent, if he does choose to Speak and gives false or misleading
information that, in itself, may also amount to‘ misprision.
Non-disclosure should be justified by a claim of right made in
good faith. The privilege to keep information confidential should
extend at least to the relationships of lawyer and client, doctor
and patient, clergyman and parishioner, employer and employee,
husband and wife, and parent and child. This extension, may
appear, to some, to be unduly wide. It may be reasonable and
practicable to formulate a list of the more serious offences to
which the privilege should not extend.
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The right to counsel ~
In 1964 the Judges of the Queen’s Bench Division, in formulating a
new set of Judges’ Rules, prefaced the Rules by an indication that they
were not to affect ﬁve principles of general application. It was asserted that
one of these principles was:
“That every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to
communicate and consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if
he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay
or hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation or the
administration of justice by his so doing.”
Thus, with surprising suddenness, the Judges appear to have created a
new principle for which there was no preceding authority. The question of
the right of the accused to counsel (other than before the court) is one
which had previously received. little attention in the deliberations of our
courts and the assertion of this rule in the new Judges’ Rules raises many
questions of serious-importance for the administration of criminal justice.
The proposition that every person at any stage. of an investigation
should be able to communicate and to. consult privately with a solicitor
immediately raises a‘host of further questions. Does this imply a right or
merely a privilege? Does it impose any duty upon the State to supply
counsel and, if so, at what stage? What is the effect, if any, of the accused
failing to avail himself of legal advice or of being prevented from obtaining
such advice? ‘
There does not appear, at present, in New South Wales, to be any
legal justification for the assertion of such a right. But as the principle has
been so clearly and starkly asserted in the Judges‘ Rules, it must now be
seriously considered whether such a right ought to be given to any accused
person in New South Wales. It should perhaps be noted also that under
part 7 of the Administrative Directions attached to the Judges’ Rules
explicit and detailed provisions appear relating to this right to consult with
a solicitor. ' .
The English development may yet parallel the situation which seems
today to be crystallizing in the United States. There the Courts have held
that the accused has a positive right to counsel and it is the duty of the
State to provide such counsel where he is unable to do so himself. This
right has been held to extend to the stage when the police start their
interrogation of a prime suspect. The view is taken that it is a police duty
to advise the suspect of his right and failure to do so invalidates any
admission or confession even though he made no formal request fOr
counsel. '
In Canada Mr Justice Roach of the Ontario Court of Criminal Appeal
has expressed strong views on the accused’s right to consult with his legal
adviser:
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“The suggestion that any detective or other police ofﬁcer is justified
in preventing or attempting to prevent a prisoner from conferring with
his counsellor is a most shocking one. The suggestion that counsel, if
he is permitted to confer with his client who is in custody, might
thereby obstruct the police in the discharge of their duties is even
more shocking."
In’ considering what should be the pattern of development of this
supposed right to counsel it is suggested that the validity of the following
should be considered: ‘
(d)
1. That legal procedure is important and that criminal procedure is
at least as important as civil procedure.
2. That most defendants in criminal proceedings are not legally
trained and would welcome professional assistance if it was
available.
3. That an accused person is in as great a need, if -not a greater
need, of the advice of a lawyer at the time of arrest as he is in
need of legal representation at subsequent court proceedings.
4. That it is possible to establish effective working rules that will
neither unduly restrict the police in the enforcement of the
criminal law nor unduly erode the civil rights of the individual.
Judge C. D. Monahan
The “Old” Judges’ Rules
1. When a police officer is endeavouring to discover the author of
a crime there is no objection to his putting questions in respect
thereof to any person or persons, whether suspected or not,
from whom he thinks useful information can be obtained.
2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to charge a
person with a crime, he should first caution that person before
asking him any questions, or any further questions, as the case
may be.
By section 352 of the Crimes Act any constable may without warrant
apprehend any person whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects of
having committed an offence. Clark v. Bailey, 33 SR. 304, 309. He
has no authority to arrest or confine any person merely for the
purpose of asking questions. Bales v. Parmenter, 35 S.R. 182 at 188.
If a person has been arrested and is in the process of being brought
before a Magistrate, questioning within limits is regarded aspro‘per
provided the proper caution is first given, but if it is not given the
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answers are still admissible. Ibid. 190. A person is not in the process
of being brought before a Magistrate if he is detained for some hours
at the C.I.B. or elsewhere. Ex. P. Evers, 62 W.N., 146. However, if he
is so detained before being charged, any answers to questions put to
him during the detention are admissible if the interrogation is properly
conducted, that is, so long as'the admissions are not obtained by
“impropriety in the conduct” of the examiners. This means some
impropriety short of violence, threats, promises, lies or inducements -
which would make them inadmissible anyway. R. v. Jeffn‘es, 64 W.N.
71. R. v. McDermott, 47 SR. 407, 409.
3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual
caution being first administered. '
If Rule 3 means in custody before being charged 1 think it should be
taken literally, and 'not in the restricted sense referred to by Hamilton
and Addison, 6th edn 401. It means that persons in custody cannot
be questioned before being charged. No one takes any notice of it, and
it is contrary to the law here.
After a person has been charged he should not be questioned except
upon some new matter which has come to the knowledge of the
police, e.g., as a result of their checking of the accused’s own previous
statement, or as the result of their further investigations.
The factual situation is that in the course of investigating a crime
police ofﬁcers, after speaking to a person in the street, in a hotel, at
his home or place of work, or some other place, and after some
preliminary questioning, tell the person that they want him to
accompany them to a police station. The formula runs: “The accused
was then placed in a police vehicle and conveyed to -——— police
station”. He is then cautioned, usually for the ﬁrst time, and
afterwards interrogated. The interrogation may take the course of a
typewritten record of interview (which is unexceptionable in itself);
Dawson v. The Queen, 106 C.L.R. l; R. v. Regen, 8l W.N. Pt 1,
p.572; or it may be a verbal interrogation followed by an invitation
to the accused to make a statement (meaning a written statement),
completed with a warning that he is not obliged to do so. Finally, the
accused is charged or released.
' The captive never seems to refuse to go to the station, he rarely
refuses to answer questions, he rarely asks to get in touch with a
solicitor, he never demands to be released from what is virtually illegal
arrest or insists on being charged or set free. Thus, without arresting a
person, and without charging him, the police are able to achieve the
result of holding him for interrogation — which is something we
pretend to look upon with pious horror.
In the result, the following comments may be made on the old
Judges’ Rules:
Rule 1 is simply a statement of elementary practice.  
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(6)
Rule 2 is almost useless, because the police officer has to get all
the information he can from the accused before deciding to charge
him, and the caution comes when it is too late to be of any use.
Rule 3 is usually observed, but by the time the accused is at
the police station and taken into custody some useful admissions have
probably already been extracted from him.
Rules 4 and 5 (cautioning before a volunteered statement and
when formally charged) and Rule 6 (a statement made before there is
time to caution not being inadmissible) do not help the accused at all.
Rule 7 (A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be
cross-examined, and no questions should be put to him about it
except for the purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has actually
said) is obsolete. It cannot be reconciled with the existing practice
unless it refers to the written statement which the accused is invited
to make at the end Of his interrogation. Sometimes he makes this
statement and sometimes he declines, saying: “No, I will not make a
statement, I have already said enough”. It cannot be reconciled with
the record of interview system.
Rule 8 is commonly observed, but it only relates to what is
done when two or more persons are charged with the same offence.
Rule 9 is commonly observed.
The 1964 Judges’ Rules
The new English Judges’ Rules seem to me to be unduly restrictive
and unrealistic. See the paper by N. J. Skelhom, Q.C., “Investigation
of Offences and Trial of Accused Persons”, delivered at the Third
Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference held at Sydney in August,
1965. In my view it would be better to forget all about the Judges’
Rules, both old and new, and rely upon the well established principles
laid down in the cases. The whole subject is admirably dealt with in
an article by R. R. Kidston, Q.C., 33 A.L.J. 369.
Mr C. K. Ward, CS.M.
The Judges’ Rules
Neither the Judges’ Rules in England nor the Police
Commissioner’s Instructions in New South Wales have the force of
law, and this in my opinion is perhaps a weakness. If they were in
the form of legislation, perhaps as regulations or rules made under
Section 12 of the Police Regulation Act, an arrested person would
know what his rights were.
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(f)
I would like to make four further points:
Such rules as may be made should be very simple, ju
st
embodying the main principles, as they must be capable of bein
g
understood by persons of low intelligence and by foreigners wit
h
little knowledge of English.
There should be some means by which a person who is invit
ed
to go or taken to‘ a police station should know deﬁnitely the
moment when he is arrested. This is a question which frequentl
y
arises in court and it is important in regard to the question of a
.. confession.
A person who is arrested should have some line o
f
communication with the outside world left open to him. The
rules should make some provision for an observer to .be presen
t.
The police sometimes prevent this, for example, by brushing
aside afriend of the accused who may be present.
Whatever rules are made should be printed in several lmguage
s
and the appropriate card handed to the suspect to read, so th
at
)re cannot be heard to say later on that he did not know wh
at
his rights were.
Mr w. J. anyu, QC.
.1.
The Judges' Rules
The solution of crime and conviction and punishment of guilt
y
people preserves peace and order and ensures a society in which
people can be happy.
like severity of punishment, the detection of crime in a
proportion of cases is sufﬁcient to keep society on a level keel.
The proportion must be high enough to deter the antisocial by
the knowledge that the risk of detection is great and to pacify
the masses by the knowledge that they are protected.
The powers given to the investigating body must preserve a
balance between the preservation of law and order and the
minimum interference with the rights of individuals in society.
So the powers must depend on the requirements of the time. In
America between the two world wars, when gangsterism was rife,
the voluntary confession rule ,was waived, so that the judge
determined as a prerequisite of admissibility whether the fear,
threat, promise or representation would have been unlikely to
induce a false confession from the individual concerned. (So
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some States go even further than New Zealand.) After the
second world war, when law and order prevailed, the fact of
two detectives merely taking a young person to a police station
and interrogating him there was held to be so intimidatory as to
exclude the confession.
6. What of our times so far as unsolved crimes are concerned?
There are a number of considerations.
(3)
(b)
It has been clear for a long time that police methods are
inadequate to deal with big business in two respects: (i)
We rely on a system of reporting to police to begin
investigations. There is no one to report the defalcations of
the management of companies. Much as we dislike a police ‘
state or police acting as agents provacateurs we have to have
watchdogs on the activities of managements that hold huge
fortunes in trust for inarticulate, uninformed masses (ii)
That directors or trustees should refuse to answer questions
or have any of the confessional safeguards Operate in their
favour is just foolish. In Division 3 of the Companies Act,
1961, we have initiated a system of investigation of
company activities on a compulsory answer basis. It will
probably have to be considerably extended.
The motor car is a new factor in crime. Cars provide quick
transport from populous to secluded areas and are usually
employed in pack rapes. Cars, some stolen or disguised, are
used in organized robbery or housebreaking. Cars permit
people who have committed crimes to put a lot of
distance between themselves and the scene. Cars facilitate
quick dispersing and diffusion into the multitude that
comprise modern cities. The point is that the village
policeman, who knows all the facts of the happening, no
longer walks round and interviews his suspects. Wanted
people are usually located by police who know practically
nothing about the case and very often are far away from
the police who do know all about it. A case in point was
A. H. Johnson. Dallison v. Caffeor (1964 3 W.L.R. at 398)
shows the tendency in England to enlary the holding
powers of police to make reasonable investigations before
taking a man before amagistrate. I think that at the least
magistrates would have power to authorize police to hold
a suspect without charge, or fear of litigation, for a very
limited time. The present practice is that after serious
charges accused are regularly remanded in custody until the
police can present their evidence. The very small
proportion of cases where magistrates fail to corrrrnit for
trial vindicates these persons being held.
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(c) There is a small proportion of unsolved crimes of violence
such as homicide and club and bank robberies, but they
are very bad cases. In every large community there will
always be a core of tough, skilful criminals who succeed.
We have a very limited number here and in the past few
years we have had some unsolved machinegunning and
bank and club robbing by them. The police are convinced
that they know the offenders but in the absence of a
confession they are unable to arrest them. To give the
police power to deal with these people in a way that
would be likely to extorta confession from them would in
my opinion introduce an evil which would be out of all
proportion to the harm to be averted. It might, of course,
be different if gangsterism got out of hand. It would be
wrong to think that all unsolved holdups and safe
robberies were by such people. Every now and again we
come across a lone-wolf clean-skin who has been very
active for a long time without ever being interrogated and
immediately he is he confessesto everything.
(d) Uncaught breaches of trafﬁc and betting laws are legion,
but they are revenue matters and of no concern to the
subject of confesu'on.
(e) Abortion is rife, rarely prosecuted, and still more rarely
convicted. Police know many abortionists and do not catch
them. This is a crime which is reported to the police only
if something goes wrong, and things do not often go
wrong with competent abortionists. Attempts to trap
abortionists rarely succeed, and agents provocateurs would
have to be women who were prepared to lose children. I
do not think any feasible changes in the powers and
methods of interrogation would be likely to lead to
confessions of abortion by people who go to all lengths to
avoid detection.
The laws of evidence and their interpretation are just as
important in police interrogation as are the cautions and
safeguards advocated by the Judges’ Rules; In most parts of the
British Commonwealth a policeman at the scene of a happening
writes in his notebook a record of the “relevant” events and
parts of his interrogation. When he comes to court it is assumed
that he cannot remember the details of all conversations that he
has in the course of his duties, and he reads his notes to the
Court. The numbered pages of his notebook and the position of
the entry in it ensure that the entry was made at the time, and
alteration afterwards is unlikely. In New South Wales when I
was appointed Prosecutor police endeavoured to “recollect” (i.e.
produce verbatim by cramming) the conversations. They would
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not admit that they had exhausted their recollection. Their
notebooks never had the signiﬁcance that they had elsewhere as
police were not permitted to read from them. Notes of
conversations. were generally made, some days after the
conversation, on pieces of paper which were destroyed when the
statement for the prosecuting sergeant was made. The system
lent itself to alterations and additions, and suggestions of them,
right up until the eve of the committal proceedings. It also
created a paradise for crossexaminers, and made criminal trials
sporting events in which all the rules were loaded in favour of
the fox. To combat suggestions of fabrication, alteration,
mistakes, errors in recollection, collaboration in compiling, and
the cross-examination directed to similar sounding words or
triﬂing variations with the corroborating evidence, I introduced
and advocated records of interview,acknowledged by signature to
be correct at the time. It has its limitations. It can only take
place when and where a typewriter is available. All police are
not competent or capable of doing it. It cannot be applied to
casual conversations, but only to deliberate interrogation. In my
view the laws of evidence shouldpermit a policeman to read to
the court a record made in his notebook at the time.
8. Possibly the most important semi-judicial function of police is
‘ taking witnesses’ statements. What is written down and signed on
the ﬁrst occasion that a written statement is made will as a rule
be the testimony that will ultimately be given and adhered to.
Some police try to ensure that this will be so by giving ﬁre
proposed witnesses cOpies of their statements. The use of
non-leading 'questions in examirtation-in-clrief of ﬁre Crown
wimesses is of triﬂing importance compared with that of
obtaining an initial uncontrolled recital of ﬁre witnesses’
recollection as distinct from a version suggested by ﬁie police to
fit into a factual pattern as they believe they know it to be. In
a big, long-term‘ investigation of a crime statements are obtained
from all sorts of people. Then, when an arrest has been made,
statements are obtained on ﬁre signiﬁcant and relevant facts.
There is no reason why in important cases this should not be
done by people independent of the investigating police.
(g) Miss 0. Wood
Police Powers of Detention and Interrogation in France
Introduction
It may be of help in our discussion to have some idea of the powers
given to police in countries under the Civil Law System. France has been
chosen as a typical eXample of ﬁris type of country, and much of ﬁre
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information has been taken from a book entitled “Police Power and
Individual Freedom” edited by E. R. Sowle (1962) which is a collection of
papers given at the International Conference on Criminal Law
Administration in 1960. In addition to France, the law and practice in
Canada, England, Germany, Israel, Japan and Norway were discussed, and
the Conference was particularly helpful in that the police view was
vigorously expressed by Professor F. E. Inbau who from 1938—41 was
director of the Chicago Police Scientiﬁc Crime Detection Laboratory, and is
now Professor of law at Northwestern University, and 0. W. Wilson,
Superintendent of Police, Chicago. ‘ ‘
_ French Law
In France the Police have power to (a) keep “close watch” on a
person and (b) check his identity. '
_(a) In case- of a crime or ﬂagrant delict the police may detain for 24
hours persons (i) who are at the place where the crime occurred (ii) whose
identity it mems necessary to establish and (iii) who seem able to give
information on the facts. This period may be extended for a further 24
hours by permission of the “Procureur de la Republique” in the case of
persons against whom serious and concordant incriminating evidence exists.
' As well as this, the police are empoweredto carry out “préliminary
enquiries"? of their own accord, or at the request of the “Procureur de la
Republique” and may legally detain persons for 24 hours “for the
necessities of the preliminary enquiry”. This may be extended for a further
24 hours by decision of the “Procureur de la Republique”, even though
there is no serious and concordant incriminating evidence.
‘ (b) In addition to “keeping close watch” every person whose identity
it seems necessary to establish or check is required to “lend himself to the
operatiOns-requested by this measure”. Failure to do so may result in
imprisonment for‘a maximum period of 10 days or a ﬁne of up to 360
NF. ‘ ‘
There are several safeguards relating to the power to keep “close
watch”, .namelyi _
1. At the, hearing the police must report the time the “close watc ”
was commenced and concluded and exactly how long _the interrogations and
the breaks dividing them lasted, and must also give the reasons for the“close
watch”. ' r
2. The report must be signed by_tlre person on whom the watch‘is
kept or reasons given for his'failure to do so.
3. The police of their own accord or,at the request of the person’s
relatives, may have the person kept on “close watch” examined by a doctor
at any time, and after 24 hours cannot refuse such examination if the
person requests it. '
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A person charged with an offence cannot be interrogated by ﬁre
police at all, but must be brought (by a number of means) before an
examining magistrate for interrogation. Once before the magistrate he is
permitted legal aid by a barrister, and does not have to take an oath.
The police, however, in the process of a preliminary investigation, may
be given power by the examining magistrate (“a rogatory commission”) to
examine witnesses, though not the accused. A person may well, therefore, ‘
be interrogated as a witness before being brought before a judge to be
indicted.
To prevent delay in bringing an indictment, article 105 of the Penal
Procedure Code provides that magistrates and police acting on a rogatory
comrhission cannot hear as witnesses persons against whom “serious and _
concordant incriminating evidences" exist.
However persons being kept on “close watch” may be interrogated by
the police for 24 hours and a further 24 hours with the permigion of the
“Procureur de la Republique".
The result is therefore that police interrogation is ended either when
serious and concordant incriminating evidence is disclosed against the
interrogated person, or when he has been delayed against his will for 24 to
48 hours.
Summary
Continental systems recognize a distinction between arrest proper and
detention for questioning, the latter, unlike the former, not requiring
reasonable suspicion or a deﬁnite chary. While the maximum--arnount of
time a suspect can be held for questioning in France is 48 hours, in’ some.
other countries the time may be much lonyr than this.
This type of detention is often regarded with mistrust by ‘Britidr
peoples, yet in England the police .make a practice of “detaining for
'questioning” though they limit it at the most to three or four days. Thus
in England suspected persons can be illegally held for questioning longer
than they can legally be held in France, and drere seems to be a complete
public acquiescence to this practice.
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APPENDIX 3
Some propositions andcomments[repared by Associate-ProfessorR. P. Roulston
for consideration by the Committee
The primary ﬁmction of the police is the protection of the
community by the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
offenders against the criminal law.
Comment
It is universally accepted that this is the proper primary purpose of
~ the police force. In New South Wales the function of prevention and
detection of crime, the identiﬁcation and apprehension of violators of the
criminal law and .the bringing of such violators initially before the courts is
for the most part (although not exclusively) entrusted to the police force
(Police Regulations Act, 1957). It is true that increasing demands have been
made in modern times upon the police to perform other allied functions
but their primary function is still regarded as the prevention 'of crime and
the apprehension of offenders.
Enquiry into crime cannot be left simply to administrative discretion
and police ﬁrnctions and practices must be regulated both formally
and informally.
Comment.
This proposition has, by and large, been assumed rather than
demonstrated in any discussion. The modern professionally organized police
forces began their work of inquiry as freely as the Justices whom they
superseded. It is' only in comparatively recent time that the police have
found themselves more and more controlled by rules, partly self-imposed
and partly derived from the mandates of the judges. Even so, modern police
practices in the preliminary criminal investigation and the interrogation of
suSpects are striking instances of discretionary administrative power which
remains largely unregulated by judicial standards. In large measure police
practices are governed only by self-imposed restraint. Although extensive
judicial standards have been developed for other administrative agencies little
judicial action has been taken and no exhaustive standards have been
developed in regard to police activities. '
The question revolves around the need for effective police
investigation of crime on the one hand and protection from the abuse of
power on the other. The present absence of judicial control of
administrative discretion in police interrogation is generally regarded as
inconsistent with the values of a democratic society but the system works
in large part because of public conﬁdence that the police will behave fairly.
 
ﬂ
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It is probably true that the mere presence of police ofﬁcers mds to
arouse apprehension in most members of the public and that questioning
with intimidatory or suggestive overtones is inescapable from any police
inquiry. But it may be seriously questioned whether an adequate solution is
to be found in placing ordinary modes of investigation of crime in a
straight jacket of artiﬁcial rules. Rigid formulae can be either meaningless or
absurd and it may be argued that inﬂexible preliminary conditions serve no
genuine interest of the accused and add only an unreal formalism.
However, even if one accepts existing police practices as a matter of
practical necessity in the war against crime it does not follow that the
existing procedure cannot be improved. One of the most serious difﬁculties
is the absence of reliable information as to what the, existing practices are
and the “low-visibility” nature of the police process.
The secrecy of police activity creates the risk of abuse and contributes
to public distrust. Secrecy is not the same thing as the privacy which
expert investigators insist is necessary for effective investigation of crime.
Privacy can be defended on various grounds including the need for
prejudicial questioning and the need to prevent premature disclosure of
police activities but secrecy cannot be defended on this or any other
grounds. Eliminating secrecy would go a long way towards" building up
public conﬁdence.
“lack of ,public understanding of the police purpose and what the
police must do to accomplish it (and) ..... ignorance of the facts involved
in the war against crime in a free society continue unabated .......
because the police are not a vocal scholarly group that devotes much time '
to presenting in a favourable light the facts that bear on the problem. The
literature in consequence is principally devoted to the case against the
police: little has been written in their defence. The press, the. literature, and
even case law are all directed at incidents that discredit the police.” (0. W.
Wilson, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, “Police Arrest
Privileges in a Free Society: a Plea for Modernisation” in Police Powerand
Individual Freedom (1962) p. 25.)
When a police ofﬁcer is trying to discover whether, or by whom, an
offence has been committed. he is entitled to question anybody,
whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks that useﬁzl
information can be obtained.
Comment
This proposition has been recognized in both the old and new Judges’
Rules and in New South Wales in the Instructions issued by the
Commissioner of Police (Instruction 11). It is difﬁcult to see how the
position could realistically be otherwise. At this initial stage of the inquiry
the police ofﬁcer is performing a truly administrative function, a task of
detection, and had not embarked upon the legal work of prosecution.
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Of course at this stage the police officer has no authority to exercise
any restraint upon the person being questioned, or detain him in any way,
and such person is entirely free to come and go as he pleases. (The
desirability of this shall be considered separately as shall also the question
of what duty, if any, rests upon the person being questioned to give any
answer to police inquiry.) _
Any person questioned about a felony is required by law to give a
police officer all the information that he has concerning the offence
unless his answers would tend to incriminate him either of that
offence or of another offence.
Comment
It was, until recently, thought that the law which gave fr
eedom to the
police to question equally gave freedom to.the person questioned not to
answer. The assumption that the citizen has a right to silence has been
destroyed by the decision of' the House of Lords in Sykes v. Director of
Public Prosecutions- (1962) A.C. 220 where it was held that misprision of
felony is not' obsolete and is complete if a person knows that a felony has
been committed by someone and fails to convey all his knowledy to a
person in audiorit'y. It was further suwsted, although not decided, in this
case, that the duty to inform may also extend to disclosing information of a
contemplated felony of misdemeanours. '
Two qualiﬁcations to the absolute duty to inform where recognized
by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. King (1965) A.E.R. 1052. Firstly,
that a man questioned about a serious offence is not bound to answer if
his answer would tend to incriminate him either of that offence or another
offence and secondly, that after a caution has been administered to an
arrested person, silence could not possibly constitute the offence of
misprision.-However whilst in these circumstances refusal to answer would
not amomt to misprision someform of active concealment might “as when
a man tells a pack of lies to put therpolice off the scent.”
Every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to
communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor.
Comment
_ [n 1964 the Judges of the Queen’s Division, formulating a new set of
Judges’ Rules, prefaced the rules by an indication that they were not to
affect ﬁve principles of yueral application. It was asserted that one of
those principles was: . I
“That every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to
communicate and consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if
he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay
or hindrance is caused to ' the process of investigation or the
administration of justice by his so doing”.
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Under Part 7 of the Administrative Direction attached to the Judges
Rules explicit and detailed provisions appear relating to this right to consult
with a solicitor. There does not appear at present in New South Wales, to
be any legal justification for the assertion of such a right. But as the
principle has been so clearly and starkly asserted in the Judges’ Rules it
must now be seriously considered whether such a right ought to be given to
a suspect or accused person in New South Wales. ‘
In considering the merits of this proposal one practical matter should
be borne in mind. If the suspected or arrested person is to be given such a
right it will almost necessarily place a severe limitation upon effective police
investigation. Glanville Williams has said, “consideration of liberty, dignity
and privacy must give way to some extentv to the practical necessities of
law enforcement, and for this reason it is necessary to maintain the present
position under which a person who is the custody of the police has no
legal right to have his lawyer present while making a statement”.(PoIice
Power and Individual Freedom, p. 192.) ,
It is generally assumed by police and lawyers alike that any lawyer
worth his salt will tell his client to say nothing to the police. It is then
assumed that the presence of counsel during interrogation would make
interrogation impossible and then it is assumed that the end of interrogation
would result in the collapse of law mforcement and the end of the
effective investigation of crime. None of these assumptions are supported by
empirical evidence, and the truth is that no such evidence is available. We
do not know how many crimes are solved by interrogation, and countries
such as Scotland and India, which have strict rules excluding from evidence
information, including confessions, obtained as a result of police,
investigation; do not seem to be less effective in their enforcement of the
criminal law.
We do not know how often lawyers do advise co-operation and full
disclosure by their clients. Since silence inevitably invites suspicion it is
probable that in many cases where a client is innocent his legal adviser will
urge him to answer questions in order to clear himself quickly and to assist
the police. Moreover, even if there is reason to suppose that counsel will
ordinarily advise silence when he learns that his client is guilty or, although
innocent, endangered by compromising circumstances, it is not self evident
that his advice would be the same if he were to'be present at the
interrogation. ' .
“It is one thing'to dispense general advice to a suspect from whose
interrogation fthe lawyer will be barred, it’ is quite a different matter to
counsel silence or answer to particular questions when the lawyer hears
them as they are asked”. (Police Power and Individual Freedom, p. 179.)
In considering the question of the accused’s right to legal advice one
cannot ignore the very practical question of cost. Apart from considerable
alteration of existing criminal procedures the introduction of such a right
‘ would undoubtedly increase significantly the cost of the criminal process.
l
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The expense of providing counsel for every accused person might prove so
high as to be impracticable and undoubtedly the work of the police would
become more difﬁcult, time consuming and expensive.
Apart from the increased administrative expense there is the intangible
cost of the fear and losses which must be endured if it is true that the
introduction of lawyers would enable criminals to go free because, as it is
argued, such a modiﬁcation would serve no purpose but to free the guilty,
since the innocent never confess.
The present importance of the interrogation process cannot be over
emphan’sed,‘ There can be no doubt that statements of the accused taken by
the police often play a great part in the prosecution’s case. “In any study
of the inquiry into crime it would be far less important than it is to
examine police methods of interrogation if it were not true to say that the
evidence Which interrogation produces is often decisive. The high degree of
proof which the English law requires . . . often could not be achieved by
the prosecution without the assistance of the accused’s own statements”.
As soon as a police ofﬁcer has evidence which would afford
reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an
offence he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned
before putting to him any question or further question relating to
that offence.
Comment
.This is perhaps the most difﬁcult situation from the point of view of
the police. It presupposes that it is possible to clearly divide the lines of
criminal investigation into stages — a preliminary stage in which the object
is to ascertain the guilty party and a later stage where the object is to
prove the case against him -— and that as soon as this later stage is reached
the suspect is entitled to distinct safeguards. It is difﬁcult to know where
to draw the line but there will be a point when the police become
sufﬁciently convinced of their suspicious and have sufﬁcient evidence in
their possession that they can be properly said to have reasonable grounds
to suppose that the suspect has committed the crime. Experienced police
ofﬁcers suggest. that there is, in reality, a stage coming somewhere before
this “which arises when the police are satisﬁed that a crime has been
committed, and suspect that a particular person has committed it, but their
enquiries have not yet proceeded far enough for their suspicions to amount
to evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for that suspicion. At
that particular stage there does not appear to be any existing or suggested
limitation upon police enquiry.
The English Judges’ Rules have recognized that~when a police ofﬁcer
has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a
person has committed an offence that person is entitled to be cautioned,
whether the suspected person is in fact arrested or charged or informed that
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he may be summonsed. The United States Supreme Court has similarly held
that a, person is entitled to legal protection and thepolice are subject to
judicial supervision when “the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus upon a particular suspect”
Escobedo v. Illinois 378 US. It would seem both proper and practicable to
divide the period of investigation into three - enquiry, suspicion and
accusation. . ‘
When a police ofﬁcer who is making inquiries of any person about an
offence has enough evidence to prefer a charge against that pason for
that offence he should without delay cause that person to be charged - '
or inform him that he may be prosecuted for that offence »
Comment
This proposition is contained in the present Judges’ Rules and goes
further then the present Instruction 11 of the New South Wales
Commissioner’s Instructions which merely provided “whenever a pdice
ofﬁcer has made up his mind to charp a person With a crime, he should
ﬁrst caution such a person before asking questions or any further questions
as the case may be”. '
There are difﬁculties in determining when this position ﬁrst arises.
Therewﬂl however come a point in the inquiry when the police become
sufﬁciently convinced of guilt to a degree more than that of having grounds
or reasonable grounds for wspecting guilt and at that stage further inquiries
must necessarily be directed towards acquiring legal proof of that which
they already believe. -
It is at this stage that the courts have most vigoroudy interfered in
the administrative process of inquiry and have in effect said that at this
stage the police ofﬁcer in his interrogation is not acting purely
administratively but is acting in a quasi judicial capacity and must observe
the legal limitations which the courts have imposed upon him. As Lord
Devlin has remarked, “the distinction . . . is in effect the distinction
between suspicion and accusation. The moment at which the suspect
becomes the accused marks the chanp”. (The Criminal Prosecution in
England, p. 26.) ' '
A police constable may arrest without warrant a person committing,
or attempting to commit, treason or felony or a dangerous breach of
the peace in his presence. He may arrest any person in the act of
committing or immediately after having committed, an offence
‘ punishable, whether by indictment of summary conviction, under any
Act and any person who has committed a felony for which he has
not been tried. He may arrest any person who he, with reasonable
cause, suspects or having committed an offence under any Act or any '
person lying or loitering in any highway, or yard or other place
during the night, whom he, with reasonable cause suspects of being
about to commit any felony and to take him and any property found
upon him before a justice to be dealt with according to law.
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Comment
The bam's of police power of arrest rests on both a common law a
nd
statutory foundation. At common law a constable could not arres
t without
warrant a person found committing a misdemeanour or a statut
ory offence
punishable on summary conviction. Under section 352 of the Crimes
Act
the Common Law power was extended to offences “punishable
under any
Act" and to cases where the constable reasonably suspects a
person of
having committed a statutory offence not amounting to a fe
lony and gives
a qualiﬁed power of arrest of persons suspected of f‘being about t
o commit
any felony”. ,
This statutory extension does not speciﬁcally cover common law
misdemean'ours, nor does it deal with the vexed question of
whether an
arrest on a minor- or ‘holding” char; is permissible whilst a more se
rious
charge in being investigated. Nor is it clear whether the section
gives a
power of arrest in circumstances which fall short of the legal requir
ement
of an attempt. ‘ '
A police-ofﬁcer may arrest any person committing or atte
mpting to
commit in his presence an offence against the Commonwealth Cri
mes
Act which involves any breach of the peace. He may arrest without
martin! any person whom he' has reasonable grounds to believe
to
have committed an offence against the laws of the Commonwealth
provided that he has reasonable grounds to believe that proc
eedings
min.“ the person by summons would not be effective.
Comment
These powers are contained in sections 8 and 8A of
the
Commonwealth Crimes Act and place considerable limitations o
n a police
.ofﬁcer’s power of arrest in relation to Commonwealth offences.
It retains
the Common Law power of arrest only in relation to offences
involving
breach of the peace in relation to, offences against the Commonweal
th
Crimes Act. In other cases the officer is required not
only to have
reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person has committe
d an
offence against the laws of the Commonwealth but must also
have
reasonable grounds to believe that proceedings by way 'of sum
mons against
the person arrested would not be effective.
Other statutory powers of detention are conferred on police officers
in various speciﬁc circumstances by particular enactments.
Commart
The existence of special provisions giving police ofﬁcers additional
powers in speciﬁed circumstances tend to magnify rather than ease the
confusions underlying the whole question of power of arrest. It is doubtful
whether many of these provisions add anything to the general provisions
contained in section 352 of the Crimes Act. or, if they do, it is unclear
what are the precise limits of the extensions.
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For example section 9 of the Vagrancy Act provides that (1) any
person found offending against this Act may be apprehended by a constable
or other person and forthwith taken before a justice to be dealt'with as
directed by this Act. (2) Whenever a person other than a constable
apprehends an offender he may deliver him to a constable to be taken
before a justice. (3) Every constable who refuses or wilfully neglects to take
into his custody, or take before a justice, a person so delivered, or does not
use his best endeavours or apprehend and convey before a justice any .
person whom he ﬁnds offending against this Act, shall be deemed to have
neglected his duty and liable to conviction ofan offence [under the Act.
This would seem to impose on police ofﬁcers a positive duty, rather
than a permissive power to arrest. Such a consequence would seem to be
unfortunate, particularly as the offences under the Vagrancy Act include
such vague concepts as being- a “idle or disorderly person”, “incorrigible
rogue", and “rogue and vagabond”.
Again section 36 of die Police Offences Act empowers any constable
to “stop, search and detain ....... a person who may be reasonably
suspected of having or conveying in any manner anything stolen, or
unlawfully obtained”. It is not clear whether the words “stop, search and
detain” are .intended to confer power of a greater or lesser magnitude than
that conferred by the traditional powers of arrest and if so what is the
ambit of the power. The ambit of section 41R. is equally confusing and
uncertain.
An otherwise lawﬁd arrest will nevertheless be generally unlawﬂll if
the person arrested is not informed of the grounds on which he is
being arrested
Commart
In arresting without warrant the arresting ofﬁcer must in ordinary
circumstances inform the person arrested of the true ground of arrest and is
not entitled to keep the reason to himself or give a reason which is not the
true reason. Failure to do so renders the police ofﬁcer liable for fdse
imprisonment. Re need not be informed in technical or precise languay nor
need he be informed if the circumstances are such that he must know the
gneral nature of the allepd offence for which he is detained or if he
himself produces a situation which makes it practically impossible to inform
him.
A police ofﬁcer has no power to detain a person solely for the
purpose of questioning him or to enable ﬁrrther investigation to be
undertaken.
Comment '
Under the existing law an arrest is lawful only if the purpose, at the
time when it is effected, is that the person arrested should be formally'
charged. (Bales v. Parmeter (1935) 35 SR. (N.S.W.).) Neither at common
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~law nor underanyvof the statutory provisions, is a policeman, or any other
person, empowered to detain a person merely for the purpose of identifying
the arrestee or merely for the purpose of furthering investigations to verify
or disprove suspicions which at the time of the arrest are not reasonable.
A police ofﬁcer’s intention to‘ subject the person arrested to the
criminal process need. not be absolute nor conﬁrmed, in the sense that he
will not necessarily be attributed with an improper intent if the charge is
not laid or if some other charge is actually laid. There is a difference
between making an arrest without any intention of making a charge and
making the arrest 'with the intention of laying a charge unless the supect
clears himself or gives a satisfactory explanation.
If after an-arrest a man is found on enquiry to be innocent or, at
any rate, that there is not sufﬁcient case for detaining him, he should at
once he set free and then. there is no obligation to take him before a_
magistrate, (Wiltshire v. Barrett (1965) 2 All ER. 271.)
A police ofﬁcer may arrest on a less serious charge than the one
,uItimately proceeded upon or ultimately intended to be proceeded
upon._
Comm: .
It is generally agreed that police do frequently arrest on a less serious
charge than. the one ultimately proceeded with. Provided the reason given
for the arrest is not manifestly concocted and there are reasonable grounds
for making the arrest on the minor charge, the arrest does not become
unlawful simply because subsequent investigation justiﬁes the preferment of
a more serious charge. Although the arresting ofﬁcer is not entitled to keep
the reason for arrest to himself or to give a reason which is not the true
reastm it does-not follow that the offence given as the reason for arrest
must “necessarily .be the only, or the most serious, offence which the
arresting person suspects the arrestee to have committed. Nor need it be the
offence with which the person is eventually charged, if charged, and no
other. .
The practice of arresting on a minor charge pending enquiries into a
major crime was, however, deprecated by the United Kingdom Royal
Commission on the Police (1929) which said: .
“We think that any deliberate recourse to the practice which contains
elements of subterfuge is, on principle, to be deprecated. There is a Special
.risk of unfaimess when the minor charge on which the man is arrested is
itself of an undeﬁned character such as ‘Loitering with intent to commit a
a”
felony .
An arrest does not necessarily become unlawﬁxl by virtue of the fact
that the arrestee was not taken directly or as soon as practicable
before a magistrate.
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. Comment
This proposition was previously uncertain and possibly inconsistent
with the decision of' the Supreme Court in Clark v. Bailey (1933) 33 SR.
(N.S.W.) 303 but has been clariﬁed by the decision of the Court of Appeal
in Dallison v. Caffrey (1964) 2 All ER. 610. In Clark v. Bailey the
Supreme Court held that» an arrest, otherwise lawful, became unlawful, when
the constable making the arrest took the person from the place of arrest (a
market garden) to an hotel room for the purpose of searching his person. It
was common ground that the purpose ultimately of the arrest was that the
arrestee should be brought before a magistrate but the court held that the
deviation from the most direct route signiﬁed a dual purpose, one aspect of
which was not consistent with the principal purpose. In Dallison' v. Caffrey
however, the Court of Appeal held that as a matter of law, the constable
was not bound to take the arrested person by the most direct route before
a magistrate and was entitled to take him elsewhere for the purpose of
continuing the investigation and obtaining evidence whether incriminatory or
exculpatory of the person arrested. 'Ihe onlyrequirement, in this context,
that the law imposes is that the arresting ofﬁcer should act reasonably in
the circumstances of the case under consideration.
Although a private person cannot take an anested person around
seeking evidence against him, the court considered a constable had greater
power:
“When a constable has taken into custody a person reasonably
suspected of felony, he can do what is reasonable to investigate the matter,
and to see whether his suSpicions are supported or not by further evidence.
He ~can, for instance, take the person suspected to his own house to see if
any of the stolen property is there; else it may be removed and valuable
evidence lost. He can take the person suspected to the place where he says
he was working, for there he may ﬁnd persons to conﬁrm or refute his
alibi. The constable can put the suspect in an identiﬁcation parade to see if
he is picked out by the witnesses. So long as such measures are taken
reasonably, they are an important adjunct to the administration of justice;
by which I mean of course, justice not only to the man himself but also to
the community at large. The measures must, however, be reasonable.”
A police ofﬁcer has reasonable and probable cause for arrest without
warrant if the facts which he himself knows or of which he has been
credibly informed at the time of the arrest make it probable that the
person-arrested committed the offence.
Comment
A police constable is variously described as being lawfully entitled to ,
make an arrest 'when he “has reasonable cause to suspect”, “reason to
suspect”, “reasonably suspected”, “on reasonable grounds suspects” or “has
reasonable or probable cause to suspect” that the accused has committed an
i
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offence. The meaning to be given to these terms was recently considered in
Dallison v. Caffrey (1964) 2 All ER. 610 (where the above proposition was -
laid down) and in Wiltshire v. Barrett (1965) 2 All ER. 271. In Dallison v.
Caffrey it was held that a person who acts honestly and reasonably in
effecting an arrest commits no actionable a wrong. The concept of honesty,
in this connection, does not change, but “what is reasonable changes as
society and the organization for the enforcement of the criminal law
evolves”. ~ . .
The test whether there' was reasonable and probable cause for the
arrest is an objective one? namely, whether a remonable man assumed to
know the law and, possessed of the information which in fact was possessed
.by"the arrestor, would believe that there was reasonable and probable cause.
' Provided that this testis satisﬁed the onus then lies on the person who has
_ been arrested to establish that the arrestor did‘ not in fact believe what he' - '
would have believed had‘he been reasonable. This latter is a situation,
whitinin the nature of thing, can seldom seriously be raised and involves
. an'orius’ or proof- which can only with extreme difﬁculty be discharged.
It is a well set rule of procedure that the question-"whether the
arrestor is acting reasonably is one to be decided by the judig. The judge
_ shopldrnot leave this issue to the (jury, except in the highly unlikely event
rth‘at there is coynt positive evidence that despite'the actual existence of .
“probable reason and cause, the defendant himself did not believe that it
existed. - _
.. . The propriety of putting the time-honoured question “did the
defendant honestly believe that the plaintiff was guilty?” was questioned in
”Dawson v. Caffrey, Lord Denning considering that it had"“caused a cartload
of trouble ....... I hope that it will now be cast into the limbo. It is
‘onlyto' be used in the most exceptional circumstances,” and Diplock LJ.
was similarly dubious. '- -
'ln ,M‘Itshire v. Barrett, Lord Denning elaboratéd his view:
‘ “My conclusion is that ...... a constable is justiﬁed in arresting a
' driver of a motor car if the driver is apparently committing an offence
‘ ....... Sometimes the test has been put in several different ways.”
“The 'test is sﬁd to be that a constable is justiﬁed if he honestly
believed on reasonable grounds the driver was guilty; ......... we have,
however, had several cases in recent years which show that the’test ‘honest
belief in guilt’ is fraught with ambiguities and gives rise to much difﬁculty
in summing up to a jury,-no matter if it is an action for false‘arrest or
imprisonment or for malicious prosecution; I prefer to approach the case in
this way: the constable is justiﬁed if the facts, as they appear to him at the
time were such as to warrant him to bring the man to court on the
grounds that the man was unﬁt to drive through drink.- In other words,
such as to warrant him thinking that the man was probably guilty.”
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However, although the reasonableness of a constable's suspicions must
be shown, it does not follow that merely because a constable has made an
arrest honestly believing that the arrested person is guilty the conduct is
therefore reasonable. The reasonableness of the constable’s suspicions is
examinable by the courts and he is not relieved of the responsibility if it
can be shown that in the circumstances he could and should have made
reasonable enquiries to test his suspicions.
It is not the function of a constable “to satisfy himself of a person’s
guilt or innocence” but it is said that he should act on the assumption that
his prima facie suspicion may be ill-founded. Often a constable has to act ,
on the spur of the moment to prevent the escape of a suspect and what“
amounts to a reasonable belief in the circumstances may well be something
different to what may amount to a reasonable belief in circumstances where
there was no risk of evasion. in the latter situation it has been said that it
is incumbent on the police to “make all presently practical enquiries of
persons present or immediately accessible who are likely toanswer to their
enquiries forthwith." (Dunbell v. Roberts (1944) 1 All ER. 326.) Onthe
other hand it has been said f‘the police have to act' at once, on the facts as
they appear on the spot; and they must be justiﬁed by.- the. facts as they
~ appear to them at the time and not on anyex post facto analysis of the
situation. Their conduct should not ‘be condemned as. unlawful simply-
because afterwards the jury acquit .......... the police_ must be entitled
to act on the facts as they appear to them at the time.” (Wiltshire v.
Barrett (1965) 2 All EUR 271..)
 
Police ofﬁcers should be required to keep a notebook and make a
record therein of all interviews and such notebooks should be
admissible in evidence. . .
Comment
It is not always possible to adopt the prevailing system of a
typewritten record of interview. Where this is not practicable it would mm
that the presnt practice is for the police to make up a police brief
containing, inter alia, typed statements by the police themselves setting out
their conversation with the accused person and, it may be, also anything he
has written or signed, aid then to destroy any actual notes of the
conversation taken at the time once the proweutor‘s brief .has been
prepared.
it would be much more satisfactory for the police to keep a
notebook in chronological order and record in it at the ﬁrst reasonably
practical moment what actually'occufred. This book should be available at
the trial and drould be available for inspection by the accused and the
police ofﬁcer should not, as at present, be required to exhaust his memory
ﬁrst before being able to refresh his memory by reference to any notes he
may have taken. This would be much more satisfactory than most of the
present verbal testimony of police ofﬁcers relating to interviews of which
they have recorded their own versions for the police brief, subsequently
" learning them byheart, so far as possible, inorder to repeat them in court.
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It should not be necessary for every ofﬁcerpresent at the interview
to separately and individually record what took place. It would be sufﬁcient
if one of ‘the ofﬁcers prepared the record in his notebook and that the
other ofﬁcers present concurred in the record which has been made.
Although, involuntary confessions are mandatorily inadmissible
' incriminating facts discovered in consequence of an inadmissible
' confession may be received. ‘
Comment
In R. v. Warickshaﬂ (1793) l leach 263, a woman, who was charged
as an accessory after the fact of theft and a receiver of stolen goods, was
improperly induced to make a confession, in the course of which she said
the pr0perty in question was in her lodging where it was in fact found. The
Court held that the confesﬁon was inadmissible but:
“This principle respecting confession has no application whatever as to
the admission or rejection of facts, whether the kn'owledg of them be
obtained in conﬁdence or by an extorted confession or whether it arises
from any other source; the fact, if it exists at all, must exist invariably in
the same manner whedrer the confess'on from which it derives be in other
respects true or false. Facts thus obtained however, must. be fully and
satisfactorily proved without calling in the aid of any part of the confession
from which they may have been derived.” ‘
Ever since this decision it has been regarded as settled that facts
discovered in consequence of an inadmimible confession may be received in
evidence. There is some difﬁculty and conﬂict, however, on the issue as to
how far, if at all, any part of the confess’on which is conﬁrmed by the
discovery of the facts mentioned by the aeoused can be admitted. Professor
Cross (Evidence page 269) concludes his careful analysis of the authorities
by saying “the only statement that can conﬁdently be made on the basis of
the English authorities is that facts discovered in consequence of an
inadmissible confesa'on may certainly be proved in evidence if their
relevance can be established without'resorting to any part of the confession,
and the cases conflict so far as the admissibility of the part of the
confession showing the accused’s knowledge of those facts is concerned.”
Police ofﬁcers_should be encouraged wherever reasonably practical to
make a tape recording of interrogations undertaken by them.
Comment
This has become ,a relativelycommorr practice in overseas police forces
and attention has been focused on the matter by remarks made by Mr
Justice Sholl of the Victorian Supreme Court and it seems likely that action
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along the lines of the proposition will certainly be taken in the immediate
future in Victoria. In ex parte Molinari (1962) V.R. 168 Mr Justice Sholl
said: ‘
“Many judges, I venture to think, are satisﬁed that some violence is
inﬂicted by some police in police premises from time to time ..........
No doubt it is not nearly as common as some persons believe or as accused
persons allege. But a few police ofﬁcers, acting improperly, necessarily
affect the standing and credibility of all in the eye of the tribunal which
has to deal with an allegation of intimidation by the police. As is
frequently and correctly said, such an allegation is easy to make, and
difﬁcult to disprove, and is very tempting as a possible means of escape
from a genuine confession which a wrongdoer has subsequently — perhaps
after obtaining legal advice — repented of having made. Nonetheless, my
own approach to such a question is, I am bound to say, now considerably
affected by the consideration that police ofﬁcers do not avail themselves of
other means of recording interviews with accused persons, even in
circumstances where such facilities would be available, a course which would
go a long way towards reassuring the tribunals to. which they are
subsequently recounted, certainly judgs and, in my Opinion, juries too. For
example, the tape recording of such interviews, used overseas according to
one’s reading, has not to my knowledge been used here ....... One thing
I am certain of, and that is that interviews so proved would seem to the
courts far more real and would carry a far more satisfactory assurance of
accuracy than does most of the present verbal testimony of police ofﬁcers
relating to interviews of which they have recorded their own versions for
the police brief, subsequently learning them by heart, so far as possible, in
order to repeat them in court ....... I have drawn attention to these
matters because I regard this case as touching upon a real and important
problem in judicial proceedings on the criminal side of the, courts.”
_Any doubts that may have at one time existed as to the admissibility
of tape recordings in evidence have been authoritatively resolved in favour
of admissibility. (R. v. Duvets (I957) 74 WN. (N.S.W.) 484: Hopes v. Her
Majesty’s Advocate (1960) S.LT. 264: R. v. MiIIs (1962) 3 All E.R.) In the
most recent decision of the English Court of Criminal Appeal, R. v. Maqsud
Ali (1965) 2 All ER. 464 the Court said: '
“For many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence
on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that
the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched. The prints as seen
represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and
chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars
which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been
admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting and
recording conversations. We can see no difference in principle between a
tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as
saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it
does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages
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to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the acc
uracy of
the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly i
dentiﬁed:
provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admis
sible, we are
satisﬁed that a tape recording is admim'ble in evidence.”
Objections to admission of tape recordings:
(a) One of the most frequent objections to a tape recording is that
they constitute secondary evidence and are therefore not admissible und
er
the best evidence rule. In many situations a witness hears a statement mad
e
and the statement is also recorded and the question naturally arises
as to
what is the best evidence of the statement. In the United States differe
nt
answers to“this question have been given. Some State Courts hold that the
witness’s testimony as to what he heard is the primary evidence despite t
he
fact that the same matter was. incorporated in a sound recording while
other States adopt the. view that the best evidence of a statement by a
witness is the properly authenticated voice recording a‘nce one hears the
witness’s own voice with inﬂections. and overtones which cannot be
reproduced in any other way.
(b) One of the inherent weaknesses of tape recording is the ease with
which alterations may be made either intentionally or by mistake. The tape
may be altered by an inexperienced operator unconsciously erasing part of
the recording or by an unscrupulous operator erasing parts and cleverly
inserting new material in place of the missing part. Thus alteration may be
both negative and positive. As a condition of admiw'bility it should be
demonstrated that the recording has not been altered in‘any manner. The
party offering the recording should make a proper showing that no changes,
deletions or additions to the recording have been made. .
. T. B. Radley (Recording as Testimony to Truth 1954 Criminal Law .
Réview 96) makes some interesting suggestions as to how forgery could be
prevented. He sugests ;that it would be possible to imprint on the tape
used for police work a ﬁne pattern which ran through its whole length, and
by simple measurement it would be readily possible to determine whether
the tape had been cut or not, because the pattern would be hard to match
just as the scroll patterns on a pormd note are. He suggsts. that a better
method would be “to superimpose upon the magnetisations due to speech
when the recording is made, other rnagnetisations of a similar complicated
nonlrepeating wave pattern. Before the recording could then be played at all
to make speech again the superimposed magnetic wave pattern would have
to be unscrarnbled from it. All this could be managed, and it would in fact
make forgery very difficult.”
He also warns of the danger of employing means which look safe‘ and
are not and gives examples of those. He concludes that the essence of any
safeguard which is at once real and understandable seems to lie in
physically guarding the tape as soon as the’recording has been made on it;
and making sure that it is under: guard until it is needed for a lawful
occasion.
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(c) It is also objected that tape recorders would not always be
- available and that the person being questioned may be inhibited by the
presence of a tape recorder. As to the former it is not suggested that tape
recorders should always be used but only where such means are reasonably
available. In many circumstances this would not be the position, particularly
outside the metropolitan area. As to the latter it seems unlikely that a
person being questionedwill be more inhibited by a tape recorder than by
having his statement taken down by a shorthand writer or typist.
.Advantages of Tape Recordings:
1. The spoken word is not necessarily inferior to the written word
as a vehicle of truth. A written confession can never obtain exactly all that
was said. A recorded confession does. It contains the questions from the
police as well as the answers to them and all the surrounding circumstances.
It might be awkward for either side on occasion but it would at least be
the truth.
2. A recording can be the means of arriving at a written confession
— a script could be made from the recording and used by police and
wimesses for editing into a ﬁnal form agreed upon by both and allowing
scope for thought, care and accuracy.
3. A recording does contain a whole range of material which is
beyond the reach of words as written down. It retains the way in which
things are said, not only the details of inﬂection and vocabulary but the
whole colour and shade of the speech. This is likely to be a help to judps
and juries in their task of trying to assess the truth.
, Illegally obtained eur‘dence, other than confessions, is admissible.
Comment “
The question of admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence has
not come to occupy a very large area in the thought of English or
Australian lawyers. This is in sharp contrast to the position in the United
States where since 1914 the question has been one of serious continuing
concern.
The English authorities, although few in numbers are uniformly in
favour of the reception of such illegally obtained evidence. The standard
attitude is that infractions of laW' should be punished directly if at all,.and
not subject to collateral penalisation by suppression of the truth. The
likelihood of direct punishment of such infractions of the law, however,
seems to‘be somewhat remote.
In Jones v. Owen (1870) 34 LP. 759 it was said that “it would be a
dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if we were to hold, -
because evidence was obtained by illegal means‘it could not be used against
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.a party charged with an offence” and in R. v.‘ Leatham it was said that “it
matters not how you get it, if you steal it even, it would be adrnissible' in
evidence”. ' - .
More recently in Kumma v. R. (1955) A.C. 197 the Privy Council
was of the opinion that if evidence is relevant it is admissible and it '
matters not how it was obtained. “In their Lordships opinion the test to be
applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is
relevant to matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not
concerned with how the evidence is obtained” (page 226—7). They
recognized, however, that the Judge always had a discretion to disallow
evidence in a criminal case if the strict rules of admissibility would operate
unfairly against the accused.
. There is very little other authority in England or Australia on the
extent to which evidence illegally obtained may be exluded on the score of
public policy in a criminal case. It is however of considerable signiﬁcance
. that Dixon CJ. in Wendo v. R. (1964) A.L.R. 292 commented:
“It is, therefore, unnecessary to deal with the controversial question
whether evidence which is relevant should be rejected-on the ground that it
is come by unlawfully or otherwise improperly. I do not think that in this
or any other jurisdiction the question has been put at rest by Kuruma-
v. R. " - i
x
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’ , APPENDIX 4
THE JUDGES’ RULES
The 1912 Judges' Rules
In 1912 the ﬁrst four Judges’ Rules were formulated and approved by
the Judges of the King’s Bench Division. These were as follows.
1. When a police ofﬁcer is endeavouring to discover the author of a
crime there is no objection to his putting questions in respect thereof
to any person or persons whether suspected or not from whom he
thinks that useful information can be obtained.
2. Whenever a police ofﬁcer has made up his mind to charge a person
with a crime he should ﬁrst caution such person before asking any
questions or any further questions as the case ,may be.
3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual
caution being ﬁrst administered.
4. If the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement the usual caution
should be administered. It is desirable that the last two words of such
caution should be omitted, and that the caution mould end with the
words “be given in evidence".
The 1918 Judges' Rules
In 1918 the following ﬁve additional Rules were formulated:
S. The caution to be administered to a prisoner, when he is formally
charged, should therefore be in the following words: “Do you wish to
say anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say
anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say will be”
taken down in writing and may be given in evidence.” Care should be
taken to avoid any suggestion that his answers can only be used in
evidence against him, as this may prevent an innocent persion making
a statement which might assist to clear him of the charge.
6. A statement made by a prisoner before there is time to caution him
is not rendered inadmissible in evidence merely by reason of no
caution having been given, but in such a case he should be cautioned 7
as soon as possible.
7. A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be cross-examined,
and no questions mould be put to him about it except for the
purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has actually said. For
instance, if he has mentioned an hour without actually saying whether
it was morning or evening, or has given a day of the week and day of
106 ' ' Working Papers
 
the month which do not. agree, or has not made it clear to what
individual or what place he intended to refer in some part of his
statement, he may be questioned sufﬁciently to clear up the point.
8. When two or more persons are charged with the same offence and
‘statements are taken separately 'from the persons charyd, the police
should not read these statements to the other persons charged, but
each of those persons mould be fumished by the police with a copy
of the statements and nothing should be said or done by the‘police
to invite a reply. If the person charged desires to make a statement in
. reply, theusual caution should be administered. '
9. Any statement made in accordance with these rules should, whenever
possible, be taken down in writing and signed by the person making it
after it has been read to him and he has been invited to'make any
corrections he may wish. ‘ .
'J
The 1930'Judges'kuza 7 -
" On 24th June, 1930, Home Ofﬁce Circular'536053I23 was issued
restating these rules and amplifying Rule 3 as follows to clarify the
meaning: , .
3 Persons in custody should not be questioned without the 'usual
caution being ﬁrst administered. The mere fact that a caution required
by the rules has not been administered does not make the statement
of a" person in custody in reply to a question by a policeofﬁcer
inadmissible. It is a matter for the discretion of the judg in the
particular case whether the statement should be admitted. On the
other hand, the requirement that a prisoner in custody should not be
questioned without being cautioned is not intended to encourage or
' authorize the questioning or crossexamination of a person in custody,
after he has been cautioned, on the subject of the crime for which he
is in custody and it has long been the practice for the judg not to
allow any answer to a question irnproperly so put to be given in
evidence; but in some caes it may be proper and necessary to put
questions to a person in custody after the caution has been
‘ administered. This is intended to apply to such cases and, so
understood, is not in conﬂict with or does not qualify rule 7 which
prohibits any. question upon a voluntary statement except such as is '
necessary to clear up ambiguity. ,
The 1964 Judges’ Ruler;
_ In 1964 the foregoing Judgs’ Rules were superseded by a new set of
Rules which were approved byla meeting of all the Queen’s Bench Judges
and were set out in Home Ofﬁce Circular ,No. 31/1964 (reproduced here by
permission of the Home Ofﬁce). '
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HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR No. 31/1964 —
I-I.O. 31(1964 Home Ofﬁce
F.2 ' ' Whitehall, S.W.l.
January, 1964.
'Sir,
I am directed by the Secretary of State to inform you that new Rules
'have been made by Her Majesty’s Judges of the Queen’s Bench Division
' with regard to interrogation and the taking of statements by the police.
These Rules supersede the Rules previously made by the Judges. They are
reproduced in Appendix A to this circular. v
2. The new Rules differ in certain important respects from the old.
It will be observed, in particular, that two forms of caution are prescribed
according to the stage which an investigation has reached. One is to be
given when an ofﬁcer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds,
for suspecting that a person has» committed an offence. After this caution
questioning may continue, but a record must be kept of. the time and place
at which such questioning began and ended and of the persons present. The
second form of caution is to be given as soon as a person is charged with
or informed that he may be prosecuted for an offence. Thereafter questions
relating to the offence can be put only in exceptional cases, where they are
necessary for the purpose of preventing or minimising harm or loss to any
person or to the public or for clearing up an ambiguity in a previous
answer or statement.
3.. As is made clear by the Judges, the Rules are concerned with
the admissibility in evidence against a person of answers, oral or written,
given by that person to questions asked by police ofﬁcers and of statements
made by that person. In giving evidence as to the circumstances in which
any statement was made or taken down in writing, ofﬁcers must be
absolutely frank in describing to the court exactly what occurred, and it
will then be for the Judy to dedde whether or not the statement tendered
should be admitted in evidence.
4. The Rules, which have been made by the Judges as a guide
to police ofﬁcers conducting investigations, should constantly be borne in
mind, as should the general principles which the Judges have set out before
the Rules. But in addition to complying with the Rules, interrogating
ofﬁcers should always try to be fair to the person who is being questioned,
and scrupulously avoid any method which could be regarded as in any way
unfair or oppressive. ‘ '
5. In Appendix B there is a statement of guidance for interrogating
ofﬁcers about various procedural points which may arise in the course of
interrogation and the taking of statements. This guidance has been drawn
up\with the‘ approval of the Judges.
. I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
C. C. CUNNINGHAM.
The Chief Constable. _
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3:, JUDGES‘ RULES
' Noi‘rs
. Theorigin of the Judges‘ Rulesis probably to be found in a letter
dated October. 26,1,906 which the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord
Alverstone, wrote to the Chief Constable of Birmingham in answer to a
request for advice inconsequence of the fact that on the same Circuit one
Judge had censured a member of his force for having cautioned a prisoner,
while another Judge had censured a constable for having omitted to do so. '
The first four of. the present Rules were formulated and approved by the
Judges of the King’s Bench Division in 1912; the remaining ﬁve in 1918.
‘ They have been much-criticized, inter alia for alleged lack of clarity and of
' efficacy for-the protection of persons who are questioned by police ofﬁcers;
.on the other hand it has. been maintained that their application unduly
hampers the detection and punishment of crime. A Committee of Judges
has devoted censiderable time and attention to producing, after
consideration of representative views, a new set of Rules which has been
. appr0ved by a meeting of all the Queen’s Bench Judges. ‘
. The Judges control the conduct of trials and the admission of
. evidence against persons on trial before them: they do not control or in
any way initiate or supervise police activities or conduct. As stated in
- paragraph (e) of the introduction to the new Rules, it is the law that
answers and statements made are only admissible in evidence if they have
' been voluntary in the sense that they have not been obtained by fear of
prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out by a person. in
authority, or by oppression. The new Rules do not purport, any more than
the old Rules, to envisage or deal with the many varieties of conduct which
mightrender answers and statements involuntary and therefore inadmissible.
The Rules merely deal with particular aspects of the matter. Other matters
such as affording reasonably comfortable conditions, adequate breaks for
' rest and refreshment, special procedures in the case ofpersons unfamiliar
with the English language or of immature age or feeble understanding, are
' . proper Subjects for administrative directions to the police.
.JUDGES’ RULES.
1' These Rules do not affect the principles
' (a) That citizens have-a duty to help a police ofﬁcer'to discover
'and apprehend offenders;
(b): That police Ofﬁcers, otherwise than by arrest,‘cannot compel
‘- any person against his: will to come to ,or remain in any police
‘ station;
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(c) That every person at any stage of an investigation should be
able to communicate and to consult privately with- a solicitor.
This is so even if he is in Custody provided that in such a case
no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the processes of
investigation or the administration of justice by his doing so;
(d) That when a police ofﬁcer who is making enquiries of any
person about an offence has enough evidence to prefer a charge
against that person for the offence, he should without delay
cause that person to be charged or informed that he may be
prosecuted for the offence;
(e) That it is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in
evidence against any person, equally ‘of any oral answer given by
that person to a question put by a police ofﬁcer and of any
statement made by that person, that it shall have been
voluntary, in the 'sense that it has not been obtained from him
by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out
by a person in authority, or by oppression.
The principle set out in paragraph (e) above is overriding and
applicable in all cases. Within that principle the following Rules are put
forward as a guide. to police ofﬁcers conducting investigations.
Non-conformity with these Rules may render answers and statements liable
to be excluded from evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings.
RULES
1. When a police ofﬁcer is trying to discover whether, or by whom,
an offence has been committed he is entitled to question any person,
whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks that useful information
may be obtained. This is so whether or not the person in question has been
taken into custody so long as he has not been charged with the offence or
informed that he may be prosecuted for it.
11. As soon as a police ofﬁcer has evidence which would afford
reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence,
he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned before putting to
him any questions, or further questions, relating to that offence.
The caution shall be in the following terms:
' “You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so
but what you say may be put into writing and given in
evidence.”
, When after being cautioned a person is being questioned, or elects to
make a statement, a record shall be kept of the time and place at which
any such questioning or statement began and ended and of the persons
present.
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III. (a) Where a person is charged with or informed that he may be
prosecuted for an offence he shall be cautioned in the following terms:
“Do you wish to say anything? You are not obliged to say
anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you say will be
taken down in writing and may be given in evidence.”
(b) It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the
offence should be put to the accused person after he has been charged or
informed that he may be prosecuted. Such questions may be put where
they are necessary for the purpose of preventing or minimising harm or loss
to some other person or to the public or for clearing up an ambiguity in a
previous answer or statement.
Before any such questions are put the accused should be cautioned in
these terms:
“I wish to put some questions to you about the offence with
which you have been charged (or‘ about the offence for which
you may be prosecuted). You are not obliged to answer any of
’ these questions, but if you do the questions and answers will be ,
taken‘down in writing and may be given in evidence.”
Any questions, put and answers given relating to the offence must be
contemporaneously recorded in full and the record signed by that person or
if he refuses by the interrogating ofﬁcer.
(c) When such a person is being questioned, or elects to make a .
statement, a record shall be kept of the time and place at which any
quemioning or statement began and ended and of the persons present.
N All written statements made after caution shall be taken in the
following mariner: .
(a) If a person says that he wants to make a statement he
shall be told that it is intended to make a written record
of what he says.
He shall always be asked whether he wishes to write down ‘
himself what he wants to Say; if he‘says that he cannot
write or that he would like someone to write it for him, a
police officer may offer to write the statement for him. If
he accepts the offer the police ofﬁcer shall, before starting,
ask the person making the statement to sign,.or make his
mark to, the following:
“I, ..... ' ............. , wish to make a statement.
I want someone to write down what I say. I have
been told that I need not say anything unless I wish
. to do so and that whatever I say may be given in
evidence.”
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(b) Any person writing his own statement shall be allowed to
do so without any prompting as distinct from indicating to
him what matters are material.
(c) The person making. the statement, if he is going to write it
himself, shall be asked to write out and sign before writing
what he wants to say, the following: ‘
“I make this statement of my own free will. I have
been told that I need not say anything unless I wish
to do so and that whatever I say may be given in
evidence.” 5 .
((1) Whenever a police ofﬁcer writes the statement, he'shall
take down the exact words spoken by the person making
the statement, without putting any questions other than
and: as may be needed to make the statement coherent,
intelligible aid relevant to the material matters: he shall
not prompt him. '
(e) When the writing of a statement by a police ofﬁcer is
ﬁnished the person making it mall be asked to read it and.
to make any corrections, alterations or additions he wishes.
Whenhe has ﬁnished readingitheshallbeaskedtowrite
and sign or make his mark on the following Certiﬁcate at
the end of the statement:
“I have read the above statement and I have been
told that I can correct, alter or add anything I wish. ‘
This statement is true. I have made it of my own
free will.” , 7
(f) If the person who has made a statement‘refuses to read it
or to write the above mentioned Certiﬁcate at the end. of
it or to sign it, the renior police ofﬁcer present shall
record on the statement itself, and in the present: of the
person making it, what has happened. If the person making
the statement cannot read, or refuses to read it, the ofﬁcer
whohastakenitdownshallreaditovertohimandask
him whether he would like to comet, alter or add
anything and to put his signature or make his mark at the
end. The police ofﬁcer shall then certify on the statement
inelf what he has done.
V. If at any time after a person has been charged with, or has been
informed that he may be prosecuted for, an offence a police ofﬁcer wishes
to bring to the notice of that person any written statement made by
another person who in respect of the same offence has also been charged or
informed that he may be prosecuted, he shall hand to that person a t
rue
mm of such written statement, but nothing shall be said or done to invite
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any reply or comment. If that person says that he would like to make a »
statement in reply, or starts to say something, he shall at once be cautioned
or further cautioned as prescribed by Rule 111 (a).
VI. Persons other than police ofﬁcers charged with the duty of
investigating offences, or charging offenders shall, so far as may be
practicable, comply with these Rules. '
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Appendix B
ADMNISTRATlVE DIRECTIONS 0N INTERROGATION
AND THE TAKING OF STATEMENTS
1. Procedure generally
(a) When possible statements of persons under caution should bewritten on the forms provided for the purpose. Police ofﬁcers’ notebooksshould be used for taking statements only when no forms are available.
(b) When a person is being questioned or elects to make a statement,a record should be kept of the time or times at which during thequestioning or making of a statement there were intervals or refreshmentwas taken. The nature of the refreshment should be noted. In nocircumstances should alcoholic drink be giVen. '
(c) In writing down a statement, the words used should not betranslated into “ofﬁcial” vocabulary; this may give a misleading impressionof the genuineness of the statement.
((1) Care should be taken to avoid any suggestion that the person’sanswers can only be used in evidence against him, as this may prevent aninnocent person making a statement which might help to clear him of thecharge. '
2, Record of interrogation
Rule II and Rule [II (c) demand that a record should be kept of thefollowing matters:
(a) when, after being cautioned in accordance with Rule 11,
the' person is being questioned or elects to make a
statement—of the time and place at~ which any 'such.
questioning began. and ended and of the persons present;
(b) when, after being cautioned in accordance with Rule Ill (a)
or (b) a person is being questioned or elects to make a
statement—of the time and place at which any questioning
and statement began and ended and of the persons present.
In addition to the records required by these Rules full records of thefollowing matters should additionally be kept:
(a) of the time or times at which cautions were taken, and
(b) of the time when a charge was made and/or the person
was arrested, and ~
(c) of the matters referred to in paragraph] (b) above.
1 14 '
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If two or more police ofﬁcers are present when the questio
ns are
being put or the statement made, the records made sho
uld be countersigned
by the other ofﬁcers present. - p
3. Comfort aid reﬂ-eshmarr
Reasonable arrangements should be made for the c
omfort and
refreshment of persons being questioned. Whenever pra
cticable both the
person being oustioned or mting a statement and the ofﬁcers
asking the
questions or taking the statement should be seated.
I .l .. ' '
4. Intenogra‘an of drildrm and young person:
_ .106 J '. ““ 3’»
- ' -
As far as practicable children (whether-suspected of crime or
not)
diould only be interviewed in the presence of a pment or
guardian, or, in
their absence,"soin“e‘ person who is not alp'olice Tofticenand is of the
same
axis the cliil‘diiA child or young person should notibe arrested,
or even
interviewed,‘ at sdrool if sudr action can poﬁbly be avoided.
Where it is
' found essential to caiduct the interview at school, this should be
done only
With? the consent, and in the presence, of the'head teacher, or
his nominee.
-. , i.-. .. .c,‘
S. Intenoyrtian of foreigners
In tin case of a foreigner making a statement inhis native language:
FM ‘é(a)':¢::’l'treiinterpr6ter:shorild take down the statement in the language
' in‘ which it is made. - '
3" » ~9:20») ﬂ'Aii ofﬁcial-“En‘dish trlrslation should be made in due
course and
n 1: r» The promise an exhibi’‘ ‘r with» the orig'nal Statement.
this. 2:15 dairiw ‘. ween: LEM" ‘ .- , ~‘..:
-.
'-‘(‘c)-‘- The foreighe? should sign the statemént at (a).
Apart nah; th'e'_qr’ns’ticn‘of apparent rmfairiress, to obtain the n‘gnat
ure of a
suspect to aiiErigliﬂi tians'latim of what he said in a foreigr langu
age can
have. little o'r"nc'-_v'alue as evidence if the suspect disputes the accu
racy of
this record of hisstatementﬁ ' ' ‘ ' .- '
‘
I. .
, 6. Supply to accused persons of written statemart of charges
(a) The following proadure should be adopted whenever a charge is
preferred against a person arrested without warrant for any offence:
'rAs soon as a char‘p has been accepted 'by the appropriat
e police
ofﬁcer the accused person shotrld be-given a written notice containing
a copy of the entry in the charge sheet or book giving particul
arsof
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the offence with which he is charged. So far as possible the
particulars of the charge should be stated in simple language so that
the accused person may understand it, but they should also show
clearly the precise offence in law with which he ‘is charyd. Where the
offence charged is a statutory one, it should be sufﬁcient for the
latter purpose to quote the section of the statute which created the
offence. ' . ‘-
The written notice should include some statement on the lines‘of the
caution given orally to the accused person in accordance with the .
Judges’ Rules after a diary: has been pre'ferred.‘it is Suggested" that
the form-of notice should begin with" the follbwing words: ‘ " '
“You .are charged with the offence(s) shown below. *Youe‘aie’inor
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do ‘so, but whate’ﬁgryou
‘ say will be taken dowii in‘wriﬂting en'd'rnay be"givén in evidence”.
. -- ' 21:1; fag-'25:. ‘.“’R .t. -.r-— " Hi” 1623131.
(b) Once the accused panda has appeared béroxe' the court it is 66:“
necessary to serve him with a written, notice of any rfurtherndmrge’srwhich
may be preferred. If, howevei', _'", police decide,,befoi'je he'hase'ppeai'ed
before a court, to modify the chirp ,"or to: preferﬂfurtherlcin'rpmh’tt'is
desirable that the person concemed'iiould be formally aihiﬁ'd‘ﬁt‘h'the
further offence and given a written copy ofl‘the‘chlary as soonn,es_it is
possible to do so having '16 "'“d to the particularurcunistaiiceé'bf’thecase
If the accused person has 'thfen bééhiieleésed 'éii'hail; it naysayers»;
practicable or reasonable to" piefer athe new ,chaib/ atdhceﬁ‘an’dinca‘ses
where he is due to surrender to his baiﬂiaim'fény'eight'héiiﬁ‘ﬁi‘mjgoeu} -
cases of difﬁculty it will be sufﬁcient for him to be formally arﬁ’gf'éa'vinm
the further offence and screed with_a written notice of theweharprafter he
has surrendered to his bail and before he appeiirs‘ béfo'r'e: the' eouh,’ -
. 7. We for eereeee . . ,2; :gs‘
(a) A person in custody should be allowed to Speakpn‘the telephone
to his solicitor or to__ his friends. providedjthatmo hindrance;is reasonably
likely to be caused to.the processes; of investigation, or the'admimstration
of justice by his doing so. '. . .l ' i. E. ’. '
He should be supplied on request with writing materialsand his letters
should be sent by post or otherwise with the least possible ~delay.
Additionally, telegrams should be sent at once, at his own expense.
(b) Persons in custody should not only be informed orallyof the
rights and facilities available to them, but in addition notices describing
them should be displayed at convenient and conspicuous places at police
stations 'and the attention of persons in custody should be drawn to these
notices.
\.
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'APPENDIX 5
Extract from R. v. RAGEN before McClemens, J. 23rd June, 1964,
Central Criminal Court, N.S.W.
For convenience, I set out in detail Instructions 11 to 16 of
Instruction No. 16 issued to the New South Wales Police. It will be
observed, although these adopt in substance the English Judges’ Rules, they
are much more detailed.
“11. When a Police Ofﬁcer is endeavouring to discover the author of
a crime, there is no objection to his putting questions in respect thereof to
any . person or persons, whether suspected or not, from whom useful
information can be obtained.
“The- Police Ofﬁcer, however, has no authority to exercise any
restraint whatever upon the person being questioned, or detain him in any
way, and such person is entirely free to come‘and go as he pleases.
“Whenever a Police Ofﬁcer has made up his mind to charge a person
with a crime, he should ﬁrst caution such person before asking questions or
any further questions as the case may be.
“Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual
caution being ﬁrst administered. The caution should be: ‘1 am going to ask
you certain questions. You are not obliged to answer unless you wish to do
so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be used
in evidence.’
.1 f‘12. If an accused person wishes to volunteer any statement, the
usual caution should ﬁrst be administered. (Mr Justice Darling, in R. v.
Cook .(1918), 34 T.L.R. 515.)
[See Reference Book — Judges’ Rules — Statements by persons
suspected of crime, or by prisoners in Police custody.]
“13. On arresting a man, a Constable ought simply to read his
warrant or tell the accused the nature of the charge upon which he is
arrested, leaving it to him to say anything or nothing as he pleases. For a
Constable to press an accused to say anything with reference to the crime
of which he is accused is very wrong. There is, however, no objection to a
Constable listening to any mere voluntary statement which an accused desires
to make, and repeating such statement in evidence (Mr Justice Hawkins
[Lord Brampton] on Police Duties: Reference Book — ‘Advice to,Police~on
duties and powers’). ' " ‘
“14. When two or more persons are Icharged'with the same offence,
and statements are taken separately from the persons charged, the Police
should not read these statements to the other persons charged; but each of
such persons should be furnished by the Police with a copy of such
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statements, and nothing should be said or done by the Police to invite a_reply. If the person charged desires to make a statement in reply, the usualcaution should be administered.
“15. No confession, admission, or statement can be given in evidenceagainst an accused person if it has been induced by any untruerepresentation made to him, or by any threat or promise held out to himby Police or prosecutor, or by some person in authority. It is not enoughthat Police do not offend in this reSpect; they must, as far as practicable,see that the prosecutor, or a person in authority, does not so induce aconfession or statement, and so cause a miscarriage of justice.
“If such an inducement has been held out, the effect of it can beremoved before the trial by a person in authority indicating the time andcircumstances of the inducement, and clearly causing the person to whom 'the inducement was made to understand that he must not allow anythingsaid previously to operate in his mind, and that such consideration mustnot be taken into account by him.
“When this shall have been done, and upon the person concernedstating he understands what has been said to him, and expressing awillingness to make a further statement, the Opening of such statementshould be set out‘ —
(a) The date and place of previous statements and to whom made.
(b) Steps taken (in detail) to remove such inducement; and
(c) That anything said on the ﬁrst occasion either did-not operateon his mind or no longer does so.
“16. A person charged or likely to be charged with an offence maybe asked if he desires to make a statement and if the answer is in theafﬁrmative, he should then be cautioned. He should then be asked whether
he wishes to write the statement himself, and if he intimates that he isprepared to do so, he should be handed the necessary writing material toenable him to do so. If he intimates that he is not prepared to write thestatement himself, he should be asked whether he desires the member ofthe Force interviewing him to write or type it for him. If the answer is inthe afﬁrmative the exact words used by the person making the statementshould be written, and nothing should be suggested to him as to what heshould say in the dictating of the statement. When he has ﬁnished dictatingthe statement, it should be handed to him to read, and he should be
invited to'make any correction he may wish. After he has done this. heshould be asked whether he will sign the statement, and if he is preparedto do this he should be handed a pen or pencil for the purpose. Thefollowing questions should then be asked and the questions and answerstyped (or written) at the foot of the statement:
118 Working
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Q. Have you read this statement? (In the event of the person making the
statement being unable to read he should be asked: ‘Has this statement
been read over to you?’) A. - .....
Q. Have you made this statement of your own free will? A.—.....
Q. Has any inducement, threat or promise been held out to you to make
this statement? A.—.....
Q. Were you cautioned before making the statement that you were not
obliged to make the statement unless you so desired, as anything you did
say would be taken down in writing and may be used in evidence? A.-. . . .
“Questions could then be asked for the purpose of removing any
ambiguity in the statement. Questions and answers should be written out in
full in the actual words used. The answers to all questions should, if
possible, be written in the handwriting of the person making the statement.
These questions should not be in the form of cross-examination. The person
making the statement should then sign the statement again after he has read
it or it has been read to him and any correction he desires has been made.
The signatures (m the statement should be witnessed by the ofﬁcer taking
the statement.
“All corrections in the statement should be initialled by the person
making the statement. Where the statement consists of more than one page,
each page should be signed by the person making same and also by the
witness. -
“Every precaution should be taken to see that the statement contains
only informaﬁon regarding one offence — otherwise the statement is
inadmissible at the Higher Courts.
“On completion of the statement the senior Police Ofﬁcer available
should,if practicable,be immediately called in to make observations of th
e
person making the statement and keep a record for his own information of
the time, place and circumstances, and should initial and date the
statement. A copy of a written statement made to the Police by a person
charged with an offence may be supplied to that person on request.
“Many persons, from psychopathic or other causes, confess to crimes
of which they are innocent; therefore, confessions to crime, should be the
subject of the closest examination before they are accepted and acted upon
as statements of fact. Before any person is charged with a criminal offence
on the basis of a confession, careful investigation should ensue to adduce
some independent corroborative evidence of the complicity of that person
in the crime. If no such corroboration can be found, a senior member of
the Service, preferably one with detective experience, should, if possible,
examine the position before a charge is preferred."
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statement until after consulting a legal adviser, the making of
the statement should be deferred for such time as is reasonable
in the circumstances, to enable the person to attempt to obtain
legal advice.
(0) There is no objection to a person, after arrest and while in
custody, being shown and allowed to read or given a copy of a
statement by some other person concerning the crime. Nothing
must be said or done by a Police Ofﬁcer in such circumstances
to invite a reply or comment, but if the person in custody then ,
desires or starts to make any statement, the usual caution shall
ﬁrst be administered.
(d) Questions may be put to a person in custody (after caution)
where Grey are necessary for the purpose of , preventing or
~ “4 minimising harm or loss to some other person or to the public
ynerally;
5. ‘ Statements Germany
All possible steps should be taken to ensure and establish
that any statement was freely and voluntarily made (and if
made after arrest, was volunteered), e.g. —
(i) by arranging, if pomible, for Police, other than those engapd on
the case, to be present while the statement is made;
(ii) by asking the person whether he wishes to write a statement
himself, and if so, he should be given the necessary writing
material to enable him to do so;
(iii) by accurately recording the complete statement, if verbal, in any
one or more of the following ways possible: writing, shorthand,
typewriting, tape recorder, or other means, in the presence and
with the knowledge of the person in question;
(iv) by adopting - the following procedure: when the person has '
ﬁnished making or dictating the statement, the record should be
handed to him to read, and he should be invited to make any
correction he may wish. After he has done this he should be
asked whether he will sign die statement or record, and he
shOuld do so, if willing. The following questions should then be
asked and the questions and answers typed (or written) at the
foot of the statement or record:
Q. Have you read this statement?
- (In the event of the person making the statement being
unable to read he should be asked: ‘
‘Has this statement been read over to you?’) A.— . . ..
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Q. Have you made this statement of your own free will?
_ A.—. . . . .
Q. Has any inducement, threat or promise been held out to
- you to make this statement? A.—. . . . .
Q. Were you cautioned before making the statement that you
were not oblipd to make the statement unless you so
desired, as anything you did say would be‘taken down in
writing and may be used in evidence? Ag. . . . .
All corrections in the statement should be initialled by the
'-per§on making the statement Where the statement consists of
more than one pap; each pay should be signed by the person
‘ making same and also by witness. Every care should be taken to
see that the statement contains only information regarding one
offence;
. (v) and by a senior Police Ofﬁcer, if pom'ble, interviewing the
person immediately after the making of the statement. Such
senior Ofﬁcer mould initial and date the statement and keep a
note of the time, place and cirarmstancos thereof;
(vi) a copy of the statement or record (whether aimed or not)
~ . . mould besupplied to the person or his legal adviser, on request.
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APPENDIX 7
SUGGESTED AMENDED POLICE INSTRUCTIONS:
BASIS FOR DISCUSSION
Prepared by — Mr Justice J. Mcaemens
(1) Preliminary to consideration of this matter we should have clear'
in our minds the distinction between administrative and judiciary
investigation. The judiciary should have no direct control of the
investi'gatory process and should not seek to impose Judps’ Rules on it.
(The basis of the admission of confessional statements is laid down by
section 410 of the Crimes Act and the decided cases. What is needed is
clarity as to what acts or omissions by the police will render confessional
statements admissible or inadmissible. {
(2) Care must always, I believe, be taken to avoid the da'n'pr' of 7
unreasonable and arbitrary limitations on investigations by police. This could
lead to (s) assistance to the gangster type or organized criminal with funds
and legal assistance at his immediate disposal, e.g., it would usually be the
suspect who least needed help who could always have his lawyer obtained
for the investigation if there was a right to have him present, and (b)
frustration and resentment among honest and able police ofﬁcers and (c)
rejection of bona ﬁde confessions for what are obviously instquate
reasons. -
(3) In our thinking on this topic we must asume (a) an efﬁcient
police force of integrity—without such a police force social defence becomes
impossible; to impose limitations in investigations on such a police force is
foolish; (b) a reasonable and easily workable system of regulations known
by heart by every member of the force who would be required tone that
they were complied with but which would be sufﬁciently elastic- to deal _
with unforeseen situations and those requiring the exercise of discretion; (c)
a commmsense judiciary with the acqu to differentiate those cam of
false claims of pressure and the odd pnuine case of pressure. 7' ’ r
(4) All confessional evidence is subject to two safeguards in the
Courts: (a) if the suggestion is made that it is not voluntary a separate and
independent examination of the evidence has to be made by the judp, in
the absence 'of the jury, who is bound to reject the evidence unless he
afﬁrmatively ﬁnds that it is a voluntary statement; (b) the need for the
direction to the jury that the weight of the statement is a matter entirely
for them; which means that, even if the Judge, having come to adecision
in favour of the voluntariness of the confession, admits the evidence, the
jury are entitled to reject it if they think it was obtained by pressure,
threats or anything of the kind. These elementary mles are too often
overlooked.
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(5) Undue limitation on the power of the police to investigate would
tend to elevate the interests of the person who is in fact the offender and
to diminish the interests of other suspects in the community, e.g., some
years ago I tried a matter in which every piece of circumstantial evidence
pointed to the husband of the deceased woman as being the author of the
crime. He was having a liaison, he could find no one to corroborate his
whereabouts on the morning of the killing and he had a serious row with
his wife just before he left home. He was suspect for many weeks, knew
that he was being watched by the police and yet it was only after the real
perpetrator of the crime had been found guilty of indecent assault that the
latter’s wife in a ﬁt of pique, told the police certain things, with which he
was confronted, and he confessed. Without this confession the other man
may have had to remain under suspicion for a long time.
T, (6) In drafting, the amended Police Instructions aloud be put on the
bas's that there must be a full and frank compliance with the requirement
that confessions to crimes should be the subject of the closest examination
before_,,they_ are accepted and acted upon as statements of fact. Before any
person is charged with a criminal offence on the basis of a confession,
careful investigation should ensue to adduce some independent corroborative
evidence of the iniplication of that person in the crime. Sitting as a judge,
of course one does not hear what investigation takes place by the police
but the conduct of Crown cases would give the impression that there is too
much casual acceptance of confessions without analysing them out and
seeing how far the other evidence available corroborates them. My
experience convinces me that evidence is very cogent which is either found
as a result of a confession or where the statement is made to a person who
is unaware that the assertions contained in the confession, or some of them,
are true.
(7) If all investigations by the police were made with courtesy and
scrupulous fairness there would be no need for the suggestion of the
learned Solicitor-General that if prior to decis‘on to arrest, the person being
questioned desires to consult a legal adviser, no legal obstacle should be
,placed in the way of his doing so and, that in that event, further
questioning mould be deferred to enable the person to attempt to obtain
legal advice by telephone or otherwise. Such a limitation could only tend to,
prevent the pr0per investigation and could, it is conceived, operate as the
“tip off” that the police are on a certain line. Once a person is charged, he
should have the immediate right to his lawyer but not before. The right to
introduce a lawyer at the early stag means that the adversary process is
brought into existence at a stage before the charge. Further, it would
operate adversely to the poor and humble, who could not be expected to
have easy access to legal .advice, and in favour of the wealthy and
experienced in crime.
Speaking generally, a lawyer introduced into an interrogation before it
has been decided to lay a charge will only advise the completely innocent
person fully to co-operate in an investigation but, .by the very nature of the
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case, if the circumstances against his client are suspicious, the lawyer when
introduced is only going to advise his client not to answer any questions,
and his presence can only operate adversely to a proper investigation.
(8) In my view there should be three divisions:
(a) the period of investigation
(b) the period after the decision to charge and -
(c) the period after the formal charge has been made.
Even after the decision to charge has been arrived at, there may be
good reasons why the arrest should not be made forthwith. But from then
on the suspect should be warned that he is not bound to make a
statement. Once arrested he should be taken without undue delay to an
appropriate police station (not necessarily the nearest) and charged.
Discretion should be left in the arresting ofﬁcers to give them some
legitimate leeway for proper investigations. This should not extend into
lengthy periods overnight or into the night if the person is taken into
custody during ordinary working hours nor the denial of food and ordinary-
comfon. It should also be made clear that there is no objection, piovided
there is no unduedelay, to taking the arrested person to a place to recover
property or to protect a person or pr0perty or to have place or‘ thiny
pointed out or identiﬁed. Where the charge is made by summons obviously
decision to arrest is immaterial but the decision to char: is. v .
(9) Once the formal chat; is made the matter moves from the area
of investigation to the invoking of the judicial process and the person‘
charpd should be at liberty to inform a suitable relative or relatives where
he is and to have a relative or his lawyer present at any further questioning
of him. . ‘ '
(10) As soon as reasonably possible after an accused person is
chargd, he should have the right to obtain, without delay, a‘copy of any
statements made by him. » ' - '
I (ll) So far as paragraph 2c of Mr Snelling’s Memorandum is.
concemed, _I‘ would direct attention to Instruction No. 9, paragraph 16, of
the Police Instructions which provides:
“Whenever a parent or guardian requests that he be permitted to be
present when. a juvenile in his care is to be interviewed or is maln'ng a
statement, such request should be acceded to unless there are good
reasons to the contrary. In any case, care should be exercised to see
that the interview or the making of the statement takes place only in
the presence of the senior member of the Police Force available, who
should remain present until the juvenile leaves the Station. Whenever
juvenile offenders are interviewed at a Police Station, every effort
should be made to see that they do not come into contact with adult
offenders (particularly those of immoral character); that the place is
an open one and that they are removed therefrom at the earliest
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practicable moment to their homes or to a shelter. Whenever a written
admission or confession is made in the form of a written statement
by a juvenile offender, the instructions laid down in Police Instruction
No. 16 para. 16 should be followed.”
In this area I think that there should be a discretion left to the police
who should, however, be required to note at the time the reason why the
parent or guardian was notpermitted to be prewnt and to append, in an
easily removable form, that note to the statement.
(12) So far as the mentally ﬂl or mentally defective person is
concerned perhaps it would be more suitable to have some provision made
by whichﬂiepoliceoudrttoberequiredtoascertainfromtheofﬁcerin
charge of the adrhism'on centre or psychiatric clinic or mental hospital where
the patient is whether he is ﬁt to be interviewed and capable of giving an
accurate sté'ry, and if he is,to arrange to havepresent a Medical Ofﬁcer or
other anior person attached to the staff of the hospital concerned at the
interruption. This would involve an administrative direction by the Health
Department?
-’ (13) Taken by and lary I wouldregard the existing Police
Regulatiéns -as.found in Instruction 16 para. 11_ et seq as being basically
adequ‘ate.- They' mould be simpliﬁed and lured as public documents, as
rules mde under section 12 of the Police Regulation Act. Every police
ofﬁcer would be bormd to know them and to comply with them; the legal
profewonwonld- know the rights,- duties and liabilities and they could be
so irnpliﬁe‘d''that it would be possible for every police ofﬁcer to learn
them ”off by'heart. A lot of the difﬁculties that arise from confessional
statements migit well be avoided if Crown and Police prosecutors in
presenting cases, emphasized the matters in which the statements were
corroborated, and if the need for corroboration in investigation was stressed
to remove the too frequent- attitude, “Well, he’s confessed it- now, what
need have we for further wimeasec?” Also the requirement of bringing
persons who have made confessions before the senior ofﬁcer present should
be regarded as a substantial obligation and not a mere formality.
1
DRAFT RULES
(1) When a police ofﬁcer is endeavouring to discover the author of a
crime he is at liberty to obtain a statement and put questions in respect
_ thereof to any person whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks
useful information can be obtained
(2) _ Unless a person is in custody on a lawful arrest a police ofﬁcer has
no authority to exercise any restraint whatsoever upon any person being
questioned or to detain him in any way and such person is entirely free to
come and go as he pleases.
gee .41.: -;« u ‘ N - "adiawk‘r
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(3) Whenever a police ofﬁcer has made up his mind to charge a person
with a crime, he should ﬁrst caution that person.
(4) An arresting constable, on making an arrest, ought simply to read his
warrant or tell the accused the nature of the charge upon which he is being
arrested, leaving it to the person arrested to say anything or not as he
chooses.
(S) If an arrested person wishes to volunteer a statement the usual
caution should be administered to him.
(6) Once a person has been charged it is improper for a police ofﬁcer to
interroyte him about any offence with which he has been charpd without
giving the person the opportunity of obtaining the presence of his solicitor.
No person who desires his solicitor present should be interrogated about
any offence with which he has been chargd in the absence of his solicitor.
(7) Subject to the provisions of Rule 6, a person in custody should not
be questioned about any offences in respect of which he has been arrested
without the usual caution being ﬁrst administered.'Where the police ofﬁcer
concerned has made up his mind to prefer another charge, the person
should be cautioned before being questioned about that matter. 3
(8) Special precautions should be taken for the protection of persons
unable to read, or to speak, read or write English. 0 -
(9) On completion of any statement made by a person suspected of a
crime, the senior police ofﬁcer available who should .wherever pessible not
be concerned in the investigation, should be immediately called in and
should ask the person making the statement whether it is his statement,
whether it was free and voluntary, whether he has any complaints in
respect of it and should initial and date the statement and keep a full
record in permanent form with the time and place and circumstance. If the
circumstances are such as to render immediate compliance with this rule
impracticable, it should be complied with as soon as is reasonably possible.
(10) A copy of the written statement made to the police by a person
charged with an offence must be supplied to-that person on request as
soon as practicable after the request is made.
(11) Where it has been decided to charge two or more persons with the
same offence the statements are to be taken separately and each of such
persons should be furnished by the police with a copy of the statement of
the other and nothing should be said or done by the police to invite a
reply but if the persons charged desire to make a statement such statement
should be taken but before it is taken the usual caution should be
administered. ‘
([2) Unless in answer to a speciﬁc request police should not read such
statements to the other persons charged except in special circumstances —
such as inability to read.
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(13) In the case of a foreigner making a statement in his native language,
an interpreter should take down the statement in the language in which it
is made and an ofﬁcial translation into English should be made in due
course and the foreigner should sign the original statement in the presence
of the interpreter.
(l4) Whenever a juvenile suspected of an offence is to be interviewed or is
requested to make a statement his parent or guardian should be informed
and if such person requests to be present at the interview such request
should be granted unless there are good reasons to the contrary.
(15) Where a person is a patient in a mental hospital, whether as a
certiﬁed or voluntary patient, such patient should only be interrogated or a
statement taken from him in the presence of a doctor or person on the
staff of the mental hospital and the senior police ofﬁcer present should
obtain from such medical ofﬁcer a certiﬁcate to the effect that the medical
ofﬁcer was present throughout and ‘ that the patient was ﬁt to be
interrogated or to‘ make a statement.
(16) Once a police ofﬁcer has made an arrest, the person concerned shall
be chargd as soon as is reasonably possible and should be taken without
undue delay to a proper police station and charged provided that he may
be taken in custody to a place to recover’or protect property or to protect
a person or to point out places and thing or to identify them.
(17) Once a person is formally charged at the police 'station he is entitled
to have his legal adviser present at any further interrogation upon any
matter in respect of which he has been so charged.
(18)' Once a person is formally charyd at the Police Station a senior
ofﬁcer shall forthwith inform him —
(a) that he is entitled to have any relative whom he may specify
informed ‘
(b) that he is entitled to have his solicitor informed
(c) that he is entitled to apply for bail
(d) that he is entitled to have a doctor of his choice examine him.
(19) It shall be the obligation of the police ofﬁcer‘in charge of the station
to:
(a) telephone the relative of the person charged
. (b) telephone his solicitor and
(c) telephone a person who might be able to give bail to the person
charged
(d) telephone the doctor of his choice — and he may, if he thinks
it proper to do so, enable the person charged to make a call
himself.
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(20) Once a person is charged with an offence there is no justiﬁcation for
refusing to permit him to be seen by any of the persons mentioned in Rule
18 unless there is good reason to the contrary.
(21) Where for reasons of security or for any other reason the ofﬁcer in
charge of a police station refuses to allow a person to see a person charged
with an offence he shall forthwith note in permanent form the reasons for
such refusal with a statement of the crime, place and circumstances of such
refusal and shall report such refusal to his superior ofﬁcer.
INSTRUCIIONS
(I) For an arresting ofﬁcer to press a person to say anything in reference
to the crime is wrong; however, an arresting ofﬁcer ouyrt to listen to
anything which the person arrested desires to say and make a note of it as
soon as practicable and if it is material, he may properly give evidence of it
(R. 4).
(2) Where a police ofﬁcer makes up his mind to charge a person with an
offence the person concemed should be aked if he wishes to make a
statement and 'if the answer is in the afﬁrmative he mould then be
cautioned. He should then be asked if he wishes to write the statement
himself and if he says he is prepared to do so he should be given the
necessary writing material to enable him to do so. If he states he is not
prepared to write the statement himself he should be asked whether he
desires a member of the force interviewing him to write or type it for him.
If he says he does, the member of the Force interviewing him should write
or type the exact words used by the person making the statement and
nothing should be suggested as to what he should say in dictating the
statement. When he has ﬁnished dictating the statement it should be handed ‘
to him to read and he should be asked to make any correction he may
wish. After he has done this he should be asked whether he will sign the
statement and if he is prepared to do so he should be handed a pen or
pencil for the purpose. .
The following questions should then be asked and the questions and
answers typed or written at the foot of the statement:
“Q. Have you read this statement? A. ......
Have you made the statement of your own free will? A. ......
Has any inducement, threat, or promise, been held out to you
to make this statement? A. ......
Q. Were you cautioned before making this statement that you were
not obliged to make the statement unless you so desired as
anything you did say would be taken down in writing and may
be used as evidence? A. ......" (R. 8)
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(3) Questions should only be asked for the purpose of removing
ambiguities in the written statement. Quesﬁons and answers should be
written out in full in the actual words used. The perén being questioned
should be asked to complete the answers to all quesﬁurs in his own
handwriting. If further questions are asked the person making the statement
should be asked to sign the statement again after he has read it. The
signature on the statement should be witnessed by the ofﬁcer taking the
statement and all corrections in the statement should be initialled by the
person makingthe statement.
 
(4) Where a person- who is mable to read makes a statement, the
statement mould be read over to him, if pracﬁceble by an ofﬁcer not
connectedwith the investigation and he should be asked: " -
“Has this statement been read to you?- . . -, - ~ s ,Iw
Do you tmde'rstand its contents? r . .
Does that set out accurately what you have said?”_ ‘- Li,X' c
The senior police-ofﬁcer referred to in paragraph (9) mound also himself
read the statement to the person making the statement and should note ’
that he has done so and that the person appears to understand it. .3”.
(5) Where a statement made to police with regardrto criminal charms
extencb beymd one pam of wriﬁng each pam should be aimed by the
person making the statement for- idenﬁﬁcaﬁon as conﬁrmation of its-
accuracy in the event of the statement being«knied or an attempt being ,
marbtoquahfyrtuni.~ ,- . ,. ‘
(6) Police should{clearly nnderstand that Rule (9)13- not a mere formality
aid the senior police.“ ofﬁcer edicemed should say nothing which might
summatacomplsintwillnotbelirtenedtoorthatthepersonwillbe
‘pqudimdbemum he-hsscon‘qiarned. lfacomplaintismade itshouldbe
forthwith reported to the ofﬁcer in charm of the district for proper action.
(7) It is the obligation of police where any persm is charmd witha
criminal offence on the basis of confession to male careful investigation to
wek to adduce some corroboraﬁve evidence and the «not: in charm of the
case should at an early convement time analym the statemmt fOr the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not any corroboraﬁve evidence exists of
any matter contained in it, particularly of matter that was not known to
the police at the time of the stabmart or found orrtas a result of it. Such
analysis should be available to the Police Prosecutor in the Court of Petty
Sesa'ons and to the Crown Prosecutor onany trial orindictment. -- '
(8) _Where no corroboraﬁve evidence an be found ofa statement a senior
member of the Service, preferably one with detective experience, should
carefully examine the statement to ascertain whether the confession should
be accepted and acted upon as statements of [hotbecause some persons for
psychopathic or other reasons confess to crimes of _which they are not
guilty
' not be taken into aecount by him. '” 'N
(14) When this shall have been done, andupon the persmconeemed‘
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(9) Wherever possible any confession obtained from a person suspected of
an offence should contain information regarding only that offence and a
separate statement obtained from him in regard to other offences. Failure
to comply with this Instruction could render the statement inadmissible.
(10) Where a request is made for the supply of a written statement made
to the police if possible a photostat copy ought to be given to the person
. concerned.
(11) Where a statement is made through an interpreter the person making
the statement to the interpreter and the interpreter should be seen as is
provided for in Rule (9) and the Rule should be carried into effect
(12) No confession, admmon, or statement can be given inevidence
against an accused person if it 'has been induced‘byany untrue
representation made to him, or by 'ariy threat or promise held outto him
by police or prosecutor, or by some ﬁersoh inauthority It isnot enough
that police do not offend in this respect; they must, as far as practicable,
see that the prosecutor, or a person in authority, does not“soinduce a’
. confession or statement, and so causea miscamagof justice.t.‘ .~ "‘5
dt‘ .. c; BC“.1?
(13) If such an inducement has been held out, theyeffect of it- can only be
removed before the trial by a person in authority indicating the time and
‘ circumstances of” the inducement, 'aid'clearlycausing-the) peisonmtowhorriv
the inducement was made to understand that’ he inust' notRallow-taﬁything
said previously to operate in his mind,endthatsuch cmsrderation must
.r‘ ' 3 . a: :if; .‘z _/;‘F
stating he understands what has been said to him, and expressing .a
wilhngnees to make a further statement, the opening of such statement
shouldbeset out— ‘ , «~.:. ,(. ,3
(a) The date md place of~pie'v_i0iis' statements lid to whom made;
(b) steps taken (in detail) to remove su'di inducement; and
(c) that anything said on the ﬁrst occasion either did not operate
on his mind or no lonpr does so. 9 “a: mi
(15) There may be circInnstanceswhereit isdealrablethat the parent or
guardian should not bepresentmat the interrogation ofa juvenile, eg. where
the parent or guardianWill seek to protect thechild or.puiWords into its
mouth or they have manifested complicity with the child in the offence. In
that event, if possible, an'ofﬁcer of the Child Welfare Department or a
senior teacher at the child's school should bepresent. In any case where
neither parent nor guardian, teacher nor 01in Welfare Ofﬁcer is present at
the interview or the making of a statement, this should take place only in
the presence of the senior member of the Police Force available who is not
associated with the enquiry who should remain present.until the juvenile
leaves the station. Whenever a written admission or confession is made in
the form of a written statement by a juvenile the instructions laid down in
Rule (9) should be carefully complied with.
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APPENDIX 8
Memorandum submitted by the Hon. Mr J. H. McClemens
Confessional Statements by Juveniles
The framing of a set of rules to deal with the obtaining of statements
from Juveniles (which includes young persons and children as deﬁned
by the Child Welfare Act) seems to me to be fraught with great
difﬁculties.
Obviously it involves consideration of the family situation of the
child.
A juvenile living in an established home with both parents who are
willing and able to undertake the care of the child, and who are not
minded to regard the breaches of the law by the juvenile as something
to be condoned or encouraged, poses different problems from the case
where the juvenile is neglected or uncontrolled or where the parents
are separated or divorced, or widowed or remarried, or where the
parents themselves will condone as against the Police any offence, or
are particeps with the juvenile in the offence.
There are circumstances in which the school is not in any way
involved, and others in which it is.
Already there is an Education Department Instruction 5.1.2.8. as to
Police Authority in Schools.
It reads as follows:
(i) From time to time ofﬁcers of the Police Department seek
to interview pupils during school hours. In this connection,
the Police Department has advised that “standing
instructions to the Police are that, if at all possible, Police
should avoid going to the school for the purpose of
interviewing a juvenile, and when it is necessary to
interview school children, such interviews, if practicable,
should be conducted at the homes of the children rather
than at the school which they attend”.
(ii) Further, the Crown Solicitor has advised that the principals
should allow the Police to question a child at school and
to take a child from the school without the consent of the
parents concerned.
(iii) Where it is deemed necessary to question the child at
school the principal should be present during the interview,
and it should be conducted privately. As soon as
practicable after completion of the interview, the principal
should advise the parent or guardian of the outcome and
in addition should advise the district inspector of the
relevant circumstances.
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This recognizes clearly that though Police visits to the schools should
be avoided, there are occasions where it is necessary. Truancy with
breaking, entering and stealing and offences committed in the school
are examples that immediately spring to mind. There must also be
circumstances in which criminal acitivity by adults outside schools can
Operate in and through the school.
Reference is made also to the existing Police Instruction No. 9,
which will, in my belief, have to be carefully considered before any
set of instructions involving confessional statements by juveniles can
be satisfactorily drafted, as will also the Child Welfare 'Act, and the.
Regulations made and the instructions given under it. Copies of these,
so far as material, should be obtained. ' ‘ . -
Though it is probably exagprated by the Press, the problem of drug
taking by juveniles is sufﬁciently important to necessitate that inevery part of me measures for the mppressionof pedanzthe Police
know where they stand as to powers and. limitationa in - the
questioning of juvenile drug takers. . .
The instructions in as far a they affect the ”Meier 'ﬁrveniles,cannot overlook the fact that the protection of 'the juvenileconcerned may be of prime importance. ‘ . . g
‘I- would suggest that the instructions should be framed so as to ﬁve
the Police a wide discretiOn', but taking into account:-. . _ . ._
(a). that in normal circumstances the parents shouldbe notifiedand
.be‘present if-d'esired;_ 1 x - , :
(b) that there must be circumstances of distance-(04., the child who V
is not at home or who is taken into masterly away‘from hm)
or of time'(e.g., practical inabilitytocontact the- parenr'or
inability for him to attend within a reasonable time) that must
. qualify consideration (a); ' ,. .. 3",?
(9) there must also, be 3! Widelmiery ogmm or"
which are adverted to in paragraph 2. abovexthat would render
it worse than undesirable for the parents to bepr'eae‘rrtg. ., .4-
(d) there are circumstances where early contact with theChﬁd
Welfare Department is desirable and the‘prem of a Child
Welfare Ofﬁcer proper; ' ' . J ' f ’ '.
(e) that there must be circumstances where the Police interrogate
juveniles at school; V. . . '
(t) the'need for elasticity and a wide discretioncar be seen from a
operusalrofPartXIVof are Child WelfareAet. '
'Obviously different considerations must apply to- the
interrogations of the juveniles referred to in Section 72 andtthe
cases to which 83 (l) and (2), and a fortiori 86 (l) and 87 (l), '
apply- ‘ '
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APPENDIX 9
: Memorandum byMr_J. M. Davis,
. Commissioner of the Commonwealth Police
Records of Interview
In the last .few years there has developed a considerable. amount of
pressure in certain parts of'Australia to have. aﬁrﬂcarrrempormeaus record
made of Police interviews- with suspects in accordancewith some approved
procedure. One; of. the...suggested methods is by recording the full
conversation by tape. ms was discussed at ﬁre Seminaron Hlnnan Rigrts
heldin Canherra irr 1963; ‘ _
There has developed anoﬁrer practice, uwd to varying degeec in some
of theAustralian Forces, of making a coatemporaneous typewutten record
of an interview with a suspect at a Police Station.
. This 9139‘???" was approved by liis Honour, Mr Jhstice Medemens of
the NewSouthWales Supreme" Court.in the cm of“Reg_v. Ragar (1964)
81 WN. 572.
341.325.; _;;.-.;, . ..,r -.,- .
. lt- is apparent gin-”reading. ﬁrat=.judynent that Iiis,.-Hmour was
enthusiastic about therecord of interview.mbcause as;-he said at pay 574,
‘ht is much more satisfactory to have put before the jury_a contemporary
document which is recorded, which cannot be dranipd, beau: itis there
a a permanent record, rather than to havea witnessstinginto the box
and gving evideuce.perhaps quitehonestlybutin respect:-of a. matter
.which, in .the.ordinary. way of humar nature, he has forgotten and which
he has set about,probably the. day hefore,,to,_leanoff by heart”. That he
had inminda“freqcontemporary record? tit-the'arterview- is. clear from his
use of these precise words on pay 58Q,-:—4“?!read the taking either ofa
full shorthand record so that the book' immediately comes into existence
r'mdfrornﬁrencnisalwaysamlahle,derarcurrrstanceswhereitcould
H
"neverbetamperedwiﬁr,oraﬁrll*cchtemporaryrecordofﬁrehrtervrew
signed by the pris'm'er atthe thin,broughtinto’ex'istenceso that where he
gptsacopyhnmediatelyandwherenahoelinotbetanperedwrthbemse
my pay ofrt~ccrrtainshrs signature, is a .veryyeat improvementon any
system in which- ohe has to relyentirely. atﬁrememory offthe individual
ofﬁcer concerned” . A -. -
:<.'1‘I ‘ ..'(l'.? '3 J til 5"" ‘- r.
'I‘hefactsofthecasein Rengagaralsosupportﬁnsvrewoins
-’lionours enthusiasm of the practice': as ﬁr'e‘i'evidence was that Rapn was
arrested at his home,cautioned; hard W710a PoliceStatim where
Serpant Parsons said to the accused: “I intend to air you certain
questions Iintend to have Det."_Connelly‘ztype my questions and any
'ansWers you may make. At the corr’cludorr of the interviw you may read
therecord and sigr rt rfyoummlwﬂlgrveyouacopyofthemtemew
- - and ask you to sign a receipt for it. Is that prowdure suitable to you?"
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The accused said “Yes”. What happened after that was, with Det. Connelly
typing, Sgt Parsons asking the questions and the prisoner answering them,
the document which is headed: “Interview between Det. Sgt Parsons and
John Leslie Ragen relative to the rape of Glennis Diane Magripilis at
Ieichhardt on 15th December, 1962” came into existence.
There was, therefore, a fidl contemporanebus record made in this case.
One can readily understand a practice such as this being favourably
looked upon by a Judge, a prosecutor or other Counsel as it would cut
down to a minimum the objections raised against “Police" evidence. But it
seems to me that this is looking at the problem from a judicial point of
view and from a different point of time than that which primarily concerns
the investigator. The Detective has, in addition to the responsibility of
serving the Courts as well as he can, a duty to serve the community in ,
obtaining information in order to clear up crime. In order to do this he
must ask questions of persons whether suspect or not. He must, I sugyst,
to be of the utmost use in the investigation of aime, remain ﬂexible.
In allowing the practice as approved in Reg. v._Ragen to develop into
a standard practice the question arises whether it may become too ritualistic
in its application. It has been suggested that one possible result is that the
ﬂexibility in the conduct of interrogations could" be undermined. -
Skilled investigators must, I think, continue to sum up. the person to
be questioned and apply methods best suited to individual cases. It is quite
well known that some suspects will become over-suspicious merely on the
production of a notebook let alone a typewriter and will, as a
consequence, be reluctant to answer questions. On the other hand by
removing the circumstances creating apprehension’in their minds these same
persons will answer questions of Ofﬁcers and will supply some information
of vahn. . - -, _ '
It would seem therefore, that should the practice as set out in Reg. v.
Ragenbe applied to all cases (its suitability to some cases would, of course,
be readily conceded) then Police interrogations would become formalised
and their pne‘ral usefulness possibly curtailed. ~ 1'
A further and more long-rang: consideration [have in mind relates to
the consequences the formalization of Police practices can have on the
ultimate use of Police in the ﬁeld of criminal administration. This, of
comic, formed the theme of Mr Justice Devlin’s book, “The Criminal
Prosecution in England". At pay 9 he said “It is part of the natural
growth. of an. institution that, having been brought into existence for a
purpose, it shapes and contains itself within miles for carrying out the
purpose and so becomes more and rmore formalized; eventually the
formalization reaches a point where, unless a function can be found for the
institution different from its original one, it ossifies into obsolescence;
meanwhile a new and informal institution grows up whidr discharges the
original task. All that I have said so far illustrates the application of this
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natural law. Each organ of inquiry into crime has begun informally and
with freedom to behave as it liked; each has gone on to make its ownpractice and then its practice has been formulated in rules. The preliminaryinquiry before the magistrates know a purely legal proceeding; it wasdesigned as an instrument of the prosecution‘for ﬁnding the culprit andpreparing the evidence against him; it has become a shield for the defence,allowing the defendant to ascertain precisely what the material is that is tobe used against him and relieving him from the expense and odium of atrial if in the judgment of impartial persons there is not enough evidence tojustify it. When the proceedings before the justices assumed this" character,there was nothing left "for the grand jury to do, and it was driven ﬁrst toobsolescence and then to death. There is'a constant drift, always in thesame direction, from unfettered administrative actiOn to regulated judicialproweding. Anyone who wishes to understand the part that the Police nowplay in England in the investigation of crime, needs to have observed andunderstood that drift; If he has understood it, it will not surprise him tohear that the Police have already in some respects become a quasi judicialbody. Beginning their work of inquiry as freely as the justices began theirs,_the Police ﬁnd themselves mine and more controlled by rules, partlyself-imposed and partly derived from the mandates and the judges”. ‘
The public’s 'iri‘tereshin interrogations Was referred to in the HighCourt case of Cornelius v. The King (1936) 55 C.L.R. at'pp. 251, 252,when the Court quoted with approval a statement by Darling, 1,, in R. v.Cook (1918) (34 T.L.R. 515 at p. 516); “It Would be a lamentable thing ifthe Police were not allowed to make inquiries, and if statements made byprisoners were excluded because of a shadowy notion that if the prisonerswere left'to themselves they would not have made them”. ' ‘
Furthermore in the casetof R. ,v. Jeﬂ'ries (1947) 47 S.R.‘ N.S.W. 284the then. Chief Justice of N.S.W. said: “the investigation :of crime and thebringing of malefactors to justice is a matter of paramount importance tothe community for whose protection against wrongdoers the Police Force isconstituted. Their investigations mot be carried out in silence andnecessarily involve a, certain amount of interrogation. A suspect may bequestimied and provided his answers are made voluntarily and no unfairmethods adopted by the Police and he is-made, aware of-his rights.,eunder' . his anest, such'questions and answers are properly admissible against him”.
__ And in the High Court case 'of the King v..Lee (82 C.L.R. at p. 142)‘Court alluded to the necessity for Police 'fully probing suspiciouscirdrmstances, including the questioning of suspects, in these words:“Indeed they may have been thought blameworthy had they allowed such athing (i.e. allow the murder suspects to go before being questioned). on theother hand they had a difﬁcultand important task to perform. They wereinvestigating a murder and they were bound as O’Bryan J. saidOto make afull and complete‘investigation into the crime .. . The Detectives werebound before they preferred the most serious of all criminal charges to seewhat, if anything, each suSpect had to say about the events of the night. Itis'very”difﬁcult to see any reason why they should not put to each thematters which caused suSpicion to rest on him or her”. '-
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(In this case some verbal statements and some written ones were made
to the Police.)
Also it is not without signiﬁcance that the English Judges in Rule I
laid down a principle which seems to have reﬂected the attitude of the
ordinary man in the street to the question of investigating crime.
I am aware that the record of interview procedure as a pr'o'ved By Mr
Justice McClemens cauld be niost beneﬁcial When. applied gy experienced
investigators (as in Ragen’s case) capable of selecting appropriate ﬁrﬁj‘ects
for its use, but in a Force With a gi‘eat piéﬁ'ori‘derance of y'dun‘g men ur'ider
10 years’ service working in plainclothes, as is the case in my Force, 1 ﬁnd
an added problem in training such young Ofﬁcers in the art 3? this
selection technique.
In view, however, of the ﬁressiiie' 6f some liidés 'for ta'p‘e' ie‘Eordir'iT‘gs
and of the decision of Reg. v. Rage): on the one haiid and the desirability
of maintaining ﬂexibility iii the liivesti'gatfrr oii‘ {its other, I have been
considering whether or not I should reco‘griiie, iri ifié‘tiircticnal form, 'within
my own Force three possible phases in police interrogation of suspects:
l. a verbal iiiterrogation phase in which no con‘terrlrpd'rarie'oius' aiéco‘rdis
made and which, may or may not according to theeirE't‘iinsta'nces 5f
each particular case develop into the second phase, when:
2. a contemporaneous record (by typewriter, shorthand néte' of ta'ﬁe
recorder) of the interview as envisaged in Reg. v. Rage» is made; and
then '
3. a written statement made by the suSpect himself in his own
handwriting or at his dictation giving his own uninterrupted version of
the matter is made. ’
The point at which phase 1 merges into phase 2 would dependcn the
judgment of the investigator in charge but generally‘ would depend on
certain preliminaries having been disposed of and the investigator in charge
having become assured that the procedure can be chanpd without valuable
information being lost because of the projected change of procedure.
In this way I would hope to maintain the initiative expected of
investigation and at the same time give some measure of asurance to
members of the judiciary that I am not ignoring the views of certain of -
their members expressed at times quite strongy.
In addition I would hope that my instructions would assist Police
under cross-examination to explain why in some cases a record of intérview
has been taken forthwith and why, in others, merely a verbal interrogation
has been undertaken without any contemporaneous record then being
attempted.
i
138 ' Working Papers
 
APPENDIX 10-
. Memorandum by P. G. McGonr'guI and D. Bennett
I Wmt of Arrest
'I‘he‘courseof legal history-cleariy shows the nature of thefrmctions
exercised _by magistrates. “From the end of the twelfth century local
,.krrjglits ~.and' gentry, .often described as' ‘keepers .of the peace’ were
occasionally called. upon.to cooperate with the sheriff .in enforcing law.
Their duties were principally of an administrative and police character”
(Plucknett). ', _ _- . .
‘ In the twelfth century the duty of apprehending criminals fell upon
all.- free men with special obligations upon .dreriffs and constables and
penalties; for' neglect addressed to the individuals, the township .or the
kindred. Ontlawry- and the hue. and-cry'were devices designedto apprehend
escapedfelons, and necessary. in the social content of small Scattered centres
of population. The bulk of the administrative- duties of the sheriff devolved
upon the justices of the peace with the establishment of their’ jurisdictions,
and among these duties were those of apprehension of_felons andraising the
hue and ‘cry. 'l‘he’early power was no wider than that of the ordinary
citizen: to‘ arrest if. they srrspebted on reasonable grounds that a felony had
been committed. The practice-developed in the‘seventeer’rth' and eighteenth
centuries of: issuingwarrants for arrest for felonies althoudr the suspicion
“is not in- himself but in the party that pays his warrant”. At the me
time, the custom of raising the "hue and cry was reduced to the issue and
execution of a warrant by the justices of the peace. In the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries the power of arrest was put on a clear
statutory basis. At no stage had the powers been other than part of the
executive function of the state. .
Okes writinghisMagisterial Synopsisin 1866 says of thenatureof ‘
. the duties of magistrates, “The authority of justices of the peace is either
ministerial "or judicial. 1he . ministerial functions of justices consist of
receiving informations or complaints for indictable offences, and for
,offences jor matters determinable in a summary way — causing the party
charged to appear and'answer, either by'summms or by warrant and taking
the examinations and bail as committing for trial . . .”. Here again it is clear
that the function of ‘muing a warrant of arrest was considered 'a ministerial
function. ' ‘ ’ - ‘
. , With regard to the suggstion that the magistrate in issuirig a warrant
is exercising a judia'al frmction, it should be borne in mind that “judi ' ”
is used in two senses: the discharge of duties exerciseable by a judg in
c'ourt; and the ' exerdse of administrative duties which Md not be
performed in court but in respect of which it is necessary to have a judicial
mind. (1) Both historically, and recently, the magisterial frmction in hearing
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committal proceedings has been considered ministerial, (2) although in the
more recent cases it has been considered that prerogative writs may lie to
supervise the exercise of this function. (3) Similarly it has been held that
the function of a magistrate in issuing a summons is judicial, in the second
sense above, i.e. is of that category known as “quasi-judicial" and therefore
subject to the prerogative writs. (4)
There are some obiter dicta that suggest that the function in issuing a
warrant for arrest is likewise “quasi-judicial” and reference has been made
to the equipping of the executive with powers of effective inquiry. (6)
 
1. Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Societyv.Parkinson
(1892) 1 QB. 431 at p. 452. '
Huddard Parker & Co. Pty Ltd v. Moorehead (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330 at
p.335.
2. Cox v. Coleridge 1 B & C 37.
‘ Huddard Parker & Co. Pty Ltd (supra) at Pp. 355—9, 383—5.
Ex parte Cousens; Re: Blacket (1946) 47 S.R. (N..SW.)145; 63 W..N.
228.
Ex parte Lyndon; Re: Cooper [1957] SR. (N.s..W) 626; 7'4 W..N
362. .
R. v. Schwarten; Ex parte Wildth [1965] Qd. R276. '
R. v. Dobwn; Ex parte Hatch (1968) 12 F.L.R. 1.
Ex parteDonald; re: McMurry (1969) 89 W.N. Part 1 (N.S.W.) 462.
3. R. v. Schwarten (supra).
Ex parte Donald (supra).
.4: Ex parte Qantas Airways; Re: Horsington (1969) 90 W.N. Part 2
N.S.W. 55.
Ex parte Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd; Re: Anderson (not yet reported).
5. Huddard Parker & Co. Pty Ltd (supra) at Pp. 351, 383—4.
‘
. . 6. [bid at Pp. 377—9.
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APPENDIX 1 l
SELECTION OF VARIOUS CASES CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE
" FROM TIME TO TIME IN TIE COURSE OF THEIR DELIBERATION
Bates v. Parmeter (1935’) 35 8111. (N.s.w.) 182.
anisa'e v. Leaehmsky (1947)AC 573(1947)1 A11 ER. 567.
aarke v. Bailey (1933) 33 SJ}.(113.91.) 303.
Camehus v.-. a, (1936) 55121.1; 235.
customs and Excise Commissioners v. Han (1967) l A..C 760; (1967) 2
W.L.R. 297, (1967) I All ER. 177.
Daﬂison v. came); (1964) 2 A11 ER 610; (1965) 1 Q..B 348;(1964) 3W.LK38$
beamv. R. (1969) 1 -A;‘C.- 30; (1968) 3 W.L.R. 58310968) 2 A11 ER.
‘ Gate "v.12. (I960)‘104 (2.1.11. 419'.
ibmhim v. R. (I9I4) A.C. 599.
King (Henna) v.‘R(1968) 3W.LR391; (1969) A.C. 304; 52 Cr App., R. 333. ..
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